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1 Introduction
One of the least understood aspects of human migration is the com
position of the migration flows. Numerous studies have described
migrant composition in terms of measures such as age, education,
occupation, income, employment status, gender, and more, but few
studies have actually attempted to explain or model such aspects. Why
do certain migration flows consist of relatively more men than women,
relatively more young than old, or relatively more skilled than
unskilled? We do not have good answers to such questions. The pri
mary objective of this study is to model the gender, age, and skill com
position of legal immigration to the United States.
For many years, immigration issues were not widely studied, pre
sumably because immigration was not an important source of U.S.
population growth, either absolutely or relatively. For example, the
foreign-born population increased by about 283,000 during the 1920s
and contributed only 1.7 percent of the incremental national population
between 1920 and 1930. The Depression discouraged immigration
during the 1930s, and World War II prevented immigration during the
1940s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the "baby boom," as it came to be
called, attracted far more attention as a demographic phenomenon than
immigration. What attention was directed at international migration
issues by economists during this period was mainly by economic histo
rians, who focused on the period of unrestricted flows, and by those
interested in the "brain drain," who were concerned with the flow of
high-level personnel from poor to rich countries (Greenwood 1983).
Immigration to the United States began to change dramatically with
the U.S. immigration law enacted in 1965 that opened the door to
immigration from Asia (which had virtually been banned since the
1880s). Because European countries were experiencing rapid eco
nomic growth in the 1960s, demand for entry from these countries was
low, and immigration from the Americas (especially from Mexico) was
becoming important.
These changes produced an immigration policy debate that became
more heated during the 1970s and (especially) the 1980s, and immigra
tion issues began to find their place in the mainstream literature of eco-
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nomics. The work of Barry Chiswick, who used census microdata to
study the earnings assimilation of the foreign-born, was particularly
noteworthy. George Borjas, who formed "synthetic" immigrant
cohorts using 1970 and 1980 census microdata to also study earnings
assimilation, further emphasized the importance of immigration in the
economics profession. Today, immigration issues are widely studied
and discussed in various social science disciplines.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANTS
Do immigrant workers cause a reduction of domestic wage rates and
displace domestic workers from jobs? This question has long been
asked in the United States. The United States Immigration Commis
sion, after meeting from 1907 to 1911, concluded that immigration was
responsible for many of the poor working conditions then evident in
the country. Bernard (1953, p. 57) felt that the Commission misrepre
sented the impacts of immigrant workers on domestic job opportuni
ties:
One of the most persistent and recurrent fallacies in popular
thought is the notion that immigrants take away the jobs of native
Americans. This rests on the misconception that only a fixed
number of jobs exist in any economy and that any newcomer
threatens the job of any old resident.

Bernard argued that immigrants as consumers cause an expansion of
the market and encourage increased investment expenditures, thereby
further contributing to increased aggregate demand. Moreover, immi
grants contribute importantly to technological progress and entrepre
neurial activity. Bernard is suggesting that immigration causes an
outward shift of not only the labor supply schedule, but also the labor
demand schedule, but he presents no reason why the demand shift
should dominate the supply shift. If the supply shift dominated the
demand shift, the consequence would be that wages would fall and
indigenous workers would be displaced, though not to the extent that
would have happened had no offsetting demand shift occurred.
Substantial quantitative evidence suggests that the position advo
cated by Bernard may have prevailed in the United States up to 1900
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and perhaps even to 1920, during which time aggregate economies of
scale probably existed. However, opposing evidence also exists; for
example, Jerome (1926) showed that during the nineteenth century,
immigration rose during expansionary periods and fell during contrac
tionary periods, with the effect that immigration did not contribute to
unemployment as much as would be the case if immigration were not
so responsive to the domestic business cycle.
Spengler (1958), in a conceptual (rather than empirical) work,
argued that the main economic consequences of immigration are
derived from two demographic effects of immigration. 1) In the short
run, immigration increases the rates of population and labor force
growth, which in turns boost the rate of growth of output. 2) Immigra
tion also changes a nation's age composition, favoring working ages
and augmenting the nation's labor force, while reducing the depen
dency ratio (i.e., the ratio of the nonworking population to the total
population). Spengler recognizes that this second effect is also short
run, with the long-run effect dependent upon such factors as the size,
sex composition, continuity, and precise temporal dimension of the
flows.
Spengler (1956) also argued that the skill composition of immigra
tion changed as the sources of U.S. immigrants shifted from western
and northern Europe to southern and eastern Europe. The "first wave"
of immigrants (see p. 37) had served as a catalyst in U.S. economic
growth, since it included many innovators and entrepreneurs. He con
tends that the "second wave" of immigrants, on the other hand, origi
nated primarily in relatively underdeveloped, agriculturally oriented
economies, and those immigrants tended to be illiterate and lacking in
occupational and industrial skills. However, with American industry
becoming more mechanized at about the same time as their arrival, this
wave of immigrants satisfied the growing demand for unskilled labor
in the nation's cities. Thus, the "second wave" performed a more or
less passive role in U.S. economic development.
In general, historical evidence suggests that the direct consequence
of immigration was to affect adversely the wages and working condi
tions of less-skilled domestic workers. As Williamson (1982, p. 254)
wrote, "surely, in the absence of mass migrations, the real wage would
have risen faster and inequality trends would have been less pro
nounced." Indirectly, however, the effects of immigration may have
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been strongly positive. Economies of scale may have been increasing
in the aggregate until the early years of the twentieth century, and
immigration may have contributed to the faster achievement of these
economies. Moreover, immigration's impacts on land and mineral
development, as well as on capital accumulation and the general
growth of markets, may well have been positive. Hill (1975), studying
the period 1840-1880, concludes that the existence of a 10 percent
economy of scale would cause observed immigration over the period to
increase per capita income by 3.1 percent.
Finally, Williamson (1982) stressed the idea of the "absorptive
capacity" of permanent immigrant settlement in the United States,
referring to the effects of immigrants on the wages of domestic work
ers. If absorptive capacity is high, immigration will have little if any
depressing effect on wages. Absorptive capacity is high if the native
labor force has high supply elasticities (i.e., native secondary workers
are crowded out of the labor force), if demand elasticities are high, and,
in a dynamic model, if a high elasticity of response of land and capital
with respect to immigration prevails. Quantitatively, the forces that
presently underlie absorptive capacity may be considerably different
than they were historically.
The debate today frequently focuses on illegal alien immigrants
(although it could as well focus on less-skilled immigrants in general),
and widespread disagreement exists about the effects of immigrants on
native-born workers. Briggs (1975a, 1975b) has expressed what might
be called the "replacement hypothesis," asserting that illegal aliens
depress local wage levels and take jobs that would otherwise be held
by native workers. Hartley (1972, p. 66) supports this view, arguing
that illegal aliens "displace low income American workers, hampering
unionizing efforts, encourage employers to disregard wage, hours, and
working conditions statutes and generally depress the labor market."
Other writers have put forth what might be called the "segmentation
hypothesis." Abrams and Abrams (1975), for example, have taken a
position that the jobs filled by illegal aliens are not at the expense of
native workers. They argue that the labor market is sufficiently seg
mented that American workers are insulated from direct employment
effects caused by immigrants. 1 Piore (1979) has pressed this argument
even further by arguing that one component of labor demand in
advanced industrial societies is for jobs that are simply undesirable to
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the native labor force. As a consequence of this demand and the failure
of the native labor force to meet the demand, a migrant labor market
develops and thrives. Marshall (1986) has taken an intermediate posi
tion, arguing that while it would be unrealistic to argue that illegal
immigrants do not displace any domestic workers, it would equally
unrealistic to argue that the displacement is one for one. The "contro
versy therefore is over the extent of displacement not whether or not it
occurs" (p. 26).
The most common approach to studying the economic conse
quences of immigration is the production-theory approach, which
essentially asks whether immigrants and natives are complements or
substitutes in production. The magnitudes of the wage and employ
ment changes due to immigration depend upon the elasticities of labor
demand and domestic labor supply, the magnitude of any immigration
quota, and other assumptions. In general, the more inelastic the
demand and supply relationships are, the greater will be the reduction
of domestic wages due to a given number of immigrants. Moreover,
the displacement effect will be greater the more elastic the domestic
labor supply is and the less elastic the labor demand is.
One of the most troubling assumptions of the production-theory
approach is that labor is homogeneous. Such an assumption rules out
issues of the differing impact of immigration on various members of
the native-born labor force. Borjas (1985 and 1987b) provided evi
dence that earlier immigrant cohorts generally do relatively better (in
terms of earnings) than both natives and immigrants in more recent
cohorts, thus suggesting that immigrant "quality" has been declining
over time. While this evidence is inferential, Borjas (1992) and others
(Smith 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991b) also have noted a decline in
observable skills, such as educational attainment, in more recent immi
grant cohorts. If U.S. immigration is becoming more oriented toward
less-skilled individuals, the most directly relevant demand and supply
elasticities are those in the low-wage labor market. Furthermore, if the
labor market is indeed nonhomogeneous, issues concerning the ease or
difficulty of transferring skills internationally (as well as those associ
ated with the economic adaptability of immigrants and their offspring
in the receiving country) take on added importance.
Studies that take the production-theory approach often recognize
that the short-term impacts of immigrants on native-born workers may
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differ from the long-term impacts. In the short run, physical capital is
fixed and time is insufficient to accumulate additional human capital.
In the long run, however, general capital accumulation and intersectoral shifts of capital may be induced by immigration, and the immi
grants themselves may invest in human capital. The domestic groups
with which the immigrants initially competed in the domestic labor
market may therefore differ from those with which they later compete.
The short-term effects of immigration should be to increase the rela
tive rates of return on factors of production that are complementary to
the migrants' skills and resources and to decrease the rates of return of
factors that are substitutable for those of the migrants. Thus, for exam
ple, if migrant labor can be substituted for native labor, the relative
earnings of native owners of capital will rise, whereas native labor
earnings will fall. A number of models assume three factors: capital
and two classes of labor, skilled and unskilled. Considering the case of
three factors of production and assuming a constant elasticity of substi
tution (CES) production function, Chiswick (1982) suggested that
immigration of either type of labor will increase aggregate per capita
income. 2 However, migration results in a decrease in the marginal
product of native workers who possess the same type of labor skill as
immigrants and results in an increase in the marginal product of both
capital and the other type of labor. Thus, if immigrants are assumed to
be less skilled than the average native worker, immigration will
increase the average earnings of skilled workers and owners of capital
and decrease the average earnings of low-skilled native-born workers.
The increase in the wage differential between skilled and unskilled
workers that results from the inflow of unskilled migrants will set in
motion another set of adjustments. Members of the indigenous popu
lation who were at the margin between whether to invest in more
human capital are now more likely to make such investments. As this
skill adjustment occurs, the wages of unskilled workers will rise rela
tive to those of skilled workers. Over time immigrants will also adjust
the level of their skills. Consequently, the initial impacts of the immi
grants may differ considerably from the ultimate impacts.
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EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE EFFECTS
OF IMMIGRATION
Aggregate Effects
A few studies have attempted to simulate the effects of immigration
on native-born workers by using relevant demand and supply esti
mates. For instance, Johnson (1979) argued that because estimates of
the elasticity of supply of low-skilled labor are close to zero, employ
ment among low-skilled native workers will fall only slightly due to
immigration, but these estimates imply a strong negative impact on
their earnings. In a later paper, Johnson (1980) postulates that in many
industries domestic wages are inflexible downward in the short run.
Consequently, immigrants who find jobs do so at the expense of the
employment of native-born workers. The rate of labor market dis
placement depends on the magnitude of various parameters. Using a
plausible range of these parameters, Johnson (1980, p. 335) suggested
"a labor market displacement effect that is only around 10 percent."
Using cross-sectional data for 1970, Grossman (1982) estimated a
translog production function to determine the substitutability between
capital, employed native workers, employed second-generation native
workers, and employed foreign-born workers. Based on measures
derived from factor-share equations estimated for 19 standard metro
politan statistical areas (SMSAs) for 1969, she concluded that "both
second generation workers and foreign workers are substitutes for
native workers, but second generation workers are much more highly
substitutable for natives than are foreign-born workers. In-migrants
substitute for second generation workers more easily than for native
workers" (p. 599).
Considering the effect of a 10 percent increase in the number of
legal U.S. immigrants and assuming that the wage rates of native
workers are downwardly rigid (as they might be in the short run), she
concludes that native employment would fall by only 0.8 percent and
wages of the foreign-born would fall by 2.2 percent. In the long run,
however, if all wages were flexible, native workers would suffer about
a 1.0 percent decrease in wages, second-generation workers a 0.8 per
cent decrease, and foreign-born workers a 2.3 percent decrease, but
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the price of capital would rise by 4.2 percent. Thus, Grossman (1982,
p. 602) concludes that "large inflows of immigrants ... do not pose
serious economic threats to natives, although the effects are not negli
gible."3 These findings are consistent with Borjas's (1986a) conclu
sion that during the 1970s, male immigrants failed to affect the
earnings of black men but had a small negative influence on the earn
ings of native white men.
Grossman's empirical results are now widely accepted, but her esti
mates must be interpreted with caution.4 Using a production-theory
approach but with a special form of the normalized quadratic func
tional form, Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1996) found that, in the
short run, an exogenous increase in the number of (recent) immigrants
causes the employment of native workers to fall, but the effect is quan
titatively small. This decrease in employment of native workers con
tributes to a short-run decline in gross domestic product, but this
decline is also quantitatively small. Because the rental price of capital
rises, owners of capital are better off. In the long run, the wages of
native workers fall only slightly. However, the wages of recent immi
grants fall considerably. The wage of nonrecent immigrants rises,
which suggests that recent immigrants are more like native workers
than nonrecent immigrants.5
Given the differences in underlying methodologies and data sets
examined and Borjas's inclusion of controls for the skill levels of indi
viduals, the similarity of the findings of Borjas (1986a), Grossman
(1982), and Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1996)—that immigrants
have had a very small (negative) impact on the earnings of the nativeborn population—is of considerable interest. Indeed, a recent study by
the National Research Council (1997, p. 5-23) concluded that "the
weight of the empirical evidence suggests that the impact of immigra
tion on the wages of competing native-born workers is small—possibly
reducing them by only 1 or 2 percent." These findings, however, imply
nothing about how quickly the economy adjusts to an exogenous
change in labor supply. Even though the resulting change in wages
may be small, adjustment costs may be large. 6
Moreover, in each study, different immigrant groups are aggregated
into a single homogeneous population. Several important issues are
raised by this approach. First, since existing evidence illustrates that
immigrants of different racial and ethnic background differ in terms of
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the characteristics they possess upon arrival in the United States, one
may question whether immigration's impacts on native workers differ
by race and/or ethnic origin. Furthermore, the various analyses deal
primarily with the impact of legal immigrants on broadly defined
classes of native workers. Therefore, their conclusions may be ques
tioned, because more finely defined subclasses of workers may have
impacts that are unidentified.7
Subgroup Effects
The impacts of racial and ethnic groups were studied in the 1980s
by, among others, Borjas (1986a, 1986b, 1987a), Stewart and Hyclack
(1986), King et al. (1986), and DeFreitas (1988). The conclusions of
those who have developed more or less direct evidence regarding the
aggregate effects of immigration on native workers (as a whole) refute
the segmentation hypothesis in its extreme form. Immigration appears
to cause a decrease in employment of low-skilled, native-born persons,
but only a small decrease. The wages of such workers probably fall
also, but again only slightly. Subdividing of the domestic labor market
and further refinements in classifying immigrant groups have led to
similar conclusions of negligible or, at most, very small immigration
impacts. Interestingly, these impacts are sometimes positive. DeFrei
tas' (1988) view of immigration, as a sequential process in which some
newcomers integrate into ethnic job clusters and, over time, disperse
from these enclaves to exert competitive pressures on low-skilled
native workers, seems to be a plausible explanation for some of the
observed coexistence of complementary and substitution relationships.
However, it should be noted that analyses based on 1990 data are still
rare. The large influx of the 1980s and its focus on California could
have changed the various relationships.
Others have studied the effects of immigrants on young workers.
Matta and Popp (1988) as well as Kimenyi (1989) argued that recent
immigrants are substitutes for low-skilled native-born workers. Wingarden and Khor (1991) found only small effects of illegal aliens on
teenagers' unemployment, but Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992)
found a significant impact of trade and immigration on the most disadvantaged U.S. workers.
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Industry-Specific Effects
Although the aggregate supply of unskilled labor may be quite
inelastic and the aggregate demand for such labor is elastic, conditions
may be considerably different in specific industries or occupations.
Consequently, while the effects of immigrants on the total employment
of unskilled persons and on their national average wage may be small,
the effects on workers at a subnational level could be considerable, yet
obscured in the aggregate.
Differences in age and educational composition, combined with
less-than-perfect transferability of skills to the U.S. labor market, con
tribute to an occupational distribution of recent immigrants that is
somewhat more oriented toward less-skilled occupations. The U.S.
workforce as a whole is considerably more concentrated in the mana
gerial and professional and in the technical, sales, and administrative
support occupations than is the new immigrant population; immigrants
are more concentrated in service and in operator, fabricator, and
laborer occupations. Immigrants who have been in the United States
for a longer period have an occupational distribution that is similar to
that for all U.S. workers, which suggests either that the older immi
grants had a different initial bundle of skills or that over time they were
assimilated into the U.S. economy.
Industry-specific studies have been conducted for agriculture (Duffield 1990; Mines and Martin 1984); manufacturing (DeFreitas and
Marshall 1984; Waldinger 1985; Maram and King 1983); and the ser
vice sector (Maram and King 1983). The many industry case studies
are largely descriptive (as opposed to analytical) contributions, but
taken as a whole, two conclusions emerge. First, in certain industries
located in specific regions, such as Los Angeles and New York,
employment displacement effects of immigrant workers are clearly
evident.8 These negative effects are frequently felt by earlier cohorts of
immigrants, but native-born workers also suffer job displacement.
Second, employers find immigrant hiring networks to be advantageous.
No study has specifically analyzed why these networks are advanta
geous, but we can infer that relatively substantial cost savings must be
realized through the use of network hiring.
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Region-Specific Effects
The concentration of the foreign-born population of the United
States differs considerably by census division and state. Whereas ear
lier immigrants of European origin tended to locate in eastern cities
and then spread out from there, contemporary immigrants from Asia
and the Americas tend to locate in western and southern areas. For
example, in 1980,40.9 percent of Miami's employees and 23.9 percent
of Los Angeles's employees were foreign-born, but only 6.0 percent of
Detroit's and 4.7 percent of Denver's. Such differential concentrations
of the foreign-born suggest that the economic impacts of immigrants
may differ in various regions of the United States, even though labor
and capital flows along with interregional trade presumably spread and
smooth the effects somewhat nationally. Studies of regional effects
have included those of Smith and Newman (1977), Davila and Mattila
(1985), Muller and Espenshade (1985), McCarthy and Valdez (1986),
Card (1990), and LaLonde and Topel (1991a, 1991b).
In general, the empirical evidence appears to indicate that in areas
where immigrant concentrations are particularly high (such as the
southwestern border and Los Angeles), some wage-depressing effects
are evident.9 Moreover, some job displacement also seems to exist.
These effects are most concentrated among the less-skilled and lowerincome native residents of these regions.
More research is clearly required to identify the markets in which
the immigrants compete, as well as to measure the relevant demand
and domestic labor supply elasticities in these markets. One observa
tion seems clear, however. The more narrowly defined the industrial
sector and/or the region in question, the more likely are investigators to
find negative consequences of immigration to native workers and ear
lier immigrant groups.

STUDIES BEYOND PRODUCTION THEORY
One of the major problems with most existing studies is that they
focus on a single channel of immigrant influence, the production-theory
channel; that is, they are concerned with whether immigrants and

12

Introduction

natives are substitutes or complements in production. However, immi
grants may also influence native workers through a number of other
channels, and these additional influences may offset or reinforce those
exerted through the production-theory channel (Greenwood 1994;
Greenwood and Hunt 1995). Another problem in many studies is that
labor and capital mobility are not incorporated explicitly.
The production-theory effect can lead to either a decrease or an
increase in aggregate labor income depending on whether immigrants
and natives are complements or substitutes and the size of the relevant
elasticities. Consequently, this effect can lead to higher or lower levels
of local demand in an area. Moreover, the greater the wealth of the
immigrants, the larger their sources of nonlabor income, and therefore
the greater will be the stimulation of local final demand in an area due
to immigrant settlement there.
Agglomeration effects—economies that accrue to an entire area
due to increased population and scale—are rarely considered in the
context of immigration, and the internal migrations caused by immi
grants' effects on local wages are also seldom focused on. These
channels of influence (and others) could be integrated into a single
model, and two recent studies introduce channels of immigrant influ
ence beyond the production-theory channel. The first of these is by
Altonji and Card (1991), who developed a structural model that in
addition to production theory includes output demand and exports
from the metropolitan region. Their local demand effect occurs
through increased population. Four skill categories of native labor are
considered, and each is low-skilled. Altonji and Card did not econometrically estimate many of their model's parameters, did not explic
itly include capital as an input, and did not explicitly incorporate labor
mobility. They estimated parts of their model with 1970 and 1980
census data for 120 SMSAs. Although their econometric results are
somewhat sensitive to the specification and estimation procedure used,
their preferred results suggest that "a 1 percentage point increase in
the fraction of immigrants in an SMSA reduced less-skilled native
wages by roughly 1.2 percent" (p. 226).
The second recent study that introduces several channels of immi
grant influence is by Greenwood and Hunt (1995). The main distin
guishing features of this study are that it includes capital, explicitly
models area supply-and-demand relationships in a structural manner,
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and incorporates several channels through which immigrants may
affect natives, including production theory, local demand (including
immigrant demand separately), net export demand, labor force partici
pation, and migration. Both capital and labor are mobile.
Greenwood and Hunt used the recently available Gross State Prod
uct Accounts, which represent a more comprehensive database than
that available to previous researchers, to estimate capital and output.
Simulation results indicate that although immigrants and natives are
substitutes in production, when other channels of influence are taken
into account, the negative effects stemming from substitutability in
production are substantially mitigated. Moreover, under certain
assumptions the effects on native wages and employment are positive,
which in turn leads to a positive correlation between native migration
and immigration (similar to the observation made by Butcher and Card
[1991] with respect to the 1980s). 10 However, increased immigration
causes somewhat lower wages among the foreign-born, which is con
sistent with previous studies using alternative models.

IMMIGRANT COMPOSITION AND ITS IMPORTANCE
Immigrant composition is important, because who is permitted to
enter may differentially affect the U.S. economy, native-born workers,
and prior immigrants. The economic consequences of immigration to
the United States are far-reaching, and they depend upon the character
istics of the immigrants. Given the fact that legal immigration is cur
rently at or near historical highs, the compositional aspects of the
immigrant population assume commensurate importance.
Gender is one of these important compositional aspects. Although
little research has ever been conducted on the economic effects of
immigrant females versus immigrant males, these effects are likely to
be considerably different. First, females are less likely than males to
be "economic migrants," or migrants motivated by economic advan
tages and costs. Female immigrants tend to have lower labor force par
ticipation rates and lower earnings than their male counterparts.
Female immigrants therefore contribute less to taxes (such as income
and Social Security taxes) than male immigrants. They tend to have a
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higher probability of part-time employment, and they sometimes com
pete in labor markets that are not common for males (e.g., day care, inhome cleaning services). Moreover, females have longer life expect
ancy than males, so those female immigrants who qualify for social
services and generally for social benefits (such as Social Security and
Medicare, as well as Supplemental Security Income) will, on average,
demand them for a longer period of time. Finally, the child-bearing
capacity of female immigrants increases the growth potential of the
second-generation immigrant population and the U.S. population as a
whole.
The age composition of immigration also is important. For
instance, the age at which immigrants enter the United States is a
determinant of the benefits that will be derived from their presence in
the country. Other things being equal, immigrants who migrate at
younger ages assimilate more rapidly into the U.S. labor force and
therefore, since younger immigrants also have more years over which
they contribute to the U.S. economy, they provide greater benefits to
the United States. Furthermore, younger immigrants tend to be more
proficient in English-language skills during their subsequent post-entry
years than immigrants who enter at older ages. Greater proficiency in
English-language skills further augments the immigrants' labor force
productivity and also facilitates their more general social and cultural
assimilation. In addition, the age composition of immigrants may
influence the magnitude of the costs that immigrant families impose on
the U.S. economy, since age composition importantly determines the
dependency ratio within newly entering immigrant families. Immi
grant families that arrive in the United States with young children may
impose costs on social service providers (such as the public school sys
tem), but the returns to these investments (such as to education) may
not accrue until many years in the future.
On the other end of the age spectrum, individuals who migrate at
older ages may constitute a net burden on the U.S. economy, since they
enter at ages at which their reliance on certain social services (e.g.,
health care) may be particularly high. Yet, age and human capital
accumulation (in the form of formal education and job experience) go
hand-in hand. Thus, in addition to implications for entrepreneurship
and technical change, the immigration of older persons typically
implies a potential direct impact on older native workers. They also
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have more nonlabor income, which more positively affects local labor
demand, and their greater assets allow older immigrants to actively
participate in housing and other (e.g., stock) markets. For these and
other reasons, the age of immigrants is an important determinant of
their economic impacts, but this aspect of immigration has not been
extensively studied.
Finally, the skill composition of immigrants has many potential
effects on the U.S. economy. The supply of highly skilled immigrant
workers is often stressed as a matter of critical importance to the main
tenance of a vibrant and competitive U.S. workforce in an economy
that is increasingly becoming more globalized. Moreover, in an era of
rapid technological change, highly skilled workers are necessary to
keep productivity at the frontiers of technological developments. Yet,
many of the studies that conclude that less-skilled immigrants have
small but non-negligible impacts on the least-skilled domestic workers
use data from 1970 and refer to immigration that occurred during the
1960s. Not only was immigration somewhat greater during the 1970s
and 1980s than during the 1960s, but it also appears to have shifted
toward less-skilled migrants. Several other studies have concluded that
more highly skilled native workers are positively affected or perhaps
are unaffected by immigration, again at least in the short run. In gen
eral, however, the literature is lacking in studies that identify precisely
why the more highly skilled workers enjoy short-run benefits. Such
benefits could result from factor complementarity, from the demand
effects of the immigrants, from capital accumulation directly related to
immigration, and/or from other causes.
In addition, migrant skill levels may be linked to many of the influ
ences discussed earlier in the context of the age composition of
migrants. Highly skilled workers are more economically productive
than less skilled workers. Therefore, highly skilled workers add more
to overall U.S. productivity, and their higher incomes contribute more
to the private sector in the form of consumption expenditures and to the
public sector in the form of tax payments. In addition to their higher
incomes, highly skilled workers generally have higher levels of educa
tion. By virtue of their education and innate abilities, such workers are
likely to be more proficient in English when they enter the United
States, and if they are not, to learn English-language skills more
quickly, and therefore they are able to assimilate more rapidly in the
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U.S. economy. Given the linkage between skill level and income/edu
cation levels, the skill composition of immigrants also may influence
the dependency ratio within immigrant families, as well as affect the
overall U.S. fertility rate in subsequent years. Crime rates too are
related to income and education levels. Therefore, the skill level of
migrants should affect the extent to which immigrants impose a net
cost on U.S. society.

OVERVIEW OF THIS STUDY
The research that is described here is based on a "human capital"
approach to immigration. Although we attempt to account for factors
such as political conditions and religion in source countries, much of
our focus is on the benefits and costs of migrating legally to the United
States. Such a focus entails explanatory variables such as relative per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and distance to the United States
from source countries of immigrants. Because all sorts of institutional
impediments inhibit free international movement, the force of eco
nomic incentives is blunted. Consequently, the models developed
below attempt to control for institutional restrictions in two ways.
First, we distinguish those immigrants who are numerically restricted
under U.S. law from those who are exempt. Second, we introduce a
number of "policy controls" as independent variables in our various
models. These controls reflect such factors as naturalization to U.S.
citizenship of persons born in different countries, as well as various
programs (e.g., lotteries) that may have caused deviations from other
wise "normal" admission procedures.
Perhaps the most unique type of variable included in the study is a
vector or set of source-country social program indicators. Four types
of social programs are examined: 1) old-age pension systems, 2) sick
ness and maternity programs, 3) unemployment insurance programs,
and 4) family allowances. We anticipate that because such programs
involve transfers or redistributions between various groups in source
countries, they influence the differential economic advantages of resid
ing in various countries relative to residing in the United States. Thus,
such programs will play a role in influencing not only the rate of legal
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migration to the United States, but also the gender, age, and skill com
position of the migrants.
As an illustration of our thinking regarding the importance of social
programs in source countries, consider unemployment insurance pro
grams, which involve transfers from older workers with lower unem
ployment rates to younger workers with higher unemployment rates.
In a typical country, the unemployment rate of persons in their twenties
may be three times higher than that of persons in their forties. The
younger workers also have migration propensities that are often three
or four times higher than those of workers 20 years older. Thus, the
benefits of unemployment insurance programs accrue differentially to
an age class that otherwise has a high propensity to migrate. Conse
quently, such programs should discourage migration, and especially
the migration of younger persons, while twisting the age composition
of U.S. immigration toward older persons. Similar modes of thinking
underlie many other social programs examined in this study.
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 sketches the history of
U.S. immigration policy, and Chapter 3 provides a brief history of U.S.
immigration. Chapter 4 provides details on the data that underlie the
models that are estimated in Chapters 5 through 8. Chapter 5 discusses
a model of the determinants of overall U.S. immigration. Chapters 6,
7, and 8 develop models of the gender, age, and occupational composi
tion of U.S. immigration, respectively; the models also distinguish
immigrants who are numerically exempt under U.S. law from those
who are numerically restricted. Chapter 9 provides a summary and
conclusions.

Notes
1. Also see Gordon (1975).
2. A CES production function requires that each elasticity of substitution between
input pairs be equal, which in turn implies that no differential pattern of factor
complementary exists.
3. Grossman's analysis is based on the assumption that characteristics of immigrants
are similar to those of U.S. legal, employed residents in 1969. Since these charac
teristics may have changed over time, the conclusions may also have to be modi
fied somewhat.
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4. Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1996) point out that her estimated production func
tion is not well behaved and that it fails to satisfy the required concavity condi
tions.
5. Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli suggest that the result appears to be consistent with
findings regarding immigrant assimilation that indicate age-earnings profiles of
immigrants that are initially lower than those of otherwise comparable native
counterparts, but after a period of years catch up with and later surpass those of
the natives. They are also consistent with declining immigrant quality over time.
6. Simon, Moore, and Sullivan (1993) report evidence of little or no observed
increase in aggregate native unemployment, even in the relatively short run during
which adjustment costs should be most severe.
7. Questions may also be raised concerning the relevance of the conclusions to the
assessment of the impact of undocumented aliens on domestic workers. For evi
dence related to impacts of undocumented workers, see Bean, Lowell, and Taylor
(1988), DeFreitas (1988), the companion U.S. General Accounting Office reports
(1986, 1988), and Grossman (1984).
8. The fact that case studies reveal the most negative impacts on native and legal
workers is not particularly surprising. Research employing the case-study meth
odology focuses on situations where researchers expect to find negative impacts.
Regions and industries where negative impacts are likely to be found are generally
known. For researchers knowledgeable about immigration in specific regions,
occupations and even firms where negative effects might be found are also well
known. Obviously, such knowledge frequently directs the researchers to cases
that show adverse consequences for native and legal workers.
9. Topel (1994) concludes that, in the West, immigration of less-skilled Hispanics
and Asian workers has adversely affected the wages of natives, especially lessskilled natives, thus contributing to the wage inequality observed in the West.
This inference is indirect, however, since the Current Population Survey data that
are used did not allow nativity status to be identified. Moreover, concerning the
possible sources of the increase in the wage gap between highly educated and less
educated individuals during the 1980s, Borjas and Ramey (1994) are unable to
reject noncointegration between the college-to-high-school dropout wage series
and the percentages of immigrants.
10. Filer (1992) describes a different pattern for the 1970s in which the location of
immigrants in various places encourages out-migration of natives.

2 United States
Immigration Policy
Immigration policy not only helps to determine how many persons
may enter the United States during any given year; it also helps to
influence the characteristics of U.S. immigrants: who they are, where
they were born, when they may come, and with whom they may come.
U.S. immigration policy has been characterized by three lengthy peri
ods during which different emphases were placed on admission crite
ria: 1) the laissez-faire period that ended in 1921; 2) the national origin
quota period from 1921 to June 30, 1968 (fiscal year 1967); and 3) the
family reunification period beginning in 1968.
During the laissez-faire period, essentially no quantitative restric
tions existed on immigration. Almost all persons were welcome to
enter the United States with the exception of the Chinese (after 1882)
and individuals such as criminals and prostitutes. Immigrants met at
least two critical and related economic needs during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. First, they allowed the frontier to be devel
oped without major labor shortages in eastern industrial centers, which
could have been one cost of developing the frontier in the absence of
immigration. Second, they satisfied the rapidly growing demand for
unskilled and semiskilled labor in the nation's cities.
Between 1820 (when immigration statistics were first compiled) and
1921, 34.5 million persons were welcomed to the United States, an
annual average of 337,843 immigrants. 1 The vast majority of these
immigrants came from Europe, where famine, religious intolerance,
political institutions, lagging employment opportunities, and relatively
low wage rates in one way or another encouraged their flight. More
over, many European nations were experiencing demographic transi
tions;2 rural areas were especially overpopulated. Vialet (1980, p. 7)
succinctly characterized the period: "The mass migration of the 19th
century was the result of a near perfect match between the needs of a
new country and overcrowded Europe."
During the second period of U.S. immigration policy, from 1922
through fiscal year 1967, 9.5 million immigrants entered the United
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States, an average of 206,875 per year, or about 61.2 percent of the
annual average during the laissez-faire period. This second period was
characterized by the national origin quota system, which allocated
visas in proportion to the national origins of the U.S. population, as
defined from various censuses.
Vialet (1980) attributed the adoption of the first comprehensive
quantitative restrictions on immigration (in the Quota Law of 1921) to
a variety of immediate causes, including the fear of a flood of refugees
from Europe following World War I, and the growing nationalism and
isolationism that followed the war. The report of the Dillingham Com
mission (Joint Commission on Immigration), which painted a fairly
negative picture of immigrants, undoubtedly also contributed to the
Quota Law. Moreover, the adoption of restrictions was reinforced by
what were at the time popular biological theories alleging the superior
ity of certain races (Congressional Research Service 1979, p. 8).
Although the national origin quota system was reaffirmed in 1952, its
philosophical basis was probably not one of racial superiority, but
rather of contemporary sociological theories relating to cultural assim
ilation. The 1952 act introduced a preference system that recognized
both needed skills and family reunification. In this way it was an ante
cedent of the Immigration Act Amendments of 1965 that were fully
implemented in 1968.
The Immigration Act Amendments of 1965 ushered in a new era
both for U.S. immigration policy and for U.S. immigration in general.
The national origin quota system was abandoned at a time when
national awareness of limitations on civil rights and civil liberties was
acute. The new system, which is described in detail later in this chap
ter, was characterized by heavy emphasis on family ties as the main
path to entry, although persons with needed skills and refugees also
were provided opportunities to enter the United States. Between 1968
and 1995, 18.2 million persons were admitted to the United States as
legal resident aliens, an annual average of 651,716. This average is
193 percent of that for the 1820-1921 period and 315 percent of that
for the 1922-1967 period.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
The Aliens Act of 1798 was the first federal law related to immigra
tion, yet it was not until 1864 that Congress attempted to centralize
control of immigration. This goal was achieved through the appoint
ment by the President of a Commissioner of Immigration who served
under the Secretary of State.
In 1875, Congress began for the first time to develop a policy of
direct federal regulation of immigration in earnest. Direct regulation
was accomplished by prohibiting the entry of undesirable persons
(criminals and prostitutes). 3 Moreover, Congress prohibited bringing
Oriental persons into the country without their free and voluntary con
sent and made contracting to supply coolie labor a felony. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers
for 10 years, provided for the deportation of Chinese who were ille
gally in the United States, and barred Chinese from naturalization,
among other provisions.4 This act was later extended, and in 1904 it
was reaffirmed and made permanent, with clarification of the territories
from which Chinese were to be excluded.
The Immigration Act of 1907, among other things, established a
Joint Commission on Immigration (the Dillingham Commission) that
was charged with examining the U.S. immigration system. The Com
mission studied the effect of immigrants on the employment, wages,
and working conditions of U.S. workers. In large part, the Commis
sion's findings were responsible for the Immigration Act of 1917,
which was a precursor of substantially more restrictive legislation
enacted during the early 1920s.
The first quantitative restrictions on U.S. immigration were pro
vided in the Quota Law of 1921,5 which limited the number of immi
grant aliens of any nationality to 3 percent of the foreign-born persons
of that nationality who were living in the United States in 1910 (based
on the decennial census of that year). The 1921 law had a clear effect
on immigration, especially that from southern and eastern Europe.
Table 2.1 shows the quotas that were in force for fiscal year 1921-22,
as well as actual admittances during this year. The quotas were restric
tive for virtually every country in southern and eastern Europe. For
example, Italy had a quota of 42,057 and admittances from Italy were
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Table 2.1 U.S. Immigration under the Quota Law of 1921 and Quotas
under the Immigration Act of 1924 for Selected Countries
1924

1921-1922
Country or
place of birth
Austria

Quota
7,451

Total
admitted

Percentage
of quota
admitted

4,797

64.4

Quota
785

Percentage of
1921 quota
10.5

1,563

1,581

101.2

512

32.8

14,282

14,248

99.8

3,073

21.5

Denmark

5,694

3,284

57.7

2,789

49.0

Finland

3,921

3,038

77.5

471

12.0

Belgium
Czechoslovakia

5,729

4,343

75.8

3,954

69.0

68,059

19,053

28.0

51,227

75.3

Greece

3,294

3,447

104.6

100

3.0

Hungary

5,638

6,035

107.0

473

8.4

42,057

42,149

100.2

3,845

9.1

3,607

2,408

66.8

1,648

45.7

Norway

12,202

5,941

48.7

6,453

52.9

Poland

25,827

26,129

101.2

5,982

23.2

7,419

7,429

100.1

603

8.1

Russia

34,284

28,908

84.3

2,248

6.6

Sweden

20,042

8,766

43.7

9,561

47.7

France
Germany

Italy
Netherlands

Romania

3,752

3,723

99.2

2,081

55.5

77,342

42,670

55.2

34,007

44.0

6,644
-

103.4
-

671

Irish Free State

6,426
-

28,567

10.4
-

Other

8,406

9,360

111.3

5,617

66.8

356,995

243,953

68.3

164,667

46.1

Switzerland
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia

Total

SOURCE: Congressional Research Service (1980), Tables 7 and 15.
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100.2 percent of this number; for Hungary, 5,638 and 107.0 percent.
On the other hand, the old source countries of the "first wave" of immi
grants in western and northern Europe had relatively high quotas, and
their admittances during 1921-22 were relatively few: Germany,
68,059 (28.0 percent); and Sweden, 20,042 (43.7 percent). In total,
only 68.3 percent of the overall quota of 356,995 was filled in fiscal
year 1921-22, the first year in U.S. history that general quotas were in
force. In 1922, the Quota Law of 1921 was extended for two years.
The Immigration Act of 1924
The Immigration Act of 1924 is one of the most important pieces of
immigration legislation in U.S. history. It made permanent the national
origin quota system and, in combination with the Immigration Act of
1917, it governed U.S. immigration policy until 1952. The 1924 law
provided that until June 30, 1927, the annual quota of any quota
nationality be set at 2 percent of the number of foreign-born persons of
such nationality resident in the continental United States in 1890. The
total annual quota was 164,667. From July 1, 1927, (but later post
poned to July 1, 1929) until December 31, 1952, it set the annual quota
for any country or nationality; the quota number had the same relation
to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the continental United
States in 1920 having that national origin did to the total population of
the continental United States in 1920.
The 1924 act was far more restrictive than that of 1921, especially
for countries of southern and eastern Europe. While the overall 1924
quota was 46.1 percent of that for 1921 (Table 2.1), the percentage for
countries of southern and eastern Europe was much smaller: Hungary,
8.4 percent, and Italy, 9.1 percent. For first-wave countries, the per
centages were much higher: Germany, 75.3 percent, and Sweden, 47.7
percent.
The change from a 1910 basis in the Quota Law of 1921 to an 1890
basis for defining country quotas in the 1924 law reflected nationality
and ethnic tensions in the country during the 1920s. The major wave
of immigration from southern and eastern Europe occurred after 1890.
By establishing a basis date from a census before this wave, Congress
effectively reduced the quotas of the new origin countries while main
taining relatively high quotas for the old source countries. In this way,
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Congress hoped to preserve what it perceived as the nationality and
ethnic balance of the United States as it existed prior to the second
wave of immigration. It was precisely this type of discriminatory treat
ment that later laws would attempt to correct.
The 1930s and the 1940s were not particularly eventful in terms of
immigration legislation. During the Depression of the 1930s, immi
gration was at a low ebb.6 During the first half of the 1940s, immigra
tion remained low because of World War II. In 1943, Congress
repealed the Chinese Exclusion laws that began in 1882. After the war,
immigration began to climb again, reaching 249,187 in 1950.
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act
(McCarran-Walter Act) over a presidential veto. In many respects this
1952 act was a continuation of the laws of 1917 and 1924. It main
tained the national origin quota system (though in a modified form); it
kept in place the Asia-Pacific-triangle restrictions; and it contained no
provisions to restrict Western Hemisphere immigration. However, the
McCarran-Walter Act lifted various racial bars to naturalization, which
removed race as a bar to immigration, and eliminated sex discrimina
tion in immigrant admittances. Moreover, the act established a system
of selective immigration that granted quota preference to skilled per
sons whose labor services met an urgent need in the United States. The
1952 act also maintained the policy established in the 1920s of exempt
ing natives of Western Hemisphere countries from numerical restric
tions.
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965
The national origin system had been designed to preserve the ethnic
balance of the U.S. population, but by the 1960s Congress began to
recognize that the system was failing in this respect. First, those coun
tries with the highest quotas were demanding only a fraction of their
quota numbers. Second, between 1953 and 1964, approximately onehalf million immigrants (of about 3.2 million total) were admitted
under various special programs as exceptions to the national origin for
mula, which in the eyes of some members of Congress essentially
resulted in the abandonment of the national origin system (Congres
sional Research Service 1979, p. 52). Between 1960 and 1965, of 1.7
million immigrants admitted to the United States, only 34.6 percent
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entered under a quota (Congressional Research Service 1980, p. 64).
Finally, public perceptions regarding race and national origin were
changed relative to what they were during the cold-war climate under
which the McCarran-Walter Act was passed in 1952.
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 were
passed in October, and most provisions of the new law took effect on
December 1, 1965. However, until June 30, 1968, certain vestiges of
the national origin formula remained operational, and during this tran
sition period, the unused quota numbers of undersubscribed countries
could be absorbed by oversubscribed countries.
Because immigrants who legally entered the United States between
1972 and 1991 entered under the terms and conditions of the Immigra
tion and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (with certain revisions
enacted after 1965), the 1965 law is especially important in the context
of the present study. This law had five major provisions.
1. It abolished the national origin quota system that had been estab
lished in 1924 and reaffirmed in 1952, thus eliminating national
origin, race, or ancestry as a basis for exclusion.
2. It established a seven-category preference system for numerically
restricted immigrants. These preferences (Table 2.2) provided for
the reunification of families—the first, second, fourth, and fifth
preferences, called the relative preferences—and for entry of per
sons with special occupational talents—the third and sixth prefer
ences, which have come to be called the occupational
preferences. (The seventh preference [not shown in Table 2.2],
which related to refugees, was eliminated by the Refugee Act of
1980 after it became clear that this preference could not accom
modate the flow of refugees who were being admitted under spe
cial legislation.) Visas not used in higher preference categories
could be used under preferences two, four, and five. Nonpreference immigrants were to receive any remaining visas, but after a
short time nonpreference visas were unavailable because prefer
ence visas accounted for the total allotment of restricted numbers.
Numerically restricted immigrant visas were allocated on a firstcome, first-served basis, but Western Hemisphere countries were
not subjected to the preference categories.
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Table 2.2 Immigrant Visa Allocation System (1968-1991)3
Preference/provision

Limit

Numerically limited immigrants: 270,000b
1st:

Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens and their children

20% or 54,000

2nd:

Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters
of permanent resident aliens

26% or 70,200C

3rd:

Members of the professions of exceptional
ability and their spouses and children

10% or 27,000

4th:

Married sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens, their spouses and children

10% or 27,000C

5th:

Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens (at least
21 years of age) and their spouses and
children

24% or 64,800C

6th:

Workers in skilled or unskilled occupations
in which laborers are in short supply in the
United States, their spouses and children

10% or 27,000

Nonpref.:

Other qualified applicants

Any numbers not
used abovec

Numerically exempt immigrants

Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
Spouses, children, parents of U.S. citizens
at least 21 years of age
Special immigrants
Certain ministers of religion
Certain former employees of the U.S.
government abroad
Certain persons who lost U.S. citizenship
Certain foreign medical graduates
Adjustments for refugees and those seeking asylum
a As presented, this table refers to the law in 1991.
b Except for immediate relatives of adult U.S. citizens, an annual limit of 20,000 is
imposed on each independent country.
0 Numbers not used in higher preference may be used in these categories.

Legal U.S. Immigration

27

3. It established a group of immigrants exempt from quota limita
tions: a) immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, i.e., the spouses,
children, and parents of U.S. citizens 21 years of age and older,
and b) special immigrants, including ministers of religion and
others.
4. It established an annual Eastern Hemisphere quota of 170,000
and a Western Hemisphere quota of 120,000. This was the first
time that the Western Hemisphere was placed under a quota.
However, the Eastern Hemisphere also was placed under a 20,000
per country limit on numerically restricted quota numbers, but
this country limit was not applicable to the Western Hemisphere. 7
5. Finally, it required that the Secretary of Labor certify that an alien
attempting to enter as a worker would not replace a worker in the
United States or adversely influence either the wages or working
conditions of individuals similarly employed in the United States.
This condition introduced a process known as labor certification
that was applied to the third and sixth preference categories.
The single most important aspect of the 1965 amendments was the
elimination of the national origin quota system, which had been in
place for over 40 years. The second most important aspect was to
bring the Western Hemisphere under a quota. The provision of a group
of immigrants exempt from numerical restrictions was not new, but the
three-tier system of numerically restricted immigration provided addi
tional structure; the three tiers are hemisphere quotas (later, world quo
tas), country quotas, and preference-category quotas.
The Immigration Act of 1990
With legal immigration rising during the 1960s and 1970s, and with
illegal migration thought to be high and perhaps also rising, the federal
government began to study and discuss various immigration issues
during the late 1970s. The result, in 1979, was a Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy that proposed sweeping changes in
the nation's immigration laws. During 1984, both the Senate and
House passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (SimpsonMazzoli Bill), but this bill died in the conference committee estab
lished to reconcile differences between the two versions. The Simp-
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son-Mazzoli Bill had three major provisions: 1) control of illegal
migration, 2) legalization of alien status, and 3) reform of legal immi
gration. When it became clear in the next (99th) Congress that the
entire package was not ready to be acted upon, the various provisions
were unbundled. The result was the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, which treated illegal migration, and the Immigration Act
of 1990, which treated legal immigration.
The 1990 act bears a strong resemblance to the 1965 law it
replaced. 8 Consequently, immigration under the previous law should
provide a reasonable blueprint for likely U.S. immigration under the
new law. Moreover, in a number of ways, the gender, age, and skill
composition of immigrants under the new law should resemble that of
their counterparts under the old law. For our purposes, the most impor
tant provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990 are the following.
1. The worldwide immigration ceiling was raised to 700,000 for fis
cal years 1992, 1993, and 1994, falling to 675,000 for 1995 and
later years. The ceiling is, however, flexible in the sense that
while immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are included under the
worldwide quota "cap," their number is unlimited.
2. Family-based immigration is guaranteed at least 226,000 visas.
These are allocated per year to four preference categories
(Table 2.3).
3. Employment-based preferences are allotted 140,000 visas annu
ally and are grouped into five preference classes (Table 2.3).
4. The family-sponsored and employment-based preference visas
made available to citizens of a single independent foreign state
may not exceed 7 percent of the total number of visas for that
state. Since family preferences are set at a minimum of 226,000
and the employment-based limit is set at a minimum of 140,000,
the per-country ceiling for independent countries is raised to
25,620. Moreover, at least 77 percent of the visa allotment
involving spouses, minor children, and unmarried sons and
daughters of lawful permanent residents is designated for spouses
and minor children, and three-quarters of these are not subject to
per-country limits. Prior to the 1990 act, the per-country quota
was set at 20,000.
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5. So-called "diversity immigrants" were allocated 40,000 visas
each in 1992, 1993, and 1994, with 1993 and 1994 gaining the
unused numbers from the prior year. The diversity quota rose to
55,000 per year beginning in 1995. Diversity immigrants are
those aliens born in countries adversely affected by the 1965 law
and their spouses and children. The 55,000 visas are to be allo
cated to natives of countries that have sent fewer than 50,000
legal immigrants to the United States over the previous five years.
No single country can receive more than 7 percent (3,850) of the
number available worldwide. To be eligible for a diversity visa, a
prospective immigrant must have at least a high school education
or its equivalent and at least two years of work experience in an
occupation that requires at least two years of training and experi
ence (and this experience must be during the five years immedi
ately preceding the date of application). Thus, diversity immi
grants are a kind of occupational immigrant, but without specific
ity regarding the occupation. Clearly, diversity visas have consid
erable potential to affect the source-country composition of U.S.
immigration.
Recent U.S. Policy
Until very recently, Congress has dealt with immigration through
specifically designed laws. However, during 1996, Congress wrote
provisions regarding immigrants into legislation that, at least on the
surface, had little or nothing to do with immigration. The best example
is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, which placed certain restrictions on the eligibility of legal
aliens for federal public benefits (although certain of these restrictions
were relaxed by Congress in 1997). Another example is the Anti-Ter
rorism Act, which provides for summary dismissal under certain cir
cumstances.
Ten years after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) in an effort to control
illegal migration, which was the primary goal of IRCA. The provi
sions of IIRIRA went into effect on April 1, 1997, but many of these
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Table 2.3 Categories of Immigrants Subject to the Numerical Cap:
Unadjusted and Fiscal Year 1996 Limits
Preference/provision

Unadjusted limit3

Family-sponsored immigrants
Family-sponsored preferences

FY1996

480,000b

56S,819b

226,000

311,819

23,400C

23,400C

2nd: Spouses, children, and
unmarried sons and
daughters of
permanent resident
aliens

114,200d

200,019d

3rd:

Married sons and
daughters of U.S.
citizens

23,400d

23,400d

4th:

Brothers and sisters of
U.S. citizens (at least
21 years of age)

65,000d

65,000d

1st:

Unmarried sons and
daughters of U.S.
citizens

Immediate relatives of adult U.S.
citizens (spouses, children, and
parents) and children born abroad
to alien residents
Employment-based preference
1st:

Not limited,
but assumed to
be 254,000

Not limited,
but assumed to
be 254,000

140,000e

140,000e
40,040e

40,040e

Priority workers

2nd:

Professionals with
advanced degrees or
aliens of exceptional
ability

40,040d

40,040d

3rd:

Skilled workers,
professionals, needed
unskilled workers and
Chinese Student
Protection Act

40,040d

40,040d

4th:

Special immigrants

9,940

9,940

5th:

Employment creation
("investors")

9,940

9,940
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Unadjusted
____Preference/provision____________limit3__________FY1996
Diversity

55,000

55,000

Total_______________________675,000b________760,819b
a The annual limit is adjusted based on visa usage in the previous year.
b The number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens included in these figures is
assumed to be 254,000. Immediate relatives may enter without any limitation; how
ever, the limit for family-sponsored preference visa immigrants in a fiscal year is
equal to 480,000 minus the number of immediate relatives admitted in the preceding
year. The limit of family-sponsored preference visas cannot go below a minimum of
226,000 (the worldwide limit of 480,000 minus 254,000).
0 Plus unused family fourth preference visas.
d Visas not used in higher preferences may be used in these categories.
e Plus unused employment fourth and fifth preference visas.

provisions are being challenged in courts of law. The IIRIRA legisla
tion is regarded as a companion to the 1996 welfare reform legislation. 9

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE COMPOSITION
OF IMMIGRATION

U.S. immigration law has profoundly influenced the composition of
U.S. immigration in numerous ways. The direct effects are written into
the law, which historically has made special provisions for skilled per
sons and for certain males, for example. The indirect effects result
from provisions of the law that affect from where immigrants may
come or with whom they may come. Other aspects of U.S. law and
U.S. policy that have nothing directly to do with immigration may also
influence both the source countries of immigrants and the composition
of various flows, especially gender and age composition.
One example of a direct influence is the emphasis that immigration
law places on occupational skills relative to family reunification. The
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 established two
occupational preferences that in 1991 potentially accounted for 54,000
visas. In 1991, only 23,591 persons qualified for an occupational pref
erence as "principals," as distinct from beneficiaries, who qualify as
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spouses and children of principals (31,358 in 1991). On the other
hand, the Immigration Act of 1990, which took effect in November
1991, provides for 140,000 employment-based immigrants (and their
spouses and children). In fiscal year 1992, 51,787 employment-based
principals were admitted; in fiscal year 1996, 51,079. Thus, the new
law shifted considerably more emphasis to occupational skills.
A second example—one that potentially could have influenced gen
der composition—is found in the Immigration Act of 1924. In this act,
Congress made clear its desire for families not to be separated and for
reunification of those families that were separated. Wives and unmar
ried children under 18 of U.S. citizens were granted nonquota status.
Moreover, preference quota status was granted to the spouses and
unmarried children under 21 of U.S. citizens aged 21 and over, as well
as to the wives and dependent children under age 16 of permanent resi
dent aliens. Harper and Chase (1975, p. 13) argue that in its original
form this law discriminated against women, because "an alien wife
preceding her husband could not confer preference quota status on
him, and an American citizen wife . . . could only confer preference
quota status on her alien husband." Although amendments were made
at later dates to lessen the impacts of these conditions, some degree of
discrimination remained until the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. Moreover, by granting "preference quota sta
tus" to wives of quota immigrants aged 21 and over who were skilled
in agriculture, the 1924 law made a further distinction based on gender.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the McCarran-Walter
Act), among other things, eliminated discrimination between the sexes
as a basis for exclusion.
The indirect influences of the law on immigrant composition are
more subtle than those exerted directly, but they are no less important.
For example, historically the occupational preferences have strongly
favored the admittance of males, especially as principals. Such gender
tilting is due in part to males in source countries having a higher prob
ability of being "economic migrants" (persons who respond to eco
nomic incentives) because of their higher labor force participation
rates. The gender tilting is also due to the higher probability that males
in most source countries will have more education than females, as
well as claim to more personal resources to finance an international
move.
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Another important indirect effect of immigration law is on the
source-country composition of immigrants. Because different coun
tries will provide immigrants who have, on average, different personal
or family characteristics (such as years of schooling, occupational
experience, and number of dependents), legal preferences or barriers to
immigration from various parts of the world have almost certainly
tilted immigrant composition in one way or another.
U.S. immigration policy in combination with foreign policy can also
indirectly affect both the gender and age composition of immigration.
For example, for many years, the United States has had a significant
military presence in certain foreign countries such as Germany, Korea,
and the Philippines. Because historically the military has been pre
dominately male, foreign-born spouses of military personnel have been
primarily female. Consequently, countries with a significant U.S. mili
tary presence have relatively many young women qualify for perma
nent resident alien status as the wives of U.S. citizens. Moreover, after
residing continuously in the United States for at least five years, a per
manent resident alien can qualify for naturalization. Upon obtaining
citizenship, any naturalized citizen who is at least 21 years of age is eli
gible to reunite with her (or his) parents, who are exempt from numeri
cal restrictions. Thus, from the same countries that are sources of
relatively many young female immigrants come relatively many older
immigrants. In the modeling effort described below, we attempt to
account for such countries.

Notes
1. These figures relate to gross immigration, not net immigration. Especially during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, return migration was consider
able, amounting to perhaps 33 percent of gross immigration (Warren and Kraly
1985).
2. The "demographic transition" refers to a society's passage from traditional to
modern economic and social conditions. During this passage, both birth and
death rates, which are initially quite high, fall. However, in many (but not all)
cases during the transitional phase, death rates fall first and, because birth rates
remain high for a time, population grows rapidly. Many possible reactions to the
high rate of population growth are possible, including internal migration from
rural to urban areas and emigration. See McNamara (1982).
3. In 1882, those persons deemed likely to become a public charge were added to the
list of excluded persons, and in 1891, persons suffering from certain contagious
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5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
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diseases were placed on the list, along with polygamists and aliens assisted by
others through the payment of passage. Anarchists, or persons who believe in, or
advocate, the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the United
States, or of all government, or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public
officials were barred in 1903. Knowledge of English was made a requirement of
naturalization in 1906. In 1907, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, and persons
with physical or mental defects that could affect their ability to earn a living were
barred from entry. In 1917, illiterate aliens were excluded from admission.
In 1940, past as well as present membership in proscribed organizations
became grounds for barring entry. In 1950, present or past membership in the
Communist party was added to the list. The exclusion or expulsion of aliens who
persecuted others on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opin
ion under the direction of the Nazi government of Germany or its allies was
authorized in 1978. Certain grounds for exclusion, especially based on health
considerations, were repealed in 1990.
Higman (1984) discussed the circumstances that led to the banning of Chinese.
Among the factors that he noted are the completion of the Union Pacific Railroad
in 1869 that resulted in what he calls "a large floating labor supply" (p. 34), a seri
ous recession in the mid 1870s, cultural differences with persons of European
ancestry, and the fact that the Chinese did not migrate freely but rather were con
trolled by Chinese societies, which appeared to be a new kind of slavery.
Goldin (1994) discussed the reasons why restrictive legislation was not adopted
much earlier in the 1890s. She concluded (p. 255) that "shifting political interest,
generally favorable economic times, and a lot of good luck" (for those who came
between 1890 and 1921) were the main reasons.
Of the 528,431 persons accepted as legal resident aliens during the 1930s,
250,000 are estimated to have been refugees from Nazi persecution (Vialet 1980).
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976 placed the Western
Hemisphere under the annual 20,000 per country ceiling as well as under the pref
erence categories. A later amendment in 1978 combined the separate Eastern and
Western Hemisphere ceilings into a single worldwide ceiling of 290,000, which in
1980 was reduced to 270,000 in connection with the Refugee Act of 1980.
The new law, like the old, provides for the unrestricted immigration of certain
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. The new law places more emphasis on
employment considerations, but the old occupational preferences (3rd and 6th)
emphasized many of the same types of considerations. Legal resident aliens are
still able to reunite with immediate relatives under a preference (though with an
expanded number of available visas).
The 1996 welfare reform bill defines a new eligibility category for legal aliens,
called qualified aliens, which includes lawful permanent residents, refugees, and
those granted asylum, as well as certain others. Most qualified aliens were barred
initially from food stamps and supplemental security income (SSI), which is a
federal cash assistance program (supplemented in certain states) for the elderly,
blind, and disabled. Moreover, the welfare reform law initially barred qualified

Legal U.S. Immigration

35

aliens admitted to the United States before the law's enactment on August 22,
1996, from all means-tested federal programs for their first five years in the
United States. However, in 1997, Congress changed its position and approved the
continuation of SSI and Medicaid for those legal immigrants who were in the
United States on August 22, 1996. It also approved such benefits for those legal
immigrants who were in the United States on this date but were not receiving
these benefits, if they subsequently become poor or disabled. States also are per
mitted to deny qualified aliens Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and
various federally funded state programs such as child care and services for the
elderly. Certain exceptions are made, including refugees and those granted asy
lum during their first five years in the United States (extended to seven years in
1997). Naturalized citizens are eligible for the benefits available to native-born
citizens, but naturalization typically requires five years as a permanent resident
alien.
Most federal public benefit programs have not been available to illegal
migrants, but the law was silent on such eligibility for certain (minor) programs.
The 1996 law defines "not qualified aliens" to include illegal migrants and bars
their use of federal public benefit programs, as well as state and local programs.
If states wish to make benefits available to nonqualified aliens, they must pass a
law that allows them to do so. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
0.5 million aliens who presently receive SSI benefits could lose their eligibility,
along with 1.0 million aliens currently using food stamps.

3 A Brief History of
U.S. Immigration
Table 3.1 provides a decade-by-decade breakdown of U.S. immi
gration from the 1820s to the 1990s. 1 Historically, the years of heavi
est immigration were early in this century, when the annual gross flow
exceeded one million during six different years with a peak at 1.3 mil
lion in 1907. Between 1901 and 1910, 8.8 million immigrants were
admitted to the United States, a figure unrivaled by any other decade in
the nation's history. However, during the 1980s, 7.3 million persons
entered. The recent surge of immigration has continued during the
1990s; in 1991 alone over 1.8 million persons were admitted as legal
permanent residents, and between 1991 and 1996, 6.1 million persons
were admitted.2

WAVES OF IMMIGRATION
The First Wave
During U.S. history, the source-country composition of immigration
has changed considerably. Muller and Espenshade (1985), following
others, characterized this changing composition as consisting of four
overlapping waves (though the third of these four refers to internal
migration and not directly to immigration). The first major wave began
in earnest during the 1830s, when the number of arrivals jumped to
599,125 from 143,439 during the 1820s. During the 1840s, arrivals
totaled over 1.7 million, and this wave peaked during the 1880s.
Although immigration during the mid to late nineteenth century was
certainly due to some combination of economic and social conditions
in Europe and the promise of a better life in America, technological
improvements in transporting people by sea, which allowed large num
bers of persons to move relatively quickly, safely, and cheaply, were
also important. Thomas (1973, p. 36) indicated that the first Cunard
steamships were placed in service during 1840, revolutionizing ocean
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Table 3.1 Immigration to the
United States, by Decade,
1821-1996
Period

Number

1821-1830

143,439

1831-1840

599,125

1841-1850

1,713,251

1851-1860

2,598,214

1861-1870

2,314,824

1871-1880

2,812,191

1881-1890

5,246,613

1891-1900

3,687,564

1901-1910
1911-1920

8,795,386
5,735,811

1921-1930

4,107,209

1931-1940

538,431

1941-1950

1,035,039

1951-1960

2,515,479

1961-1970

3,321,677

1971-1980

4,493,314

1981-1990
1991-1996

7,338,062
6,146,213

SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza
tion Service (1997), Table 1.

transport, although Scott (1972, p. 36) reported that in 1856, about 95
percent of the immigrants who arrived in New York still came by sail.
By 1873, however, the majority came by steam. 3 Gould (1979) noted
three important consequences of the substantial reduction in the dura
tion of the crossing. First, the opportunity cost of not working while
on board the ship was greatly reduced. Second, the physical hardships
of lengthy voyages, including hunger, thirst, sickness, and death, were
eased by the faster crossing. Third, knowledge about opportunities in
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America, transmitted through private correspondence and through
advertising by steamship lines, spread more rapidly.
The first wave originated in Europe, specifically in western and
northern Europe. The Potato Famine (which struck continental Europe
as well as Ireland), social and economic problems, demographic transi
tions, and religious intolerence were common motivating factors for
this wave of immigrants. Ireland was a major source country. Between
1815 and 1845, an estimated 850,000 Irish crossed the Atlantic (Taylor
1971).4 During the 1850s, 2.6 million immigrants arrived in the United
States, 35 percent from Ireland. The 1850 U.S. Census reported
962,000 persons born in Ireland; the 1890 Census, 1.9 million persons.
Immigration from Germany, which had begun during the 1830s and
had continued to build during the 1840s, outstripped that from Ireland
during the 1850s, when Germany supplied 37 percent of U.S. immi
grants. As the nineteenth century wore on, Germany far exceeded Ire
land as a source of U.S. immigrants, and the United Kingdom also
became an important source. During the 1860s, the United States had
over 2.3 million arrivals, with Germany accounting for 34 percent, the
United Kingdom for 26 percent, and Ireland for 19 percent. These
three countries of western Europe accounted for almost 80 percent of
immigrant arrivals during the 1860s, but during this decade, immigra
tion from Norway and Sweden also began to grow significantly.
The source-country pattern of U.S. immigration began to change
during the 1870s. While the three traditional source countries
remained important (accounting for about 61 percent of the arrivals),
eastern and southern Europe for the first time began to supply signifi
cant numbers, and immigration from northern Europe continued to
grow. For example, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Soviet Union
accounted for about 168,000 immigrants during the 1870s, and Nor
way-Sweden accounted for another 211,000. 5 Both numbers were to
grow markedly during the following four decades.
During the 1880s immigration increased sharply—5.2 million arriv
als compared with 2.8 million during the 1870s—with rising numbers
of immigrants from virtually every European country except France
and Spain. For example, movement from Germany more than doubled,
from about 0.7 million during the 1870s to 1.5 million during the
1880s. Major increases also occurred from Austria-Hungary, the
Soviet Union, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Belgium. Arriv-
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als from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark increased from 243,016 dur
ing the 1870s to 656,494 during the 1880s. Immigration from the
Americas was also of some significance; movement from Canada and
Newfoundland amounted to 776,944 during the 1870s and 1880s. 6
(Land arrivals from Mexico were not completely enumerated until
1908, and between 1886 and 1893 no data whatsoever are available for
Mexico, so the number of immigrants from Mexico is largely unknown
for the nineteenth century.)

The Second Wave
The second wave of immigration noted by Muller and Espenshade
was from southern and eastern Europe. This wave began seriously dur
ing the 1870s and 1880s, but it was overshadowed by movement from
western and northern Europe. During the 1890s, total arrivals fell to
3.7 million; yet during this decade, movement from the Soviet Union
and Italy more than doubled, with 0.5 million arrivals for the former
and almost 0.7 million for the latter. Austria-Hungary sent another 0.6
million. Together, these source countries accounted for 47.5 percent of
U.S. immigration during the 1890s. On the other hand, migration from
Germany declined by almost 1.0 million persons, that from the United
Kingdom by well over 0.5 million, and that from Ireland by almost 0.3
million.
The reasons for emigration from southern and eastern Europe were
many. Just as the steamship was a permissive factor in the earlier emi
gration from western European countries that had easy access to the
Atlantic, the railroad was a permissive factor in later emigration from
southern and eastern Europe because it provided relatively cheap, safe,
and fast transport to Atlantic ports (Taylor 1971). Moreover, these
countries were experiencing rapidly changing technology (and thus
economic change), institutions, and ideas. Gould (1979, p. 617) noted
that the "eastward march of personal freedom was obviously an impor
tant part of the explanation of the corresponding geographical shift of
the sources of European emigration as the nineteenth century ran its
course."7 Demographic transitions occurring in these countries also
encouraged immigration to the United States.
The first decade of the twentieth century stands out as the decade
with the most immigrant arrivals in U.S. history: between 1901 and
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1910, 8.8 million persons entered the country. During this decade,
Austria-Hungary supplied the United States with 2.1 million immi
grants, the Soviet Union with 1.6 million, and Italy with 2.0 million,
these three accounting for two-thirds of all arrivals.
With continued heavy movement from eastern and southern Europe,
the 1911-1920 period promised to be another decade of mass immigra
tion. Over 4.1 million persons arrived in the four years from 1911 to
1914, but with the beginning of World War I, immigration was sharply
curtailed. Only 1.6 million persons arrived between 1915 and 1920.
With the imposition of the first binding entry quotas during the early
1920s (the Chinese exclusion laws excepted), immigration declined to
4.1 million during the 1920s, 2.3 million (or 56 percent) of which came
during the first four years of the decade. The temporary quota restric
tions of 1921 and 1922, followed by the first permanent restrictions
embodied in the Immigration Act of 1924, spelled the effective end to
the "second wave" of U.S. immigration. However, the quota restric
tions imposed during the 1920s did not apply to Western Hemisphere
countries, and partially as a consequence, Canada and Newfoundland
(924,515) and Mexico (459,287) ranked first and second among source
countries of U.S. immigration during the 1920s. 8
The Third Wave
Picking up on an earlier theme of B. Thomas (1973), Muller and
Espenshade argued that black migration from the rural South to north
ern cities began to grow significantly when immigration, which had
been primarily directed to northern U.S. cities, declined. This north
ward internal migration, which is the third wave, in fact was general
and not restricted to blacks. It also coincided with significant move
ment from farms and into urban areas and was motivated by growing
job opportunities. In earlier years, these opportunities had been taken
by low-skilled immigrant laborers, who were presumably good labormarket substitutes for less skilled blacks and whites from the South.
With the worldwide depression of the 1930s, immigration fell
sharply: only 538,431 persons entered the United States during the
decade, and net emigration probably occurred (Gemery 1994).
Because of World War II, only 170,952 immigrants arrived during the
first half of the 1940s. However, with the end of the war, immigration
again began to build.
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The Fourth Wave
The fourth wave of migration consists primarily of Hispanics and
Asians. Immigration from Mexico and the Caribbean began to grow
significantly during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1943, Congress provided
for the importation of temporary agricultural laborers from North,
South, and Central America. This law formed the legal basis for the
"Bracero" program, which involved the importation of agricultural
workers from Mexico. Between 1942 and 1964, 4,646,399 contracts
were written for Mexicans to work temporarily in U.S. agriculture
(Congressional Research Service 1980, Table 30). A continuing flow
of migrants (legal and illegal) since 1964 makes Mexico today the sin
gle most important source of U.S. immigrants.
After restrictions on immigration from Asia were phased out begin
ning in 1965, movement from this part of the world to the United
States increased dramatically; clearly, the earlier entry restrictions had
produced a pent-up demand. Thus, the sources of U.S. immigration
shifted strongly away from Europe and strongly toward Asia and the
Americas.
During the 1970s, as the numerically restricted component of U.S.
immigration grew at high annual rates due to the family reunification
provisions of the law, illegal migration (especially from Mexico but
from elsewhere as well) was gathering momentum. Furthermore, ref
ugee admittances, particularly from Southeast Asia, were sufficiently
important that in 1980 specific legislation was passed to deal with
them (Refugee Act of 1980). During the 1981-1990 period, the
United States admitted 7.3 million persons as permanent resident
aliens. In only one other decade (1901-1910) has the nation admitted
more immigrants (8.8 million), and this decade is often characterized
as one of "mass" migration.
During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. birth rates were low. Conse
quently, changes in the foreign-born population contributed impor
tantly to overall U.S. population growth. Increases in the foreign-born
population between 1980 and 1990 and between 1970 and 1980 of 5.7
and 4.5 million, respectively, were the two largest decadal increases in
the nation's history (Table 3.2). During the 1980s, the foreign-born
population contributed 25.7 percent of the increment in U.S. popula-

Table 3.2 Foreign-Born and Native Components of Population Change by Decade, 1870-1990
Contribution of
foreign-born to
total change (%)

Contribution of
native to
total change (%)

Years

Change in
total population

Change in
foreign-born

Change in
native

1870-1880

11,597,412

1,112,714

90.41

12,791,931

2,569,634

10,484,698
10,222,297

9.59

1880-1890

20.09

79.91

1890-1900

13,046,861

1,091,699

11,955,162

8.37

91.63

1900-1910

15,977,691

3,174,610

12,803,081

19.87

80.13

1910-1920

13,738,354

404,806

13,333,548

2.95

97.05

1920-1930

17,064,426

283,457

16,780,969

1.66

98.34

1930-1940

8,894,229

-2,609,253

11,503,482

-29.34

129.34

1940-1950

19,028,086

-1,250,531

20,278,617

-6.57

106.57

1950-1960

27,766,872

-683,398

28,450,270

-2.46

102.46

1960-1970

24,747,690

^1,665

24,789,355

-0.17

100.17

1970-1980

23,333,879
22,164,068

4,460,604

18,873,275

19.12

5,687,410

16,476,658

25.66

80.88
74.34

1980-1990

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975); also 1980 and 1990 censuses.
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tion, a considerable contrast to the 1930-1970 period, when the for
eign-born population declined absolutely.
The 1990s started with the admission of 1.8 million legal immi
grants in 1991, 1.1 million of whom had been illegal aliens who were
given legal status under terms of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986. Moreover, in 1990 Congress passed the Immigration Act
of that year, which became effective in October of 1991 (fiscal 1992)
and greatly increased the immigration quota ceilings. Thus, immigra
tion promises to remain significant through and beyond the 1990s, and
the composition of immigrant flows will surely have a role in the
national debate on immigration.

SOURCE REGIONS OF IMMIGRANTS
Table 3.3 clearly shows the changing geographic sources of U.S.
immigrants. During the 1850s, 94.4 percent of U.S. immigration was
from Europe, and only 4.5 percent was from Asia and the Western
Hemisphere. During the first decade of the twentieth century, Europe
still contributed 91.6 percent of the immigrants, but by the 1950s, the
European share had fallen to just over half. By the 1980s, not only had
the volume of immigration increased appreciably, but the source-coun
try composition of immigration also had changed dramatically. As a
different view of this change, of the 45.2 million immigrants admitted
to the United States as of 1970, 78.7 percent had a country of last resi
dence in Europe; of the 17.1 million admitted between 1971 and 1995,
13.6 percent came from Europe, 48.7 percent came from the Americas,
and 34.6 percent came from Asia.
Layard et al. (1992) discussed how the changing political and eco
nomic situation in Europe may ignite a major East-West migration,
with some of the migrants seeking entry into the United States.
Indeed, migration from Europe to the United States appears to be
building once again. Immigration from Europe grew each year from
1987 (61,174) through 1994 (160,916). Between 1991 and 1994 alone,
222,585 persons were admitted from the Soviet Union (based on place
of birth), and 100,597 from Poland. However, admittances from
Europe declined to 128,185 in 1995.
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Table 3.3 Source Regions of U.S. Immigration for Selected Decades3
1851-1860

1901-1910

1951-1960

1981-1990

2,452,577
(94.4%)

8,056,040
(91.6%)

1,325,727
(52.7%)

761,550
(10.4%)

Asia

41,538
(1.6%)

323,543
(3.7%)

153,249
(6.1%)

2,738,157
(37.3%)

Americas

74,720
(2.9%)

361,888
(4.1%)

996,944
(39.6%)

3,615,225
(49.3%)

210
(0%)
158
(0%)

7,368
(0.1%)

14,092
(0.6%)

176,893
(2.4%)

13,024
(0.1%)

12,976
(0.5%)

45,205
(0.6%)

29,011
(1.1%)

33,523
(0.4%)

1,032
(0%)

2,598,214

8,795,386

12,491
(0.5%)
2,515,479

Region
Europe

Africa
Oceania
Not specified
Total

7,338,062

SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1990 Statistical Yearbook of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Government Printing Office: Wash
ington D.C., 1991, Table 2.
a These data reflect country of last residence.

HISTORICAL U.S. IMMIGRATION:
GENDER, AGE, AND SKILL

Many aspects of immigrant composition are important in terms of
the demographic structure of the United States and the effects of immi
gration on the U.S. economy. This study focuses specifically on gen
der, age, and skill composition, each of which has been important in
shaping the historical consequences of immigration in the United
States. In this section, we briefly discuss the historical context of the
contemporary compositional measures that we analyze later.
Gender Composition
In the first detailed analysis of migration using census data,
Ravenstein asserted that "woman is a greater migrant than man" (1885,
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p. 196). His seventh law of migration is that females are more
migratory than males (p. 199). Ravenstein's analysis concerned
lifetime migration in the United Kingdom and used 1871 and,
especially, 1881 census data.9
In most major international migration flows of the nineteenth and
twentieth centures, males commonly have made up more than half of
the immigrants and frequently have accounted for far more than half.
This gender composition characterized U.S. immigration through the
entire nineteenth century and through the first 30 years of the twentieth
(Table 3.4). From a high of 230.2 during the 1901 to 1910 period, this
ratio fell steadily to 67.7 (the decadal low) during the 1941 to 1950
period and remains below 100 in the 1990s.
The crossover from male-dominated to female-dominated immigra
tion occurred in 1930 and appears, at least in part, to have been due to
the imposition of binding immigration quotas by the United States dur
ing the 1920s (though the ratio had been falling steadily for some
years). The immigration quotas of the 1920s were particularly restric
tive for immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and flows from
these countries were extreme in their orientation toward males. During
the 1901 to 1910 period, the sex ratio for immigration from Greece was
1703.2; comparable ratios for Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian
Empire were 372.6, 238.5, and 185.6, respectively. On the other hand,
the Irish ratio was 90.1. 10 By curtailing flows from countries with tra
ditionally high sex ratios, the immigration laws of the 1920s had an
important effect on the immigration sex ratio that continues today.
Another factor that contributed to high sex ratios around the turn of
the century was that many male migrants apparently entered the United
States with the intention of residing here only temporarily and later
returning home; this was particularly true of migrants from Italy. The
data suggest that migrants from Greece and other countries of southern
and eastern Europe also may have intended their stays to be temporary.
Indeed, a large fraction of those from such countries did return home,
but those males who stayed later reunited with their wives and families,
which caused a subsequent reduction of sex ratios, especially after
binding quotas were enacted. The tendency for early flows from a
given source to be predominantly male and for later flows to be charac
terized by family reunification and falling sex ratios is common today.
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Table 3.4 Gender of U.S. Immigrants, 1821-1994
Period

Males

Females

Sex ratio

1821-18303

78,196

35,173

222.3

1831-18403

378,725

210,628

179.8

1841-18503

1,014,196

693,189

146.3

1851-18603

1,500,132

1,094,439

137.1

1861-18703

1,480,646

965,982

153.3

1871-18803

1,808,228

1,136,482

159.1

1881-18903

3,169,839

2,024,300

156.6

1891-19003

2,361,836

1,442,383

163.7

1901-19103

6,309,062

2,741,181

230.2

1911-19203

3,612,772

2,111,186

171.1

1921-1930b

2,282,988

1,824,221

125.1

1931-1940b

229,150

299,281

76.6

1941-1950b

417,987

617,052

67.7

1951-1960b

1,155,421

1,360,058

85.0

1961-1970b
1971-1980b>c

1,487,611

1,834,066

81.1

1,859,302

2,103,373

88.4

1981-1990d'e'f

2,659,019

2,678,507

99.3

[3,415,032]

[3,281,564]

[104.1]

1,486,857

1,705,775

87.2

[2,507,657]

[2,001,683]

[125.3]

1991-1994f'8

a From Ferenczi and Willcox (1929), Table VII.
b From Houstoun, Kramer, and Barrett (1984), Table A-l.
c Excludes 1980.
d From U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1991), Table 11.
e Excludes 1981.
f Excludes persons legalized under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Con
trol Act of 1986. Numbers in brackets include IRCA legalizations.
g From U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1996), Table 12.
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Age Composition
Immigrant age composition is more difficult to track over long peri
ods of history than is gender composition because of changed age
groupings in reported data. Table 3.5 shows the young adult age class
as 15-40, 14-44, 16-44, and 15-44 for different periods. Neverthe
less, certain generalizations can be made about the age composition of
historical immigration to the United States.
Between the 1830s and the 1880s little change occurred in the
aggregate age composition of U.S. immigrants; for example, the per
centage in the 15-40 age class ranged between 66.3 and 68.4 (Table
3.5), which is a very narrow band for a five-decade period. However,
during the 1890s, as immigration from southern and eastern Europe
surged, those who were 15 to 40 increased to 77.6 percent (1891-98).
After the 1920s, the percentage in the 16^4 class fell, while the per
centage of persons over 44 increased dramatically from 9.2 percent
(1921-30) to 18.4 percent (1941-50). After a decline in the 1950s, the
percentage of immigrants who are older has continued to rise: in 1995,
19.4 percent of U.S. immigrants were over 44 years of age.
Skill Composition
In a number of papers, Borjas has argued that the skills or human
capital embodied in successive immigrant cohorts declined during the
post-World War II period. 11 Regarding immigration toward the end of
the nineteenth century, Spengler (1956, p. 281) made the same claim:
The southward and the eastward shifts of the sources of immigra
tion were accompanied by changes in the composition of the
immigrant stream and in the nature of its impact on the American
economy. An increasingly large proportion of the immigrants
came from relatively underdeveloped agricultural countries, with
the result that the occupational composition of the immigrants
came to be increasingly inferior to that of an American population.

Available data regarding skill composition are not clean-cut. Occu
pational classifications have changed over time. Moreover, occupa
tions were for the most part self-reported, and different occupations
could carry different connotations for people from different parts of the
world. Perhaps most importantly, however, over time different per
centages of immigrants actually reported an occupation. For example,
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Table 3.5 Age Composition of U.S. Immigration, 1921-1994 (%)

Period
1821-1830
1831-1840
1841-1850
1851-1860
1861-1870
1871-1880
1881-1890
1891-1898
1899-1900
1901-1910
1911-1917
1918-1920
1921-1930
1931-1940
1941-1950
1951-1960
1961-1970
1971-1980
1981-1990
1991-1994

Age
14-44
15_40
71.3
66.3
66.8
68.4
68.2
67.0
68.1 .
77.6
81.4
83.0
80.0

16-44

15-44

70.6
73.3
66.3
60.0
63.5
60.8
59.4
66.3
68.8

Over 40 Over 44
11.3
9.8
9.9
10.5
11.8
12.6
10.5
7.9
5.7
5.0
6.5
10.4
9.2
17.1
18.4
13.6
13.8
14.8
15.8
16.4

SOURCE: For 1820-1957, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series C133-138, p. 62;
for later years, various annual reports and statistical yearbooks of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service.
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during the 1901-10 period, 74.3 percent of the immigrants reported an
occupation, whereas during the 1861-70 period, only 38.8 percent
reported one.
Table 3.6 reports two measures of skill composition and lists them
in two ways. First, it identifies immigrants classified as professional,
commercial, or skilled and refers to this group as "skilled." Second, it
breaks out the first two classes, professional and commercial, into a
group called "highly skilled." For each group, percentages are reported
relative to all immigrants and also to only those who reported an occu
pation. These occupational classifications are used by decade, begin
ning with 1821-30, but this classification scheme ends with 1898 data.
After 1898, the occupational groupings are professional, technical, and
kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; and
craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and kindred workers. These three
groups at least roughly match those for the 1821-98 period, which can
be observed by noting how similar the figures for 1899-1900 are com
pared to the corresponding figures for 1891-98.
From each measure of skill reported in Table 3.6, basically the same
conclusions may be drawn. First, as immigration from Ireland began
to surge during the 1840s, skill composition declined sharply in terms
of the percentages of immigrants classified as skilled and as highly
skilled. Second, when immigration from Germany began to build dur
ing the 1850s and 1860s, the skill composition rebounded. Third, the
data affirm Spengler's assertion that when immigrant origins shifted
toward southern and eastern Europe, the skill composition of the flows
was low: the lowest percentages reported in Table 3.6 are for the period
from 1881 to 1910. However, the downward shift appears to have
occurred earlier, during the 1861-70 and 1871-80 periods, before
movement from southern and eastern Europe became maximal.
Fourth, after the imposition of entry quotas and during the period when
immigration was at a low level for other reasons, the skill composition
increased once again during the 1930s and 1940s.
The gender, age, and skill composition of historical U.S. immigra
tion have been described in some detail (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929),
but virtually no effort has been made to formally model these composi
tional aspects. This observation parallels our earlier observation that
compositional models of migration are rare even in the contemporary
context.
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Table 3.6 Skill Composition of U.S. Immigration, 1821-1990 (%)
Those declaring
All immigrants
an occupation
Percentage
declaring an
Highly
Highly
skilled
skilled15
occupation
Skilled
Period
Skilled3
30.2
47.5
14.1
94.1
1821-1830
28.5
38.7
55.6
20.0
1831-1840
21.5
7.7
45.3
29.0
6.6
1841-1850
13.2
3.0
39.0
13.2
5.1
37.4
1851-1860
14.6
38.8
45.9
12.8
1861-1870
17.8
5.0
50.8
5.6
28.9
1871-1880
14.7
2.8
50.4
24.4
4.0
1881-1890
2.0
12.3
58.2
25.8
3.7
1891-1898
2.2
15.0
67.9
14.7
2.4
21.7
3.6
1899-1900
74.3
4.0
3.0
21.9
1901-1910
16.2
70.4
5.3
3.7
23.6
1911-1920
16.6
4.8
60.8
31.7
8.0
1921-1930
19.2
41.9
51.9
32.6
1931-1940
21.8
13.7
45.3
25.9
1941-1950
11.7
55.2
25.0
47.2
1951-1960
9.4
50.6
20.0
23.9
44.1
52.8
27.6
1961-1970
12.2
23.3
41.6
54.6
30.2
1971-1979
22.7
12.6
34.0
27.3
1982-1988C
9.3
14.0
1989-1990d
55.8
7.8
a For the 1821-1898 period, skilled refers to "professional," "commercial," and
"skilled," whereas for the period beginning 1899, skilled refers to "professional, tech
nical, and kindred workers," "managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm," and
"craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and kindred workers."
b Highly skilled refers to the first two categories listed in note "a" for the respective
periods..
c Occupational informa.tion is unavailable for 1980 and 1981 in published INS reports.
For 1982-85, what had previously been called "professional, technical, and kindred"
was called "professional specialty" and for 1986-90, "professional specialty and
technical." The skilled group is not comparable for the period after 1982 due to
changes in published occupational classifications.
d Due to the inclusion of persons legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 in the 1989 and 1990 figures, these years are not comparable to earlier
years. Thus, they are reported separately.
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Notes
1. Although "official" data such as those presented in this chapter frequently are
used with no misgivings regarding their quality, the numbers are far from flawless.
Immigrant records were not maintained consistently. For example, the definition
of an "immigrant" changed several times during the nineteenth and early twenti
eth centuries, which is at least in part responsible for U.S. immigration figures that
do not coincide with (U.S.-bound) emigration figures provided by source coun
tries. Moreover, immigrants arriving by sea were not always counted accurately,
and migration over U.S. land borders often went unreported. See Gould (1979)
for a discussion of certain shortcomings of historical U.S. immigration data.
2. Of the 1.8 million figure for 1991, over 1.1 million were legalized under the terms
and conditions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. During
1992, 1993, and 1994, a total of 193,642 were so legalized. The legalized individ
uals were not new entrants to the United States but rather had entered the country
legally and overstayed or had entered without documents. During 1992-1994,
141,690 additional persons entered as "legalization dependents."
3. During the 1820s, an average voyage from Liverpool to New York by sailing ship
required 40 days, but because of weather conditions, many voyages took much
longer, even more than twice as long (Gould 1979, p. 613). In 1867, the average
crossing for a sailing ship was 44 days, whereas that for a steamship was 14 days.
During the 1870s and 1880s, the average crossing by steamship had fallen to 7-10
days. The shorter time in passage greatly reduced sickness and the loss of life.
Scott (1972, p. 29) reported death rates for arriving vessels of almost 25 percent
during the late 1840s and illness rates of over 30 percent. However, these figures
appear to be high, perhaps focusing on what Mokyr referred to as "coffin ships,"
on which between 30 and 45 percent of the passengers died at sea; many more
died soon after arrival. During 1847, on-board mortality was quite high, but dur
ing 1848 such mortality probably did not exceed 2 percent (Mokyr 1983, pp. 267268).
4. According to Mokyr (1983, p. 230), until the early 1830s about two-thirds of the
Irish emigrants preferred Canada as a destination, but after 1835 about three-fifths
preferred the United States.
5. Of course, the Soviet Union did not exist as such during the 1870s, but the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service reports historical data in this way.
6. Although some fraction of this number no doubt originated in Canada and New
foundland, many ships bearing immigrants destined to the United States arrived in
Quebec. Ships carrying raw materials from Canada to Europe found a profitable
backhaul in migrant traffic (Gould 1979). Thus, data reporting country of last res
idence could distort figures for country of birth.
7. Gould (1979, p. 616) noted that British restrictions on the emigration of skilled
labor were lifted in 1825. Legal impediments to emigration were severe in eastern
and central Europe until much later in the nineteenth century.
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8. Migration between Mexico and the United States has occurred during four major
periods, the first of which coincided with the second wave of European migration
to the United States (Weintraub et al. 1998). The Mexico-born population of the
United States increased from approximately 100,000 in 1900 to about 1.0 million
in 1930, due primarily to the northward movement of seasonal agricultural labor
ers (along with refugees from the Mexican Revolution and some others).
During the 1930s, approximately 600,000 Mexico-born persons moved from
the United States back to Mexico, with the consequence that the Mexico-born
population of the United States declined to about 400,000 in 1940. This reverse
flow makes up the second major period of migration between Mexico and the
United States.
Weintraub et al. characterized the organized bilateral recruitment of Mexicans
to work in U.S. agriculture (1942-1964) as the third major period of migration
between Mexico and the United States. Even after the discontinuation of the
Bracero program in 1964, flows of legal immigrants and illegal migrants from
Mexico continued and grew as ties with family and friends in the United States
expanded (Massey et al. 1987), thus constituting the fourth major period of Mex
ico-United States migration.
9. "Lifetime migration" refers to persons who were residing in area j at time t and
were born in some other area.
10. Data used to calculate the 1901-1910 sex ratios have been drawn from Reports of
the Immigration Commission (1911, pp. 41-44). Some confusion appears to exist
concerning the volume number of the report cited here. The Immigration Com
mission published 42 volumes. The volume referenced above is listed in the pub
lication itself as "Vol. 20" and carries the title Statistical Review of Immigration
1820-1910 Distribution of Immigrants 1850-1900. But in the "list of reports of
the Immigration Commission" this title is shown as volume 3; volume 20 is
shown as Immigrants in Industries: Pt. 23, Summary Report on Immigrants in
Manufacturing and Mining.
11. Much of this research is summarized in Borjas (1990).

4 The Immigration Data
The immigration patterns described in Chapter 3 are based primarily
on census data. Although census data, particularly the Public Use
Microdata Samples (PUMS), provide much detail on the foreign-born
population of the United States, for the purposes of this study they
have at least three serious shortcomings with respect to tracking immi
grant composition. First, census data relate to the foreign-born popula
tion as enumerated every 10 years. The foreign-born population
consists of immigrants (legal resident aliens), nonimmigrants (such as
visitors for pleasure and students), and illegal resident aliens. The
present study focuses on legal immigrants only and thus requires an
alternative data set.
Second, census data reflect only the "residual" foreign-born popula
tion. A large fraction of those immigrants who legally enter the United
States are thought to subsequently depart. Warren and Kraly (1985)
argued that of the 30 million legal immigrants admitted to the United
States between 1900 and 1980, about 10 million subsequently emi
grated from the United States. Studying the 1971 U.S. immigrant
cohort, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) showed that the fraction of immi
grants that subsequently departs is a function of the country of birth,
meaning that the residual foreign-born population enumerated in the
census is self-selected because of the selective emigration of prior
immigrants.
Third, the census involves a count only every 10 years. Conse
quently, with the possible exception of examining specific entry
cohorts of the foreign-born, changes over time in the various composi
tional patterns of migration cannot be traced in any detail.
Due to these factors and others involving econometric procedures,
we have chosen to use the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) data in this study. Because these data are annual and include a
record for every legal resident alien granted entry into the United
States, the analyst is able to study annual swings in compositional pat
terns that may be due to economic, social, and political conditions in
source countries and to economic conditions in the United States.
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For many years the INS has published annual data on persons admit
ted to the United States as legal resident aliens. 1 These publications
also include information on persons naturalized and on those admitted
as nonimmigrants. The published data have been widely used for
descriptive purposes, but less commonly for analytical purposes. More
recently, the INS has begun to make microdata available. The INS
Public Use Tapes contain considerable detail on each person admitted
as a legal resident alien. In spite of the fact that the microdata tapes
include much valuable information, they have not been widely used for
at least two reasons. First, and probably most importantly, the data for
certain years are flawed, which has the potential to seriously interrupt
any time series created from the tapes. Second, for the years included
in the data, the number of microdata files is enormous because the
United States admits immigrants in very large numbers. Partially as a
consequence of these numbers and partially for other reasons, the INS
Public Use Tapes are extremely cumbersome to use.
This chapter, which draws heavily from Greenwood, McDowell,
and Trabka (1991), describes the INS Public Use Tapes (referred to
also as "INS data") and their strengths and weaknesses. One of the
major strengths of the data is the possibility of developing an annual
time series on many variables relating to U.S. immigration. We docu
ment the frequency and severity of certain flaws in the data, which are
clearly a major source of weakness, including the years and the number
of records for which the data are flawed. We also discuss methods of
"correcting" the problems inherent in the data, so as to allow the use of
a continuous time series in the panel-data models estimated below.
Finally, we discuss changes over time in the gender, age, and skill com
position of U.S. immigration, based on the INS data.

NUMBER OF RECORDS AND TYPES OF INFORMATION
The United States is the world's major country of immigration.
Between 1991 and 1995, over 5.2 million persons were accepted as
legal resident aliens. Consequently, the number of records in the INS
data is enormous, even for a single year. Table 4.1 reports the annual
number of U.S. immigrants beginning in 1972, which is the earliest
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year for which the Public Use microdata are available. 2 This table also
subdivides the numbers for the two broad immigrant classes defined
under U.S. law, namely, numerically restricted and numerically
exempt. It further splits the exempt group into its two major compo
nents, which are refugees and immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Not
only are the numbers large even for the year with the smallest number
of admittances (1972, 384,685); the numbers are also growing. The
number of legal immigrants admitted in 1991 (1,827,167) was the
highest annual total in U.S. history. 3
The INS data contain a record on each alien legally admitted to the
United States for permanent residence. For individuals who are classi
fied as "new entrants," the data are drawn from the U.S. Department of
State form VISA OF-155 (Immigration Visa and Alien Registration),
which is filled out at the time the individual is processed for admit
tance. For those who were already in the United States in a temporary
status but who were adjusted to legal permanent resident after petition
ing the INS, INS Form 1181 is used.
The INS Public Use Tapes contain the following information on
each alien who became a legal permanent resident of the United States
between 1972 and 1991: port of entry, month of admission, year of
admission, class of admission, country of chargeability, country of
birth, country of last permanent residence, nationality, sex, age, marital
status, occupation, state and area of intended residence, most recent
nonimmigrant class of entry, most recent nonimmigrant year of entry,
and labor certification. Almost 300 ports of arrival are listed in the
data, as are the locations of INS District offices in the United States
and in U.S. territories (such as Agana, Guam, and San Juan, Puerto
Rico).
Immigrant class of admission refers to the specific condition that
entitles the person to become a permanent resident of the United
States. Information on class of admission contains considerable detail,
such as preference category and/or precise type of family relationship
under which admittance was gained, new arrival versus adjustment of
status, the refugee act under which admittance was gained, and type of
special immigrant. For particular categories of immigrants, both the
person qualifying for admission and his or her dependents are counted
against the category; consequently, principals are distinguished from
beneficiaries.

Table 4.1 Immigrants by Type of Admission, 1972-1991

Fiscal year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1976TQC
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Total
384,685
400,063
394,861
386,194
398,613
103,676
462,315
601,442
460,348
530,639
596,600
594,131
559,763
543,903
570,009
601,708
601,516
643,025

Subject to numerical
limitations
283,666
282,911
274,131
281,561
284,773
72,511
276,500
341,104
279,478
289,479
330,409
259,749
269,213
262,016
264,208
266,968
271,135
264,148

Total3
101,019
117,152
120,730
104,633
113,840
31,165
185,815
260,338
180,870
241,160
266,191
334,382
290,550
281,887
305,801
334,740
330,381
378,877

Exempt from numerical limitations
Immediate relative of
Refugee and asylum
adjustmentsb
U.S. citizens
86,332
100,953
104,344
91,504
102,019
27,895
105,957
125,819
138,178
151,131
147,148
162,968
172,006
177,783
204,368
223,468
218,575
219,340

122,472
32,049d
75,835
107,244
156,601
102,685
92,127
95,040
104,383
96,474
110,721

1989
1,090,924
280,275
810,649e
217,514
84,288
1990
1,536,483
298,306
l,238,177e
231,680
97,364
1991_________1,827,167_____293,846_______l,533,321 e________237,103__________139,079_____
SOURCE: United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report (1966-1977) and Statistical Yearbook of the Immigra
tion and Naturalization Service (1978-1991).
a This column includes immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, refugee and asylum adjustments, and special immigrants. The last of these is
given by the difference between the "total" column and the sum of the two columns to its right.
b Data prior to 1978 are not comparable because most refugees entered as numerically restricted. During 1978, 1979, and 1980, refugees
also entered as restricted, but their numbers were dwarfed by those who entered as numerically exempt under special legislation.
c TQ = transitional quarter.
d Includes only Cuban refugees, Indochinese refugees, and other.
e The 1989 figure was inflated by the legalization of almost 478,814 resident aliens under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986. During 1990, 880,372 persons were legalized, and during 1991, 1,123,162 persons were legalized. These individ
uals are not included on the INS Public Use Tapes.
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For those who adjust their status, the INS data report the most recent
nonimmigrant class of entry, of which 35 separate designations are
included; among these designations are temporary visitor for pleasure,
temporary visitor for business, temporary worker, exchange visitor,
student, and many more. The most recent year of nonimmigrant entry
also is given.
Country of chargeability is the independent country to which the
immigrant is credited; country of chargeability is almost always coun
try of birth. Each independent country was limited to 20,000 numeri
cally restricted immigrants per year under the immigration law that is
studied here (the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1965), whereas in 1991 dependencies of independent countries were
limited to 5,000 per year of the 20,000 limit. Over 230 separate codes
are included for various countries of birth. Country of citizenship is
reported under nationality.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The Volume of the Data

The first problem encountered in working with the INS data
involves sheer volume. In addition to dealing with a very large number
of observations (totaling well over 10 million for the period 19721991), users of the data are confronted with a mind-boggling array of
variables that must somehow be organized. The possible combinations
of characteristics that might be used as variables for purposes of analy
sis are far in excess of one billion.
We were guided in our choice of information by two thoughts,
namely, the goals of the study and the theoretical model or models that
yielded hypotheses to be tested. The objective of our study is to ana
lyze the gender, age, and skill composition of legal U.S. immigrants.
To meet this goal, we specified models that required information on
country of birth, year of admission, class of admission (numerically
restricted or numerically exempt), gender, age (three groups), and
occupation (three groups). Our models also require that this informa
tion be cross-tabulated. For example, we not only needed to retain the
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number of male immigrants, but also the number of these males who
were numerically restricted, aged 20-34, and professional and techni
cal workers. The lack of the necessary data on the independent vari
ables of the model limited us to a maximum of 60 countries. In order
to produce an annual time series for each of the 60 countries of birth
for 20 years (1972-1991), we aggregated individuals from each coun
try into 36 cells (two classes of admission times two gender distinc
tions times three age groups times three occupational groups), which is
a manageable number of variables.
Immigrant Source Countries

For every immigrant, the INS Public Use Tapes contain three types
of information on source country or countries: country of birth, country
of last permanent residence, and country of nationality. Because the
objective of our research is to explain various compositional aspects of
U.S. immigration, some countries had to be eliminated because infor
mation on the explanatory variables of our models simply is not avail
able. We exhaustively sought data for as many countries as possible.
We finally had to settle on 60 source countries for which we had infor
mation on all the necessary variables (Table 4.2). The various conti
nents and regions of the world are reasonably well represented among
the set of 60 countries.
Periodicity of the Data

The INS data are available on a fiscal-year, rather than a calendaryear, basis. This means that for the years 1972-1976, the data refer to
immigrants who entered the United States from July through June of
the following year (e.g., 1972 data are for July 1971 through June
1972). The year 1976 included a transitional quarter (July, August,
September), which is specifically identified as a separate period. 4
After this, the data refer to October of the previous year through Sep
tember of the fiscal year in question.

Refugees
From an analytical perspective, the presence of refugees in the data
file has the potential to cause serious problems. As shown in Table 4.1,
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Table 4.2 The 60 Source Countries Used in This Study3
Region/Country
Africa
Botswana
Burundi
Egypt
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Tanzania
Tunisia
Zimbabwe
Asia
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Europe
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland

Region/Country
Europe (continued)
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia
North and Central America
Barbados
Canada
El Salvador
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Trinidad & Tobago
Oceania
Australia
Fiji
New Zealand
South America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela

a In the analytical work that follows, Israel is not included in "Asia," but rather is grouped with
"Europe"; also, "Western Hemisphere" refers to the groups of "North and Central America" and
"South America" in this table.
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aggregate refugee admittances have been quite irregular; for example,
122,472 were admitted or adjusted in 1978, 32,049 in 1979, and
156,601 in 1982. This irregularity is compounded because during cer
tain years, refugees tend to have been admitted or adjusted in large
blocks from specific source countries (e.g., 67,985 from Cuba in 1977,
but 3,885 in 1982; 86,777 from Vietnam in 1978, but 1,435 in 1977;
25,476 from Haiti in 1988, but only 5 in 1985). The arrival of refugees
in the United States is not actually listed in the INS data; the refugees
appear only when they adjust their status to permanent resident (and
some refugees may never adjust their status). Thus, refugees have some
potential to overwhelm the normal immigration numbers for certain
countries, causing tremendous spikes in the annual series.
The movement of refugees to the United States is probably moti
vated by reasons different than those of other migrants, although they
also presumably seek better employment opportunities and higher
wages. To a larger extent than with other immigrants, however, refu
gee admittances are discretionary on the part of U.S. authorities, who
must decide which potential immigrants qualify as refugees, how many
to accept in any given year, and from where to accept them. It is pre
cisely this discretion and the resulting irregular admittances of refu
gees from different countries that has the potential to overwhelm any
effort to empirically estimate a model using the INS data.
The problem of refugees can be eliminated in either of two ways.
First, the major source countries of the refugees can be eliminated from
the database, because country of birth is one of the variables in the INS
data. In our research, we took this approach not so much because of
refugees themselves, but because of the unavailability of other infor
mation on those countries, such as gross domestic product per capita,
measures of educational attainment, etc. Second, because refugees can
be specifically identified according to their entry class, they can be
selectively eliminated from the data for any country of birth included
in the researcher's working data set. 5 We also used this approach, even
though for most of our 60 countries very few refugees remained in our
data set because their major countries of origin had been eliminated.
As shown in Table 4.3, when refugees and IRC A legalizations are
removed from the data, the 60 countries in our sample accounted for
between 58.2 and 73.6 percent of all nonrefugee immigrants 20 years
of age and older. A definite downward trend exists in this percentage,

Table 4.3 Annual, Adjusted Annual, and 60-Country Annual Immigration, 1972-1991
Excluding refugee/legalized

Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Immigrant total
384,685
400,063
394,861
386,194
398,613
462,315
601,442
460,348b
530,639
596,600
594,131
559,763
543,903
570,009
601,708
601,516
643,025

All
355,886
369,155
369,211
351,529
358,627
383,830
468,661
364,465
442,582
489,025
486,201
456,895
451,759
474,969
497,325
509,608
561,293

Aged 20 and over
229,902
233,675
230,794
222,834
235,152
259,853
318,127
242,551
307,904
334,395
335,138
322,202
317,948
340,790
356,383
367,631
419,005

60-county set
As % of "excluding
refugee/legalized aged
20 and over"
Aged 20 and over
169,203
73.6
168,982
72.3
166,770
72.3
72.2
160,976
170,188
72.4
179,499
69.1
223,293
70.2
163,562
67.4
205,124
66.6
232,300
69.5
201,178
60.0
206,826
64.2
206,967
65.1
222,476
65.3
234,837
65.9
242,545
66.0
290,687
69.4

1989
1990
1991

1,090,924
1,536,483
1,827,167

527,340
558,737
564,921

377,839
395,474
398,665

242,747
241,406
231,977

64.2
61.0
58.2

SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Table 1; INS Public Use Tapes, 1972-1991.
a Excludes refugees and legalizations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Detail in the INS Statistical Yearbooks
may not match the totals shown here because some classes of refugees are not labeled specifically in the Yearbook, but they can be found
in the Public Use Tapes by the Act under which they were admitted.
b The total number of immigrants shown here differs from that reported in the INS Statistical Yearbook due to a problem with the data for
1979. Neither measure is accurate; the total in the Yearbook contains duplicate records, and the total shown here represents approxi
mately 85 percent of total immigration in 1979 because the duplicate records have been eliminated.
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presumably because the source countries became more diversified over
the 20-year period. These 60 countries account for a sufficiently high
fraction of all immigrants that considerable confidence can be placed
in any empirical results obtained by using them. Countries excluded
from the list that have been the source of important nonrefugee move
ments in recent years include the Dominican Republic, China, and
Iran.
Age Detail
In the INS data, a single age is reported for each immigrant.
Although some immigrants may not know their exact age (a problem
that is not uncommon around the world), we have no reason to believe
that this is a serious problem in the INS data.
The models developed below emphasize individual decision mak
ing, assuming rational agents who seek to maximize their utility.
Because children typically do not make their own decisions about
whether or not to migrate to the United States, we have eliminated chil
dren from the immigration data that we analyze: specifically, all per
sons in the INS files who were under 20 years of age at the time of
entry have been removed from the data. Within the group 20 and over,
we identify three age classes: 20-34, 35-54, and 55 and over. Our
empirical work especially focuses on the groups of age 20-34 and 55
and over.
Occupational Information
The occupational information in the INS data has some potential
problems. 6 First, the occupation listed by the immigrant is selfreported. Some experts argue that different occupational titles may
mean different things in different countries, thus perhaps making a
given occupational title noncomparable across source countries. Sec
ond, a large fraction of the immigrants either had no occupation or
chose to report none, perhaps because they were not entering under an
occupational preference and were therefore not required to give one.
Moreover, for those immigrants who enter as principals under the third
and sixth (occupational) preference categories, reported occupation
refers to the job they were to be taking in the United States and not
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their last job.7 For everyone else, the occupation refers to the last job
held in the country of last permanent residence. For those who adjust
their status, this last job could be in the United States. 8
The first problem (if indeed it is a problem) can be addressed by
grouping occupations into broad categories. Thus, only intentional
misreporting that would significantly misrepresent a person's occupa
tion would present a problem, and misreporting does not appear to be a
concern. Perhaps a second reason for using broadly defined occupa
tions is that the number of cross-classifications of the data is held to
manageable proportions. This is especially true when the data are split
into two genders, three age groups, and two classes of immigrants (i.e.,
numerically restricted and numerically exempt). Thus, two broad
occupations are defined in our work: 1) professional, technical, and
kindred workers plus managers, officials, and proprietors (not includ
ing farm proprietors); and 2) craftspersons and laborers. The second
group includes everyone who declared an occupation and is not
included in the first group. A third category includes occupation not
reported, homemakers, the unemployed or retired, and students (not
including those under 20, who were eliminated from our data set).
The second problem, of not reporting an occupation, is potentially
more serious. For each of 60 source countries, Table 4.4 reports the
average percentage of persons 20 years of age and older who reported
an occupation over the period 1972-1991. These percentages vary
widely. The problem for analytical purposes is one analogous to
selectivity and results in measurement error. Moreover, these percent
ages may differ because labor force participation rates differ across
countries, or because different proportions of men and women are
included in the flows (the latter being related to labor force participa
tion). In the empirical work on skill composition that is reported in
Chapter 8, we include in each regression a variable for the percentage
of the immigrants from country / in year t who fail to report an occupa
tion. This variable is treated as endogenous (that is, assumed to be cor
related with unobserved country-specific effects) and thus provides a
control for the percentage who do not report an occupation.
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Table 4.4 Persons 20 Years Old and Over Who Reported an Occupation:
1972-1991 Country Means (%)
Region/Country
Africa
Botswana
Burundi
Egypt
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Tanzania
Tunisia
Zimbabwe

Mean
57.1
56.3
59.5
62.4
62.0
58.4
63.3
70.1
63.1
60.5
64.4

Asia
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand

51.8
51.1
60.4
41.0
39.4
60.8
55.1
56.0
56.3
62.9
49.4

Europe
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland

60.1
53.2
60.1
56.4
58.2
47.4
56.8
60.9
49.1

Region/Country
Europe (continued)
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia

Mean
67.4
53.6
59.5
58.9
51.1
59.9
63.7
59.6
55.6

North and Central America
Barbados
Canada
El Salvador
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Trinidad & Tobago

80.6
59.7
69.0
70.1
61.8
78.7
62.6
54.7
51.5
69.1

Oceania
Australia
Fiji
New Zealand

65.2
74.7
65.9

South America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela

58.2
52.9
58.0
65.5
57.6
65.6
45.5
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FLAWS IN THE INS DATA
For certain years, two types of flaws are present in the INS Public
Use Tapes, and because each could cause a discontinuity in the time
series on immigrant admittances from various source countries, each
must be addressed.
Missing Records for 1979
The data for 1979 are not complete: only about 85 percent of total
admittances are included in the file. The INS discovered eight years
later that a number of 1979 entries were exact duplicates (one immedi
ately following the other with the same immigrant identification num
ber) and concluded that these were due to a conscious human act. The
INS then purged the file of all such duplicate observations. (The INS
1979 Statistical Yearbook erroneously includes these duplicate entries.)
The INS determine'd that the duplicate records were substituted for
actual immigrants and based on preference-category expectations
determined that about 15 percent of all 1979 immigrant records were
lost.
Because there is no way of restoring the missing information, we
felt it necessary to carefully examine the 1979 data to determine, to the
best of our ability, whether any bias was introduced by what might
have been the systematic exclusion of a certain group or groups. We
studied aggregate time-series information on many variables, such as
gender, age by gender (with 12 specific age classes identified), and
occupation. We found no indication that 1979 data were unusual, in
the sense that no break occurred in the temporal patterns of the frac
tions of all immigrants who were accounted for by our various groups.
Thus, we used the 1979 data as we received them. In our analytical
model, we control for unobserved temporal effects that, among other
things, could account for any anomaly for 1979. We feel that, for our
purposes, the problem with the 1979 data is not a major obstacle.
Missing Information for Certain Years
The second flaw in the INS data is perhaps more serious, but unlike
the 1979 problem, it is correctable. For the years 1980-1983, informa-
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tion on gender, occupation, country of last permanent residence, port
of entry, marital status, nationality, state and area of intended resi
dence, nonimmigrant class of entry, and nonimmigrant year of entry is
missing from a number of records. Experts at INS, who were not
working for the agency when the problem occurred, have no idea what
caused the information to be lost. 9 Elimination of refugees from the
sample removes many of the incomplete records, but for the 60 coun
tries used in our study, a large number of observations (Table 4.5)
remain with no information on gender and occupation, which are criti
cal variables for our study. 10
For the records with missing information, gender was imputed in the
following way. First, for the observations with no missing data, gender
was transformed into a dummy variable (1 = female; 0 = male) and was
regressed on other immigrant characteristics for which information
was complete. The independent variables in this regression were pref
erence category (six dummies, one for each of the six preference cate
gories), age, principal immigrant versus beneficiary (dummy), new
arrival versus adjustment of status (dummy), and labor certification or
not (dummy). For certain years, two different labor certification vari
ables were used. These regressions were estimated separately for each
of the 60 countries and for each year (for a total of 240 regressions; for
exceptions, see Appendix A, Table Al). The R2 values for each country
and each year for which data were imputed are reasonably high, with
almost all in excess of 0.40 and most at or above 0.50 (Table Al).
These regressions were then used to predict gender for the observations
for which this information was missing. For predicted values of 0.5
and higher, 1.0 was assigned to the observation (female); for those with
a predicted value of less than 0.5, zero was assigned (male).
The same procedure also was followed in an attempt to impute the
missing values for occupation. However, this effort was unsuccessful.
For every source country, the percentage of total immigration
accounted for by those who reported no occupation far exceeds the
percentage who reported one of the two broad occupational groupings
with which we worked. Consequently, based on predicted values, the
regression assigned the category with the highest probability, which
was almost always "no occupation reported."
As an alternative, we compared the observations with missing data
to those with complete data for the entire sample and several of the
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Table 4.5 Detail on Incomplete INS Records for 1980-1983

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983

Total records
with
missing
Total
data
immigrants
132,541
530,639
130,351
596,600
594,131
21,512
22,680
559,763

Share
of total
(%)
25.0
21.8
3.6
4.1

Records in
Share of
sample
with
sample
60-country
sample missing data
(%)
52,541
17.5
300,006
11.7
40,674
348,170
4.8
13,680
287,495
4.8
13,921
289,249

largest source countries. For the most part, the percentage of immi
grants in each classification was found to be very similar. For example,
in the complete group, 1.4 percent are first-preference immigrants,
41.0 percent are numerically exempt, and 24.5 percent are adjustments
of status; the respective percentages for the missing group are 1.4,
41.4, and 24.2." We thus assumed that the occupational distribution
also was comparable between the two groups, and we allocated the
same percentage of the incomplete observations to each of the three
occupational groups as that group represents of the complete observa
tions.
This procedure was followed separately for each country and for
each year. This approach obviously has the shortcoming of not assign
ing occupations to the micro observations, as we did with gender,
which prevents occupations from directly being cross-tabulated with
other variables. When we needed to cross-tabulate information (for
240 cells), the same procedure was followed, with the missing observa
tions assigned to the 240 cells in the same proportion that those cells
represented in the complete sample. This procedure, however, over
writes the individual gender estimates by assigning all attributes
(numerically restricted/exempt, gender, age, and occupation) of the
cell.
As shown in Table 4.6, for 1981 the observations for which informa
tion is missing are strongly biased toward adjustments of status. The
same is also true for 1982 and 1983, although the bias is not quite as
strong. For 1980, new arrivals and adjustments have virtually the same
distribution. For 1981, 1982, and 1983, the observations with partial
information lean toward the numerically exempt category relative to

Table 4.6 Comparison of Missing and Complete Records for the 60-Country Sample, 1980-1983 (%)

New arrivals
Adjustment of status

1980
Complete
Missing
75.8
75.5
24.5
24.2

Preference category
58.6
Numerically restricted
1.4
First preference
23.6
preference
Second
5.3
Third preference
1.6
Fourth preference
18.2
Fifth preference
5.4
preference
Sixth
3.1
Other
41.4
Numerically exempt

1981
Missing
Complete
86.3
28.4
71.6
13.7

1.4
23.9
4.4
1.8
18.4
5.4
3.8
41.0

47.5

32.6

52.9

44.8

54.9

47.9
2.0
23.0
6.1
3.7
13.9
6.2
0.1

1.6
15.8
11.7
3.0
8.5
7.0
0.4

1.9
23.6
6.1
3.9
13.6
5.5
0.8

1.5
16.9
10.0
3.7
8.5
5.3
1.3

1.3
20.3
3.3
3.1
17.9
4.8
16.7

1.1
15.6
9.5
2.1
7.7
7.2
9.3

1983
Complete
Missing
77.6
38.9
22.4
61.1

55.2

47.1

67.4

52.5

59.0

1982
Missing
Complete
48.8
75.7
24.3
51.2

52.1

45.1
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the numerically restricted category, although the bias is not as strong as
for new entrants/adjustments. Table 4.6 also reports differences within
preference categories.
The INS is certain that the missing information relates to specific
months during which individuals gained legal resident alien status.
This type of omission is not as serious as one related to other variables,
such as port of entry, because here the omissions would have been systejnatically biased toward specific source countries.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE INS DATA

Compared to cross-sectional data, time-series data on migration are
quite rare. However, even when time series data are available, they
rarely provide detailed migrant characteristics (e.g., gender, age, mari
tal status, education, employment status, and earnings). For example,
for the United States, the major time-series data set relating to internal
migration is the Internal Revenue Service file. These data provide con
siderable spatial detail (states and counties), and income class, but con
tain no information on gender, age, or any other demographic measure
of interest.
A major advantage of the INS data is that they have both a temporal
(year) and a cross-sectional (source-country) dimension. Moreover,
they provide considerable demographic detail. Economic information
on the immigrants is largely lacking, which is a serious drawback to
economists, but the INS Public Use Tapes are the best available data
source for the study of U.S. immigration by immigrant class. Although
the INS Public Use Tapes have shortcomings, these data also present a
great research opportunity.

COMPOSITION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION, 1972-1991

In Chapter 3, we considered historical trends beginning in 1821 in
gender, age, and skill composition. Here we focus on the 1972-1991
period and (for the most part) on the 60 countries that make up our
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sample. During this 20-year period, noteworthy aggregate changes
occurred in each measure of composition that we study. For specific
countries, the changes were often quite pronounced.
Immigrant Gender
Although many believe that immigration is dominated by young
males, and although this belief is accurate for international migration
in parts of the world, it is not true for legal immigration to the United
States, at least with respect to legal immigration over the last 25 years
(Table 4.7). 12 Through the 1970s, the gender composition favored
females by between 7.2 percentage points (1976) and 4.4 percentage
points (1979). However, during the 1980s, the flows began moving
toward equality and during most years slightly favored males. This
change was due in part to the increased admittance of refugees, which
tend to be strongly oriented toward males. For example, in 1984, 56.6
percent of 92,127 refugees were males; corresponding figures for 1986
and 1988, respectively, are 56.0 percent of 104,383 and 55.2 percent of
81,719. 13
During the early 1990s, the gender composition shifted strongly
toward males. In 1990, the differential favored males by 6.6 percent
age points; in 1991, almost two-thirds of the legally admitted immi
grants were male. However, this shift was transitory and was
associated with the legalization of previously illegal migrants under
IRCA. Persons of Mexican birth were the primary beneficiaries of
legalization (in 1991, 79.0 percent of 946,167 persons born in Mexico
who received legal status were male). 14
An important aspect of gender composition is immigrant class of
entry. Table 4.8 reports, by gender, immigrants who entered as numer
ically restricted and numerically exempt from our 60-nation set. These
data exclude both refugees and persons legalized under IRCA. Several
points are noteworthy. First, the 60-country sample favors females
more than does overall immigration. The percentage of females in the
sample never falls below 50.3 percent for any year. Second, the pattern
seen earlier, in which the female share falls toward 50 percent and then
begins to rise again, is more characteristic of numerically exempt
immigrants than numerically restricted immigrants. In many years, the
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Table 4.7 Gender of U.S. Immigrants, 1970-1996 (%)
Female
Year
Male
1970
52.6
47.4
1971
53.4
46.6
1972
53.3
46.7
1973
53.4
46.6
1974
53.3
46.7
1975
53.2
46.8
1976
53.6
46.4
1977
53.1
46.9
1978
47.6
52.4
1979
52.2
47.8
52.1 a
47.9a
1980
52.4a
47.6a
1981
49.7
1982
50.3
49.3
1983
50.7
1984
49.5
50.5
49.8
1985
50.2
50.0
1986
50.0
1987
50.1
49.9
49.5
1988
50.5
49.6
1989
50.4
46.7
1990
53.3
1991
33.6
66.4
49.0
1992
51.0
1993
53.1
46.9
1994
53.7
46.3
1995
46.3
53.7
1996
46.2
53.8
SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statisti
cal Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, vari
ous years.
a Number is taken from INS Public Use Tapes and does not include
refugees.
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Table 4.8 Gender of Numerically Restricted and Numerically Exempt
U.S. Immigrants Aged 20 and Over for 60 Countries,
1972-1991 (%)
Exempt

Restricted

All
Year

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

1972

44.8

55.2

48.2

51.8

36.8

63.2

1973

44.4

55.6

47.1

52.9

38.7

61.3

1974

44.2

55.8

47.3

52.7

38.3

61.7

1975

44.5

55.5

47.6

52.4

38.1

61.9

1976

43.7

56.3

48.2

51.8

35.5

64.5

1977

44.6

55.4

48.3

51.7

38.8

61.2

1978

44.1

55.9

48.6

51.4

36.0

64.0

1979

44.4

55.6

49.4

50.6

38.2

61.8

1980

45.5

54.5

49.1

50.9

41.4

58.6

1981

45.3

54.7

47.8

52.2

41.4

58.6

1982

46.7

53.3

49.6

50.4

44.1

55.9

1983

47.9

52.1

50.5

49.5

45.7

54.3

1984

48.2

51.8

50.0

50.0

46.9

53.1

1985

47.9

52.1

50.1

49.9

46.2

53.8

1986

47.6

52.4

50.0

50.0

46.0

54.0

1987

47.9

52.1

49.9

50.1

46.3

53.7

1988

49.7

50.3

50.4

49.6

49.4

50.6

53.4

50.1

49.9

43.9

56.1

55.6

50.1

49.9

40.1

59.9

56.5

49.6

50.4

39.0

61.0

1989

46.6

1990

44.4

1991

43.5
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differential favors exempt females by over 10 percentage points and in
some cases by over 20.
Immigrant Age
The age composition of U.S. immigration also has changed over
time (Table 4.9). The percentage of male immigrants accounted for by
the youngest age class (under 10 years old) has fallen regularly since
1970 (in 1970, 19.0 percent, but in 1992, only 9.8 percent). The per
centage of male immigrants of age 50 and over has risen regularly,
from 7.9 percent in 1970 to 11.3 percent in 1992. The percentage aged
20-29 first increased (from 24.5 percent in 1970 to 30.0 percent in
1982) and then declined (to 26.9 percent in 1988).
As is the case for males, the percentage of females under 10 years
old has fallen steadily, from 16.7 percent in 1970 to 9.9 percent in 1992
(Table 4.9). 15 The percentage of females aged 50 and over increased
from 9.2 percent in 1970 to 14.4 percent in 1992. The percentage of
women in this age class consistently has been greater than the percent
age of men. The longer life expectancy of females is one explanation
for their relatively heavier representation in the older age classes.
Notable is the decline in the percentage of female immigrants aged 2029, who accounted for 31.3 percent of female immigrants in 1976 but
26.6 percent in 1992. This decrease, as well as decreases for each
younger age class, was offset by increases for each of the older age
groups, not just for the group 50 and over.
As with gender composition, age composition is highly sensitive to
whether the immigrants are numerically restricted or numerically
exempt (Tables 4.10 and 4.11). For the 60-country sample, the age
composition of males and females within each class of entry is quite
similar. However, for each year, the exempt group has far larger shares
of persons in the 55-64 age class than the restricted group, which is
due to the family reunification provisions of U.S. law. Moreover,
among exempt immigrants, the age group 55-64 has grown quite dra
matically, to more than 20 percent of each gender in 1991. This growth
has been mainly at the expense of the youngest age group reported
(20-34), because the 35-54 age class also has increased over time.
Differences in age composition between numerically restricted and

Table 4.9 Age of Male and Female U.S. Immigrants (%)
Age
(years)
Under 10
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
80 and over

1970
19.0
18.5
24.5
20.1
9.9
4.6
2.4
0.7
0.2

1976
16.5
19.1
28.2
17.8
8.2
5.0
3.6
1.4
0.3

Males
1982
14.3
20.2
30.0
18.2
8.0
4.6
3.2
1.3
0.3

1988
10.7
16.3
26.9
22.5
11.5
6.3
4.1
1.4
0.3

1992
9.8
17.5
28.3
22.5
10.7
5.8
3.8
1.4
0.3

1970
16.7
18.2
30.4
16.7
8.8
4.9
3.1
1.0
0.2

1976
14.4
17.3
31.3
15.5
8.0
6.4
4.8
1.9
0.4

Females
1982
13.8
18.6
29.0
17.2
8.2
6.3
4.6
1.9
0.4

1988
10.8
15.6
27.3
20.4
10.7
7.6
5.3
1.9
0.5

1992
9.9
17.0
26.6
21.2
10.8
7.1
5.1
1.8
0.4
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Table 4.10 Age of Numerically Restricted Male and Female Immigrants
Aged 20 and Over for 60 Countries, 1972-1991 (%)
Males

Females

Year

20-34

35-54

55-64

20-34

35-54

55-64

1972

65.1

29.8

5.1

64.5

28.9

6.6

1973

63.4

31.0

5.6

63.7

29.0

7.4

1974

64.7

30.4

4.9

65.5

27.9

6.6

1975

65.1

29.9

5.0

64.8

28.4

6.8

1976

66.2

28.5

5.3

65.0

27.2

7.8

1977

65.1

29.1

5.8

63.9

28.0

8.1

1978

61.9

32.3

5.9

64.0

29.5

6.6

1979

62.0

33.2

4.8

63.6

32.1

4.3

1980

65.2

30.6

4.2

64.6

30.8

4.6

1981

59.0

35.5

5.5

63.6

31.3

5.1

1982

64.2

32.4

3.4

64.9

31.6

3.5

1983

63.0

33.0

3.9

64.3

32.5

3.2

1984

61.3

34.4

4.3

63.3

33.3

3.5

1985

62.8

33.3

3.9

64.6

32.3

3.1

1986

60.3

35.6

4.1

63.8

33.0

3.2

1987

60.8

35.0

4.2

64.1

32.8

3.1

1988

58.0

37.4

4.7

62.5

34.3

3.3

1989

60.0

35.6

4.4

63.0

33.8

3.2

1990

57.6

37.3

5.1

61.4

35.0

3.6

1991

58.0

36.8

5.2

61.7

34.6

3.7
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Table 4.11 Age of Numerically Exempt Male and Female Immigrants for
60 Countries, 1972-1991 (%)
Females

Males
35-54

55-64

20-34

35-54

55-64

13.5

70.7

16.6

12.7

11.2

70.7

17.3

12.1

16.0

12.0

68.4

18.0

13.6

69.2

16.2

14.7

65.4

18.2

16.4

1976

66.4

14.8

18.8

64.8

16.5

18.7

1977

64.2

15.7

20.1

60.7

17.3

22.1

1978

65.0

16.4

18.7

61.3

18.7

20.0

1979

60.2

16.3

23.5

56.7

18.9

24.5

Year

20-34

1972

70.9

15.7

1973

73.5

15.3

1974

72.0

1975

1980

63.8

17.2

19.0

57.4

18.6

24.0

1981

61.3

16.7

22.0

55.1

18.8

26.1

1982

63.5

18.5

18.0

55.9

20.2

23.9

1983

66.4

17.7

15.9

57.3

20.2

22.5

1984

68.1

17.1

14.8

58.6

19.9

21.6

1985

67.0

18.0

15.0

58.4

20.1

21.5

1986

65.9

18.4

15.7

57.5

20.1

22.5

1987

64.5

20.0

15.5

57.1

20.6

22.3

1988

52.3

33.5

14.3

51.1

29.1

19.9

1989

58.7

23.2

18.1

56.1

22.1

21.9

1990

56.8

22.4

20.8

57.0

20.9

22.1

22.3

22.2

56.1

21.4

22.5

1991

55.5
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numerically exempt immigrants again serve to emphasize the impor
tance of disaggregating along these lines.
When we move beyond these aggregate figures to study the gender
and age composition of immigration from specific countries, we
uncover considerable variability. Table 4.12 reports gender and age
composition in broad terms for 1972 and 1988 for selected countries.
(We report 1988 data because they include no legalizations, in contrast
to 1989-1991 [see Table 4.1]). Four observations are noteworthy.
First, wide variations in gender composition exist across countries for a
given year. For example, in 1972, 70.8 percent of immigrants from
Germany were female, versus 45.4 percent from India; in 1988, 72.1
percent from Germany and 41.1 percent from Haiti were female. Sec
ond, for any given country of birth, considerable changes have occurred
over time in gender composition. In 1972, 54.3 percent of immigrants
from Haiti were female, but in 1988, only 41.1 percent; from the U.K.,
58.9 percent were female in 1972, and 49.6 percent in 1988.
Third, for any given year, gender-specific age composition also var
ies widely among countries. For example, in 1988, 3.6 percent of the
female immigrants from Germany were 50 years of age or older, versus
23.8 percent from India. For the same year, only 11.0 percent of the
male immigrants from Haiti were less than 20 years of age, versus 42.9
percent from Korea. Fourth, for any given country of birth, consider
able changes have occurred in gender-specific age composition over
time. India and the Philippines provide strong support for this observa
tion. In 1972, 1.5 percent of the male immigrants and 1.5 percent of
the female immigrants from India were 50 and over; by 1988, the com
parable figures were 20.3 percent and 23.8 percent. For the same
years, the percentage of male immigrants 50 and over from the Philip
pines grew from 6.1 percent to 20.4 percent, and the percentage of
females from 7.1 percent to 21.9 percent. The countries reported in
Table 4.12 were chosen because they are or have been particularly
important sources of U.S. immigrants; other countries may have even
greater ranges.
Skill Composition
For numerically restricted immigrants 20 years of age and over in
our 60-country sample, Table 4.13 reports annual data for our three

Table 4.12 Gender and Age of U.S. Immigrants from Selected Countries, 1972 and 1988
Total immigration
Country
1972
1988
Germany
6,645
6,848
Haiti
5,809 34,806
India
16,926 26,268
Korea
18,876 34,703
Mexico
64,040 95,039
Philippines 29,376 50,697
U.K.
10,078 13,228

Female (%)
1972
1988
70.8
72.1
54.3
41.1
45.4
49.4
61.8
56.9
49.3
43.9
60.1
58.4
49.6
58.9

Aged 50 and over (%)
Male
Female
1972
1988
1972
1988
6.4
6.1
6.8
3.6
7.5
9.4
12.1
9.7
1.5
20.3
1.5
23.8
13.4
3.8
3.9
16.6
5.4
10.3
7.2
13.8
6.1
20.4
7.1
21.9
10.2
8.0
11.2
8.2

Aged less than 20 (%)
Female
Male
1988
1972
1988
1972
18.6
45.8
31.5
27.4
16.3
57.3
11.0
50.9
18.5
24.0
22.6
23.5
37.4
42.9
32.5
34.3
49.9
17.6
48.2
20.9
24.2
40.3
35.0
26.2
24.4
28.1
24.5
37.7

SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 7972 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 9;
Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1988, Table 12.
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Table 4.13 Numerically Restricted U.S. Immigrants Aged 20 and Over,
by Gender and Occupation for the 60-Country Sample,
1972-1991 (%)
Females

Males
Year
1972
1973

PTKa

1974
1975
1976
1977

31.1
33.2
34.3

40.6
34.9

37.0
29.9
33.7
35.7
27.4
35.6
32.4
31.6
31.4
30.8
31.3

Other
51.6
55.6
58.0
57.1
53.9
48.9
56.7
51.2
47.5
58.6
45.1
48.3
45.7
44.4
44.4
44.7

No
occupation
7.8
9.5
10.9
9.7
11.8
14.2
13.4
15.2
16.8
14.0
19.3

pTKa

21.2
19.9
17.7
19.3
19.7
18.3
12.9
15.4
13.0
14.0
14.8
15.9
15.7
14.3
14.6
15.4

Other
22.1
19.5
21.3
21.4
21.6
26.4
30.1
30.0
32.7
32.5
31.6

No
occupation
56.8
60.6
61.0
59.3
58.7
55.3
57.0
54.6
54.3
53.5
53.6
53.3
53.6
55.6
55.6
54.0

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
19.3
30.9
22.8
30.7
1984
24.2
30.1
1985
1986
24.9
29.8
24.0
1987
30.6
1988
20.3
15.6
32.0
52.4
29.3
50.4
16.1
31.1
1989
48.8
21.6
52.8
29.6
22.3
17.3
1990
31.0
46.7
30.0
52.7
23.0
16.5
29.7
53.8
1991
30.6
46.4
PTK = professional, technical, and kindred plus managers, officials, and proprietors.
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occupational groups (i.e., professional, technical, and kindred workers,
as well as managers, officials, and proprietors; all others who report an
occupation; and no occupation reported, homemakers, unemployed
and retired persons, and students). Table 4,14 shows the same data for
numerically exempt immigrants. To ascertain the significance of any
trend in the data reported in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, we estimated the fol
lowing simple regression for each share:
Eq. 4.1

PCT, = a, + ftr + e,-,

where PCT, is the percentage point share for each group identified in
the two tables and Tis a simple linear time trend (i.e., 7=1,2,..., 20).
The regression results are reported in Table 4.15; all estimated constant
terms and coefficients are highly significant.
Among numerically restricted males, the share of the highest skill
class fell significantly, but so did the share of immigrants with less
skills (Table 4.15). The percentage reporting no occupation increased.
Among numerically restricted females, the share of the group with the
highest skills also declined significantly, but the share in the lower skill
class increased significantly and the share reporting no occupation
declined (Table 4.15).
The highest-skilled numerically exempt males behaved much like
numerically restricted males in that their share also declined, but it fell
much more rapidly between 1977 and 1988. The share of less-skilled
immigrants also declined and those who reported no occupation
increased (Table 4.15), The pattern for numerically exempt females in
the highest skill class increased significantly over the 1972-1991
period, but the overall share for this group is not large, as indicated by
the relatively low constant term (o^-) reported in Table 4.15. As with
numerically restricted females, the share of numerically exempt
females with less skills increased, and the share reporting no occupa
tion declined.
As suggested by Borjas (e.g., 1990) in connection with census data,
the fraction of males with the highest skills declined significantly over
the 1972-1991 period. However, the fraction with lower skills also
declined. One explanation that Borjas offers for declining skill compo:
sition is that immigrants have increasingly originated in countries with

Legal U.S. Immigration

85

Table 4.14 Numerically Exempt U.S. Immigrants Aged 20 and Over, by
Gender and Occupation for the 60-Country Sample,
1972-1991 (%)
Females

Males

Other

No
occupation

6.7

13.2

80.0

13.1

6.9

14.6

78.4

66.5

13.7

6.6

16.4

77.0

22.3

62.3

15.4

7.8

15.9

76.4

23.2

58.5

18.4

7.2

15.9

76.9

1977

23.9

58.0

18.0

8.8

18.4

72.9

1978

23.1

59.1

17.8

10.5

22.6

1979

21.5

59.7

18.8

9.1

21.4

66.9
69.3

1980

21.1

56.2

22.7

9.0

19.8

71.2

1981

21.3

57.4

21.4

9.4

20.8

69.8

1982

21.7

55.9

22.4

10.1

20.4

69.6

1983

17.6

61.3

21.2

9.5

22.2

68.3

1984

16.4

59.9

23.7

8.9

22.1

69.0

1985

16.4

56.9

26.8

.9.3

22.4

68.3

1986

15.8

55.9

28.3

9.1

22.5

68.4

1987

14.8

56.6

28.6

8.7

22.0

69.3

1988

15.3

54.5

30.2

7.6

33.3

59.0

1989

15.8

53.9

30.4

8.7

20.7

70.6

Year

pTKa

Other

No
occupation

1972

21.1

64.7

14.2

1973

20.9

66.0

1974

19.8

1975
1976

pTKa

1990

18.7

45.1

36.2

11.4

17.9

70.7

1991

19.5

42.7

37.8

11.1

17.0

71.9

a PTK = professional, technical, and kindred plus managers, officials, and proprietors.
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Table 4.15 Simple Linear Regressions for Trends in Immigrant Skill
Shares, 1972-199P
Immigration class

a,

Pi

Adjusted R2

Males
PTKb

34.65***

-0.23***

€.21

Other

57.01***

-0.63***

0.47

8.36***

0.85***

0.82

Females
pTKa

18.48***

-0.20***

0.21

Other

22 41***

0.55***

0.53

No occupation

59.14***

-0.36***

0.61

Males
PTKa

23.19***

—0 35***

0.47

Other

66.27***

-0.83***

0.68

No occupation

10 54***

1 }g***

0.94

Females
PTKa

7.40***

0.14***

0.32

Other

16.37***

0.36***

0.19

No occupation

76.11***

_049***

0.35

Numerically restricted

No occupation

Numerically exempt

a *** inciicates absolute t > 1.96.
b PTK = professional, technical, and kindred plus managers, officials, and proprietors.
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less-skilled occupational structures. Since our sample of countries is
large, this is also a possible explanation for our observation.
The overall percentage of females in the highest skill class fell, but
that for the relatively small group of numerically exempt females
increased (Table 4.15). Although the number of females in the highest
skill class remained relatively low, it increased by a factor of almost 4
between 1972 and 1991. The percentage of females who reported no
occupation decreased, but the corresponding percentage of males
increased fairly substantially (Table 4.15). We do not know exactly
why this latter increase occurred. It probably was in part the result of
the increased fraction of older males who entered the United States, but
other factors were undoubtedly also operating.

Notes
1. See U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, for data from 1978 to the present. For
earlier years, a limited number of variables is available in various INS annual
reports.
2. Although 1971 data are not available on the INS Public Use Tapes, they have been
used to conduct quite innovative research. See Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982).
3. The figure for 1991 includes 1,123,162 immigrants who were legalized under the
terms of IRCA. Such legalized immigrants are not represented in the data used in
this study; we analyze "normal" immigration.
4. In our analytical work, this quarter is not included in any way.
5. Using refugee designations in the microdata files, we were able to exclude certain
individuals who are not discernible in the published INS data.
6. For 1972 and 1973, immigrant occupations correspond to the occupations
reported in the 1960 census. For 1974-1982, immigrant occupations correspond
to those used in the 1970 census. For 1983-1991, the categories correspond to
those given in the 1980 census, which relative to the previous censuses used farmore-aggregated categories.
7. For these individuals, the prospective U.S. employer actually reports a job title in
the labor certification process, and this title yields occupation.
8. Regarding occupation coding, Michael D. Hoefer of the Demographic Statistics
Branch of INS writes that "since new arrivals are coded at a central location . . .
their quality is better than for adjustments. I have reason to believe that this is true
based on comparing the occupational distributions by visa type. The percentage
of unknown occupations is lower for new arrivals than adjustments; and this holds
even for labor qualifying immigrants, who have the same source document for
both adjustments and new arrivals" (private correspondence to M.G.).
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9. Partial information regarding the lost files was created by INS through the use of
separate records. However, the information on these records was not as extensive
as that on the lost files.
10. For example, for 1980, of 132,541 records with missing data, 55,500 are for refu
gees.
11. A particularly large discrepancy does occur in 1981, with 71.6 percent of the
missing observations being adjustments of status compared with only 13.7 per
cent in the complete group. However, even for 1981 the approach used here could
not have been badly misleading. The vast majority of observations with missing
information are from countries that supplied the United States with relatively
many immigrants, and for these countries the observations with missing informa
tion were only a small fraction of the total. Thus, the distributions were based on
relatively large fractions of the total, not on relatively small fractions.
12. A widely distributed U.N. document concerned with international migration
asserts that "generally, migrants have included a larger number of males than
females and have been over-represented in the working age and under-represented
in the ages of childhood and old age, compared to the total population" (United
Nations 1979, p. 54).
13. More recently, however, the gender composition of refugees has become more
equal. In 1993, 51.0 percent of 127,343 refugees were male; in 1994, 50.9 per
cent of 121,434 refugees were male; and in 1995, 51.5 percent of 114,664 were
male (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997, p. 92).
14. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1992, p. 52.
15. Although in more recent years the male and female shares of children in the U.S.
immigration flow have converged, in general the male share under 10 years old is
greater than the female share in this age class. Many explanations are possible for
this phenomenon, ranging from more purely demographic to more purely eco
nomic. For example, due to gender-selective abortions and infanticide, many
countries around the world are known to have female population deficits. The
same forces that favor such behavior could also cause female children to be left
behind when part of a family migrates. Preferences for male adoptees in the
United States could have the same result. Finally, such a phenomenon could be
part of family long-term investment strategies that favor sending male children to
the United States.

5 Modeling Flows
of U.S. Immigration
"Determinants" of migration is a term used to broadly describe the
factors that influence decisions to migrate. An empirical model of the
determinants of U.S. immigration assesses which factors are statisti
cally significant and which are not in shaping migration flows to the
United States.
The importance of two types of characteristics may be assessed.
First, personal characteristics (such as age, gender, schooling, marital
status, English language ability, and many more) are of interest, but the
data set that we use contains a limited number of personal characteris
tics. Second, place characteristics are potentially important. Because
we know the country of birth of each legal resident alien allowed to
enter the United States, we are able to develop a fairly rich set of infor
mation concerning where the migrants came from.
The models developed in this study are based on the immigrant's
country of birth for two main reasons: 1) under U.S. immigration law,
country of birth is a primary consideration for admission as a (numeri
cally limited) legal resident alien; and 2) most legal immigrants have a
country of last permanent residence that is the same as their country of
birth. 1

PRIOR MODELS

Much of the research on the determinants of U.S.-bound migration
has focused on the nation's laissez-faire period, when institutional
impediments to immigration were either nonexistent or few and when
restrictions on emigration from source countries were low. This focus
is perhaps chosen because binding immigration constraints (such as
were put in place during the early 1920s) blunt the economic forces
underlying migration.
From an economist's perspective, differential economic opportunity
plays a key role in explaining international migration in general and
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U.S. immigration in particular. The usual starting point for most eco
nomic analyses of the determinants of international migration is the
expected utility model, in which an individual economic agent (i.e., a
potential migrant in a particular source country) is assumed to maxi
mize a utility function subject to a budget constraint. Money or real
wage (or income) differentials are presumed to reflect opportunities for
utility gains. Correspondingly, various measures of job opportunities
are presumed to reflect the probability of employment. The potential
immigrant is then assumed to select from among alternative destination
countries the one that maximizes expected utility net of the costs of
moving.2 Of course, most potential migrants stay where they are either
because the benefits of moving to another country are sufficiently low
or because the costs are sufficiently high.
In the context of nineteenth and early twentieth century migration
from Europe to the United States, two related questions have been at
the center of the debate regarding the determinants of the movements:
1) Were migration flows from Europe to America caused by economic
conditions in Europe (the push of low wages and lagging employment
opportunities) or by economic conditions in America (the pull of rela
tively high wages and attractive employment opportunities)? 2) Were
differential job opportunities more or less important than differential
wages in determining the volume of transatlantic migration?
Economic historians, demographers, and others have long debated
these questions. 3 The debate has typically concerned transatlantic
migration until the early 1920s, when entry barriers in North America
appear to have significantly curbed the flows.4 Jerome (1926) was one
of the first to study this issue. He examined immigration from Europe
over a 100-year period up to the imposition of U.S. immigration quotas
in the 1920s. He concluded that economic conditions in the United
States were primarily responsible for short-cycle movements in Euro
pean emigration to the United States. Kuznets and Rubins (1954)
agreed with Jerome's findings.
Long cycles in transatlantic migration also have been studied. 5
Thomas's (1973) basic theme was that the interaction between the
United Kingdom and the United States played a crucial role in these
cycles. Thomas viewed the Atlantic economy of the period as consist
ing of Great Britain and a periphery of developing countries, including
the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia. Thomas did not
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downplay the role of the United States in determining transatlantic
migration, but rather placed Great Britain on a more equal footing. He
felt that before 1870, conditions in Europe were probably more impor
tant than those in the United States, but after 1870 these positions were
probably reversed.
Because long swings in European migration to the United States
seem to have coincided for most source countries, Kuznets (1958)
leaned strongly toward the importance of economic forces in the United
States: "Since it is highly unlikely that the timing of either birth cycles
or 'push' elements was the same in so many different parts of the world,
the similarity must be ascribed to some 'pull' factors" (p. 31). Easterlin
(1961) also argued for the dominance of conditions in the United States.
Swedish migration to the United States during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries has been studied intensely, starting with
D.S. Thomas (1941). Contrary to the generalizations of Kuznets and
others, she concluded that economic conditions in Sweden were rela
tively more important than those in the United States. Wilkinson
(1967), in his analysis of long swings in Swedish emigration to the
United States, found that changes in U.S. labor demand were more
important than those in Sweden. On the other hand, Quigley (1972),
studying migration from the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of
Sweden to the United States between 1867 and 1908, came down
squarely on the side of Thomas. His regression analysis shows that "the
influence of both Swedish agricultural and industrial conditions was as
important as corresponding conditions on the United States" (p. 121).
Quigley's findings suggest that emigration from the agricultural sector
was at least as sensitive to Swedish agricultural wages as to those in the
United States. Industrial wages in the United States provided a strong
attraction, but emigration from the Swedish industrial sector was very
sensitive to Swedish industrial wages. U.S. agricultural and industrial
wages are significant in Quigley's regression, but the coefficients are
not nearly as high as that for Swedish industrial wages.
Wilkinson (1970) developed annual time series data (1870-1913) on
immigration from Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden,
Italy, Russia, and France, as well as data relating to output and income
in the various countries. In his regression analysis, he also used a mea
sure of migrant stock (the number of persons born in country i and liv
ing in the United States at time i) as an explanatory variable. An
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important distinguishing feature of Wilkinson's study is that he specifi
cally tests for the relative importance of income and job opportunities,
where the latter variable is proxied by output. Wilkinson concluded
that "European migration to the United States prior to World War I was
significantly influenced by both employment opportunities in the par
ticular European country ... and the gain in real income to be achieved
by migration to the United States" (p. 277). He found that employment
opportunities in the United States were much less important than real
wages. Moreover, the stock of past migrants proves to be critical for
each country he studied except Russia. In addition, Wilkinson con
cluded that output expansion in the United States had no influence on
migration from either the United Kingdom or Germany to the United
States. Because the United Kingdom and Germany were major
sources of U.S. immigrants during the nineteenth century, these find
ings appear to be in sharp contrast to those of Kuznets and others, and
they have not gone unchallenged.
Gallaway and Vedder (1971), using British data that report annual
migration flows (1860-1913) from the United Kingdom to the United
States, as well as to Australia, Canada, and South Africa, developed
regression results somewhat different than those of Wilkinson. They
found that higher unemployment rates in the United Kingdom were
marginally significant in explaining migration to the United States, but
unemployment rates and changes in wage levels in the United States
were not significant. However, four of five dummy variables that
depict various "panics" in the United States are negative and highly
significant, suggesting that business conditions in the United States
were indeed important. Gallaway and Vedder attribute the differences
between their findings and Wilkinson's to what they judge to be an
inappropriate use of lagged variables by Wilkinson. On balance, Gallaway and Vedder concluded that both push and pull forces were operat
ing to drive transatlantic migration, but the pull forces were dominant.
Hatton and Williamson (1994) argue that no consensus exists on the
push versus pull issue, in part because the issue is a "false one." Poten
tial migrants almost certainly base their decisions on a comparison of
alternatives (including the present location), but ad hoc models com
bined with shaky data have yielded conflicting conclusions.
In general, historical studies of migration from Europe to the United
States and Canada suggest that economic conditions in the destination

Legal U.S. Immigration

93

countries, especially high wage rates and employment opportunities,
were attractive. Economic conditions in Europe also were of some
important in explaining the flows, and demographic conditions in
source countries almost certainly played a role. The costs of migrating
were important as well. In this respect, past settlement was a key
determinant of migration flows, because family and friends who previ
ously migrated provided not only information about America, but also
cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to the former place of residence.

MODELING THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES
Numerous motives obviously underlie the decisions about whether
and when to move to the United States. The model developed here
emphasizes the importance of both differential economic advantage
between various source countries and the United States, as well as the
ease with which a prospective migrant can transfer accumulated occu
pational skills to the U.S. labor market (Greenwood and McDowell
1991). Moreover, we presume that, ceteris paribus, the presence or
absence of different types of social programs in source countries will
influence differential economic advantage, because these programs
entail income transfers between various groups in those countries.
Potential migrants are assumed to be optimizers who choose their
utility-maximizing location subject to their budget constraint. The
potential migrant's utility in the home country is a function of income
and the relative "attractiveness" of the home country. The individual
decides to move to the United States when expected maximum utility,
which is a function of expected market earnings, income transfers, and
amenities, exceeds anticipated utility in the home country by an
amount greater than the costs associated with migration.
The ease or difficulty of migrating to the United States is influenced
importantly by U.S. immigration policy. U.S. entry requirements may
alter the force of economic and other types of influences in numerous
ways. For example, a large and growing group of immigrants has been
exempt from the quota limitations of U.S. law, and they incur lower
costs of moving to the United States both because they need not wait
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for a preference visa and because of their family ties. Another group
has already entered the United States as nonimmigrants and has
already borne many of the costs associated with migration; certain
members of this group are able to "adjust" their status to legal resident
alien (i.e., immigrant).
An important aspect of this chapter is to estimate the magnitudes of
the influence of various determinants of U.S. immigration. In the
model that follows, immigrants who are numerically restricted are dis
tinguished from those who are numerically exempt. The models esti
mated in this study contain several vectors of variables, including
differential economic opportunity, the cost of migration, the political
attractiveness and religion of potential source countries, U.S. immigra
tion policy, and social programs in origin countries, as well as certain
features of these programs. (See Appendix B for definitions of the
variables.) The models are of the following general form:
Eq. 5.1

mit - fy vijt + eit

where
mit = the rate of U.S. immigration from country / during year r, and
the rate is defined relative to the population of / during t\
fy. = j vectors of estimated coefficients;
vijt = J vectors °f explanatory variables relating to country / during
year t\ and
eit = error terms.
Differential Economic Opportunities
The differential economic opportunity vector contains five elements:
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of country / relative to that of
the United States, measured in U.S. dollars; the rate of growth of real
GDP in country / averaged over the three previous years relative to a
comparable rate for the United States; country f s central government
revenues, expressed as a percentage of /'s GDP; the percentage of f s
population residing in urban areas; and the percentage of country /'s
labor force that is female.
Countries with a relatively high per capita GDP have smaller earn
ings differentials relative to the United States, which should reduce
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emigration. In countries with relatively rapid growth of real GDP, job
prospects in the country ought to be more attractive, again reducing
emigration. Central government revenue as a percentage of GDP mea
sures the extent of government taxes (and perhaps of government trans
fer activity) within a country. The burdens of taxes fall most heavily
on workers, who tend to be those individuals in the age groups with the
highest propensities to migrate. Given that we directly control for
numerous types of transfers (which are discussed in detail below), we
expect higher levels of government revenues to encourage migration.
The percentage of the source-country's population that is urban pro
vides a measure of economic development; ceteris paribus, the rate of
migration to the United States ought to be lower from more highly
urbanized and developed countries. Female participation in formal
labor markets is proxied by the percentage of country /'s labor force
that is female. Where jobs in formal labor markets are relatively more
available to women, their employment prospects at home should be
better, with the consequence that their emigration should be discour
aged. However, higher female labor force participation should also
reflect a larger pool of potential economic migrants from country i to
the United States, thus clouding the expected direction of its influence.
Therefore, we do not specify a priori a sign on female labor force in
the immigration-rate regressions.
Migration Costs
The vector for the costs of migration to the United States contains
six variables, three associated with direct entry costs and three associ
ated with the costs of transferring skills. Direct entry cost variables
include distance (the estimated airline mileage between the principal
city of country i and the nearest major U.S. city); country f s crude
birth rate; and a measure of the number of U.S. armed forces personnel
(as well as U.S. citizen employees of the military) who were stationed
in country / during year t, relative to the population of / during year t.
Distance serves as a proxy for the money costs (as well as the nonmoney costs) of moving farther away from relatives and friends. High
birth rates are likely to be associated with larger family size, and the
larger the family, the higher the migration costs. Finally, spouses of
U.S. military personnel enter the United States as numerically exempt
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from immigration quotas, and, after a five-year wait and meeting other
requirements, they may qualify for U.S. citizenship. As U.S. citizens
21 years of age and older, they may reunite with their parents, who are
also exempt from quota restrictions. Therefore, potential immigrants
from source countries with higher direct costs (e.g., more distant,
higher birth rate, few U.S. military persons) should, on average, have
lower propensities to migrate to the United States.
Migration costs are also incurred because some portion of an immi
grant's accumulated human capital (knowledge and skills) may not be
perfectly transferable internationally. Three variables are included to
capture these losses: a dummy variable that equals 1 if country /'s offi
cial U.N. language is English; a measure of country f s education level,
which is proxied by the number of students at the third level (i.e., uni
versities and other institutions of higher education) expressed as a frac
tion of total population (and then multiplied by 100); and the number
of natives of country i who attended a U.S. university during t, as a pro
portion of the country's population aged 20 to 24.
Expected skill losses should be lower for potential migrants from
English-speaking countries. Better educated individuals generally
have higher propensities to migrate, and they also should be better able
to adapt to the requirements of a new occupational environment; a
higher general level of education also may reflect an occupational mix
that is more like that of the United States. Finally, receiving an educa
tion at a U.S. university should enhance the ease with which an indi
vidual can transfer job skills to the United States. Because lower skill
losses should encourage migration, immigration to the United States
ought to be greater from English-speaking countries, from countries
with a relatively high level of education, and from countries that send
relatively many students to the U.S. schools.
Political Attractiveness and Religion
The political attractiveness of a country is presumed to be reflected
by its political competitiveness, which is measured by an index of
political rights ranging from 1.0 for countries with a fully competitive
electoral process to 7.0, indicating least free (Gastil 1987). Countries
with politically competitive systems are considered to be relatively
attractive. Political repression should be a push factor for emigration,

Legal U.S. Immigration

97

but, if domestic political repression is associated with emigration
restrictions, emigration will be reduced.
The measures of religion used here distinguish countries that are
primarily Catholic or Muslim, where a country is designated as Catho
lic (Muslim) if the country's population is made up of at least 50 per
cent Catholics (Muslims). Since Catholicism is the single largest
religious denomination in the United States, we expect immigrants
from countries designated as Catholic to find social assimilation easier,
which should encourage their migration. We do not specify a sign for
the influence of being from a Muslim nation.6
U.S. Immigration Policy
U.S. immigration policy clearly can influence the rate of migration
to the United States. We believe that because of policy impacts on both
the cross sections (i.e., source countries) and time series (i.e., years),
controls must be introduced for U.S. immigration policy (Greenwood
andMcDowe!11991). 7
To account for policy differences and changes in the law, our model
includes variables that reflect the spatial and temporal aspects of U.S.
policy. We distinguish three regions of the world: Asia (not including
Israel), the Western Hemisphere (1972-1976), and all other countries.
The last group is the benchmark, and immigration from the Western
Hemisphere (1972-1976) and from Asia is examined by the use of two
regional dummies. One dummy variable equals 1 for Western Hemi
sphere countries for the years 1972 through 1976, and the other equals
1 if country i is in Asia. These dummies are included to account for
differential treatment, possible non-policy-related discrimination,
divergence between policy guidelines and implementation, and the
importance of intervening alternative destinations for potential
migrants to the United States.
Other aspects of U.S. immigration law affect the costs of entry into
the United States. For instance, the law facilitates the entry of foreignborn relatives of U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens. Migration
costs are thus lower for persons who have citizen relatives in the
United States, as proxied by the number of recent naturalizations of
persons born in country /. The number of U.S. naturalizations of per-
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sons born in country / are summed over year t and the prior four years
and are expressed relative to the population of / during t.
During the period 1977-1982, 147,538 preference numbers were
issued under the Silva program, which was instituted under court order
to provide replacement visas for numbers originally used for Cuban
refugee adjustments. Visas available under the Silva program went to
independent Western Hemisphere countries and were assigned in addi
tion to the annual worldwide ceiling. As a practical matter, Mexico
was allocated the majority of Silva visas, receiving 117,045 (79 per
cent). The numbers of such visas received by Mexico in the years
1977-1982 were 3,629, 49,481, 6,333, 4,242, 53,168, and 192, respec
tively (U.S. Department of State 1987, Table VIII). To account for the
Silva program, a dummy variable is included that indicates a large
number of Silva admittances from country i during year t (equals 1 for
Mexico in 1978 and 1981).
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 provided
for 5,000 nonpreference visas in both 1987 and 1988. Nonpreference
(lottery) visas had not been available for some years, but the IRCA leg
islation made them available over and above the normal allotment of
numerically restricted visas for aliens born in countries from which
immigration had been adversely affected by the 1965 Amendments to
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 A dummy variable is used to
control for the influence of these lottery issuances. This dummy vari
able equals 1 if the number of NP-5 and OP-1 lottery issuances
charged to country / was greater than 5 percent of the number of
numerically restricted immigrants for year t who were born in that
country.
Social Programs in Source Countries

We are unaware of any previous attempt to introduce an extensive
set of social program indicators for source countries into a model of
U.S. immigration. Neither are we aware of any effort to include such
variables in a model of migration to any other country, in spite of the
fact that many countries, especially in Europe, have social program
systems that are more extensive and more generous than that of the
United States. To study the importance of such programs, we had to
develop the data set ourselves, drawing the basic information from the
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Social Security Administration's Social Security Programs throughout
the World. In the various models that we estimate, the social program
vector includes several variables relating to the population covered by
the specific program (coverage) and, given coverage, includes other
variables relating to various features of the programs (features).
The basic idea that underlies the inclusion of these social program
variables in the model is that the presence or absence of different types
of social programs will influence differential economic advantage,
since the programs entail income transfers among groups in the source
countries. The extent to which benefits are provided to various groups
depends on the particular program, program coverage, and other spe
cific program features.
Eleven variables are included in the vector of social programs in
country i. The social programs considered include those providing
old-age pensions, sickness-related benefits, unemployment benefits,
and family allowance subsidies. Old-age pension programs ordinarily
take the form of pensions payable for life (or at least a considerable
number of years). Old-age pension programs may provide pensions
that are universally available (to all residents or citizens) or that are
employment-related (available only to wage earners and salaried
employees). Universal and employment-related programs also gener
ally differ in terms of financing: whereas universal pension programs
are usually financed from general government revenues, employmentrelated systems generally are financed through some combination of
employer and employee contributions.
To distinguish the characteristics of old-age pension programs, we
include three variables: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has
a program providing pensions that are universally available; a dummy
variable that equals 1 if a country has an employment-related pension
program that operates as a social insurance system; and a dummy vari
able that equals 1 if a country has an employment-related pension pro
gram that operates as a provident funds system. 9 We also include a
control indicating if a country has an old-age pension program contain
ing a stipulation that the pension is not payable abroad or is payable
abroad only under "limited" conditions.
Sickness-related programs also can be either universal or employ
ment-related. One variable is used to indicate whether coverage is uni
versally available to all residents or citizens. Three additional variables

100 Modeling Flows of U.S. Immigration

are included to identify specific program features: 1) those for which
cash sickness benefits are paid when short-term illnesses prevent the
insured individual from going to work; 2) programs providing mater
nity benefits that are paid to working mothers during some designated
period before and after the birth of a child; and 3) programs providing
health-care benefits, which are usually provided in the form of medical,
hospital, and pharmaceutical benefits.
The unemployment-benefits programs included are those that gener
ally provide compulsory insurance of a fairly broad scope, covering the
majority of employed persons, regardless of the type of industry, or at
least covering those workers in industry and commerce. Family allow
ance programs provide regular cash payments to families with chil
dren. Such payments may be either universal (provided to all resident
families with a specific number of children) or employment-related
(provided only to the families of wage and salary workers). In certain
countries these programs may also include school grants, birth grants,
maternal and child-health services, and sometimes even allowances for
adult dependents. Two variables are included to indicate whether
either a universal or employment-related family allowance program is
available in country i.
To determine the effect of the various social programs on the (nor
malized) volume of immigration from a source country, we must first
determine the programs' net cost-benefit impacts on natives of the
country, particularly those natives who are the most likely to migrate.
Other things being equal, young workers are more likely to migrate
than older individuals. While old-age pension programs may provide
attractive benefits to all individuals who ultimately receive them, such
benefits are generally available only after some lengthy period of
employment or residence. Therefore, the tax and/or wage contribution
burdens imposed on younger workers may actually induce a larger vol
ume of migration. Such an impact may be particularly pronounced in
situations where old-age pensions are universally available. In such
cases, not only are their benefits delayed to some future period, but the
younger workers (through either tax or wage effects) also bear a sub
stantial current burden of paying for the benefits received by other indi
viduals. Thus, we anticipate that the presence of a universal old-age
pension program in country / will encourage a higher rate of emigra
tion.
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For employment-related pension programs, this expectation is less
certain. For instance, to the extent that younger workers anticipate that
the present values of their future old-age benefits outweigh the current
costs being imposed on them, the presence of such programs will not
increase their propensity to migrate. Indeed, compared with the alter
native of no pension program, employment-related pensions may serve
to reduce migration. Moreover, a provident funds system does not
entail an obvious transfer from younger to older workers. Such pro
grams may stimulate migration, in that they provide an opportunity to
save resources necessary to cover the costs of relocation. However, for
individuals who have a vested interest in an old-age pension program,
constraints on the ability to internationally transfer the pensions should
discourage migration.
Programs that provide maternity benefits, employment-related fam
ily allowances, and unemployment insurance are the most likely to
provide net benefits to young workers and their families. Conse
quently, we expect the presence of these programs to reduce the rate of
immigration to the United States. The same expectation also may be
attached to universal family allowance programs, though it is less clear
here given the nature of transfers in programs providing universal ben
efits.
The effects of programs relating to sickness are not clear. For
instance, in countries in which cash benefits are paid to individuals
with illnesses that prevent them from working, these benefits are gen
erally available to all workers. While the potential for such illnesses
may increase with age, we cannot determine the net costs and benefits
to particular groups of workers because those costs and benefits are
generally tied to earnings. Without a more detailed characterization of
the benefits and financing of such programs, we are unable to antici
pate their effect on the rate of migration. Health care in the form of
medical, hospital, and pharmaceutical benefits most likely assists older
individuals, because sicknesses that result in such medical expenses
generally increase with age. On the other hand, those benefits are also
of value to young families, especially those with children. However, if
such benefits are universally provided, we expect the cost burden
imposed on workers to induce a higher rate of migration.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This model has been estimated by means of a number of econometric
techniques that are appropriate for panel data, including random effects,
one-way fixed-effects-time, one-way fixed-effects-countries, and the
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable technique. These techniques are
described in Appendix C. Depending upon the specific technique used,
the resulting estimates differ somewhat. In this and subsequent chap
ters, we focus on the Hausman-Taylor estimates. The Hausman-Taylor
approach (Hausman and Taylor 1981) uses instrumental variables,
accounts for both temporal and country-specific effects, and is particu
larly appropriate when temporally invariant variables (labeled z) are
included in the model and when certain variables may be endogenous.
Variables that vary both temporally and among countries are labeled x.
A subscript 1 indicates an exogenous variable, and a subscript 2 indi
cates and endogenous variable. (For comparative purposes, Appendix
C reports estimates using other econometric approaches.)
The Hausman-Taylor approach specifically accounts for variables
that vary only cross-sectionally (i.e., across countries). Distance,
English language, the control for Asian nations, and the religion con
trols are obvious candidates for this set of variables. Moreover,
although the social program measures may vary through time for any
given country, in practice they need not do so. Thus, each social pro
gram variable was checked for each country. In no instance did any
social program variable fail to change in any country. Thus, each of
these variables was treated as temporally varying.
The Hausman-Taylor approach also requires a distinction between
variables that potentially may be correlated with unobservable countryspecific effects (endogenous variables) and variables that are not so
correlated (exogenous variables). Frequently, no theory underlies the
partitioning of the endogenous and exogenous variables; however, we
wished to develop an underlying rationale. Our key to making the par
tition was to ask which variables could reflect "choice" (and conse
quently a taste for the U.S. lifestyle) and which could relate to potential
work ethic or desire for education. Any such variable could be corre
lated with the unobservables. For example, naturalizations could
reflect a taste for the United States. English language could lead to
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better knowledge about the United States through education, movies,
newspapers, and television, thus leading to a correlation with the coun
try-specific effects. Similar arguments could be made with regard to
the education level in the source country, as well as to the number of
foreign students from country i and U.S. military personnel in country
/. We interpret our notion of choice broadly to include social choice.
As a consequence, government revenue, political competitiveness,
birth rate, female labor force participation, and the various social pro
gram variables are treated as endogenous, or potentially correlated
with country-specific effects. Thus, the vector (jc,) for time- and coun
try-varying exogenous variables includes relative per capita income;
relative growth of GDP; percentage of population in urban areas; the
control for the differential treatment of the Western Hemisphere
natives during the 1972-76 period; the lottery program visas; and the
Silva program. For temporally invariant exogenous variables, the vec
tor (Zi) includes distance; the control for Asian nations; and the two
controls for the primary religion being either Catholic or Muslim. Our
division of variables between exogenous and endogenous has the prac
tical consequence of placing a heavy burden on the estimation tech
nique.
Table 5.1 contains Hausman-Taylor estimates of the basic model of
U.S. immigration (with no social program variables), as well as three
models that include the vector of social program variables so that we
can see how the inclusion of the social program variables contributes to
explaining the determinants of U.S. immigration. (Appendix D, Table
Dl contains means and standard deviations for all variables used in the
study, and Table D.2 contains r-statistics corresponding to Table 5.1).
The following discussion focuses only on the regressions that include
the social program vectors (right-most three columns in Table 5.1), and
all statements of effects should be read with the implicit qualification,
ceteris paribus.
Wage or income differences between the United States and source
countries have frequently proven to be significant determinants of U.S.
immigration (Greenwood and McDowell 1991; Lucas 1976). Higher
per capita income (or related measures) in source countries or smaller
differences relative to the United States discourage migration to the
United States. Whether with respect to historical or contemporary U.S.
immigration, such measures have rarely failed to provide significant

Table 5.1 The Rate of Migration to the United States, 1972-1991:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3-15
Vector/variable
Diff. Econ. Opportunity
Relative per capita income (;ci)
Relative growth of GDP (x,)
Government revenues (x2)
% Urban (*,)
% Female in labor force (;c2)
Migration costs
Distance from U.S.A. (z\)
Birth rate (x2)
U.S. military presence (jc2)
Education (x2)
English language (z2)
U.S. college students from i (jc2)
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness (;c2)
Catholic (z,)
Muslim (z,)
U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations (x2)
Lottery visas (x} )

Basic model0

All immigrants'1

Numerically
restrictedd

Numerically
exemptd

-0.016
0.603**

0.005
0.425*
0.399***
-2.003***

0.080
0.379*
0.348***
-1.321***

-0.068*

0.288*
-1.707***
-1.304**

0.835

0.929*

-0.300***
-3.131***

-0.209***
-2.112***

0.298
2.100***
-0.307***

0.037
0.347*
-0.025
-0.250***

0.036*
0.425**
0.167
-0.227***

0.034***

0.032***

0.022***

-0.324***
-2.550***
0.074***

0.274
0.282
0.056***
0.073*

-0.362
0.023
0.057***
0.080**

-0.260
0.097
0.030***
0.096***

0.066
0.045
-0.460***
-0.168
-0.092***
-1.023***
0.003
-0.041
0.115
-0.021
0.010***
0.042
0.069
0.027***
-0.013

-0.065
0.220
0.154
0.160
Silva visas (x,)
0.068***
-0.200***
-0.270***
-0.260***
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 (x,)
0.112
-0.193
-0.117
0.637***
Asia (z,)
Social programs
-0.017
0.055
0.009
Universal old-age (jc2)
-0.017
-0.047
-0.050
Employment-related old-age (jc2)
-0.049
-0.011
-0.049
Provident fund old-age (jc2)
-0.037*
-0.089*
-0.051
Old-age pension not portable (x2)
0.046
-0.058
-0.015
Universal sickness (jc2)
-0.269***
-0.276***
-0.560***
Cash sickness benefits (x2)
0.143***
0.174***
0.032
Maternity benefits (x2)
-0.118***
-0.084*
0.036
Medical benefits (jc2)
-0.779***
-0.840***
-0.050
Unemployment insurance (x2)
-0.151*
0.015
-0.154
Universal family allowance (x2)
-0.141*
-0.174*
-0.020
Employment family allowance (x2)
Control
-0.038*
-0.010
-0.058
-0.152***
Population of i (*,)
a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <t< 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Appendix Table D2 contains the actual r-statistics that
correspond to this table.
b The interpretation of the coefficients reported in this table for the rate model are not directly comparable to those for the composition
models reported in the following chapters.
c No social program variable.
d Includes social program variables.
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explanations. Thus, our results, which show the coefficient on relative
income to be statistically insignificant in the regression for all immi
grants, are somewhat surprising. This finding appears to be due in part
to our choice of an econometric estimator, because (as indicated in
Appendix C, Table Cl) the more common one-way fixed-effects-time
estimate of relative income is negative and highly significant. We
believe that we are appropriately picking up country-specific effects
with the Hausman-Taylor estimator and thus better controlling for such
effects. Nonetheless, the lack of significance of relative income is sur
prising.
However, for those who are numerically exempt, the coefficient on
relative income is negative and marginally significant. Thus, those per
sons who are not subject to entry restrictions (and thus the most likely
to reflect the force of economic incentives) have some tendency to
come from countries with lower relative incomes.
The coefficients of relative economic growth are positive and reflect
marginal significance (Table 5.1); we had anticipated a negative sign.
One possible explanation for the positive sign is that economic growth
provides assets that help potential migrants pay the costs of an interna
tional move, but this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Thus, our
two key measures of differential economic opportunity behave disap
pointingly. Government revenue has the expected sign and is highly
significant for all immigrants and for numerically restricted immi
grants, but not for those who are exempt. Thus, higher tax and transfer
activity encourages the departure of young and highly mobile individu
als. Percent urban has the expected negative sign and is highly signifi
cant in each regression (Table 5.1). Thus, U.S. immigrants have a
strong tendency to originate in less-urbanized and presumably lessdeveloped countries. Female labor force participation does not have a
particularly strong influence on migration rate in any regression includ
ing social program variables (perhaps because the marriage-market
scenario is gender-specific and our data, at this point, are not decom
posed by gender).
The migration costs vector performs somewhat better than that for
differential economic opportunity. Distance and the associated higher
costs of moving significantly discourage migration to the United
States. Higher birth rates in source countries also significantly discour
age migration, presumably by raising the cost of family migration.
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Countries having a significant U.S. military presence send more
migrants to the United States, but the relationship is only significant
(marginally) in the numerically restricted regression.
While the influence of education is positive in three regressions
(Table 5.1), it is significant only for the numerically restricted immi
grants. Although the influence of English language is positive and
highly significant in the basic model, this variable is not statistically
significant when social programs are introduced. Thus, although
English language and level of education play some role in influencing
immigration to the United States, they do not play a particularly prom
inent role. This finding has important policy implications, because it
suggests that numerically exempt immigration is not from countries
with relatively high levels of educational attainment. If the migrants
from such countries reflect source-country characteristics, exempt
immigration is not keeping pace with restricted immigration in terms
of providing the United States with well-educated newcomers.
Finally, contrary to expectations, countries that send more students
to the United States (as nonimmigrants) tend to have lower rates of
restricted immigration. This finding is surprising, but it may reflect a
strategy to circumvent U.S. immigration restrictions: for countries with
long waits for legal resident alien status, moving as a student may pro
vide an alternative means of entering the United States.
Researchers have long known that political conditions in potential
source countries provide a major inducement for immigration to the
United States. Clearly, refugees are one example, but refugees are not
included in this study. The coefficient on political competitiveness is
positive and highly significant, which suggests that even "normal"
flows to the United States are driven to some extent by dissatisfaction
with suppressive political regimes. On the other hand, religion does
not appear to directly influence decisions to move to the United States.
Parents, spouses, and children of U.S. citizens 21 years of age and
older are exempt from numerical restrictions on immigration; thus,
persons who have become naturalized U.S. citizens greatly facilitate
movement to the United States. The variable for per capita naturaliza
tions is positive and highly significant, reflecting the importance of this
legal avenue for U.S. entry. The lottery program of the late 1980s also
boosted U.S. immigration, especially numerically restricted immigra
tion. Because the lottery recipients entered as restricted and not as
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exempt, this finding makes sense. However, the Silva program does
not appear to have influenced the immigration rate.
During the first five years studied, U.S. entry requirements for
Western Hemisphere immigrants were not as stringent as they were for
natives of Eastern Hemisphere countries. Thus, the coefficients indi
cating that this differential treatment is associated with fewer immi
grants is somewhat surprising. However, when the demand for entry
from Western Hemisphere countries was low, the political cost to the
United States of sustaining a good neighbor policy was also low. As
the demand for immigrant visas from these countries increased, the
cost of maintaining such a policy rose. Consequently, Congress placed
Western Hemisphere countries under essentially the same admission
criteria as Eastern Hemisphere countries. This argument suggests that
entry restrictions favoring natives of Western Hemisphere countries
were themselves endogenous with the flows from these countries.
The unique variables in this study are those relating to social pro
gram availability in source countries. Among these variables, that for
the availability of unemployment insurance programs particularly
stands out: the coefficients on this variable in both the "all immigrants"
and the "numerically restricted" regressions have the highest t-value of
any variable in these Table 5.1 regressions (see Appendix D, Table D2).
The presence of unemployment insurance significantly discourages
migration to the United States, and because the incidence of unemploy
ment is highest among those labor force members in their low to mid
twenties, unemployment insurance discourages migration by the indi
viduals who have the highest propensity to migrate.
Numerically exempt immigrants tend to be considerably older than
restricted immigrants (because the exempt group contains parents of
U.S. citizens), and perhaps as a consequence, unemployment programs
are not significant in the regression for exempt immigrants.
Old-age pension programs have little influence on the rate of immi
gration; the only effect of such programs involves portability. For
countries where pension programs are not portable, the rate of migra
tion to the United States is lower, particularly for exempt immigrants,
who are presumably older; i.e., U.S. citizens—probably naturalized
citizens, because their parents had been living abroad—are more likely
to bring their parents to the United States if the parents are not required
to give up their pension benefits.
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Sickness and maternity programs also play a role in shaping immi
gration to the United States. In the regression for all immigrants, a sig
nificantly lower rate of immigration is evident from countries
providing cash sickness benefits, and a significantly higher rate from
countries with maternity benefits. The influence of the availability of
medical benefits is negative and marginally significant. The influence
of cash sickness benefits is strongly negative for both restricted and
exempt immigrants; maternity benefits stimulate only the flow of the
restricted group, and medical benefits appear to only retard the flow for
the exempt group. Thus, the availability of both cash sickness benefits
and health-care benefits discourages movement to the United States.
The fact that the influence of medical benefits is negative and signifi
cant only for exempt immigrants (primarily of spouses and parents of
U.S. citizens and who are generally older) is noteworthy. Although we
anticipated a negative sign on the variable for maternity benefits, for
reasons that are not clear, maternity benefits provide a push, especially
for the numerically restricted group.
The family allowance variables suggest a modest retarding effect on
migration to the United States, especially for numerically restricted
immigrants. Such programs provide benefits to families with relatively
young children, where the parents are in those age classes with fairly
high migration propensities. The younger numerically restricted group
is deterred by such programs, whereas the older numerically exempt
group is unaffected by them.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have developed a model of the determinants of
immigration that contains vectors of variables reflecting differential
economic opportunity, migration costs, political conditions in source
countries, U.S. immigration policy, and social programs in source
countries. The last of these is unique. Using panel data for 60 coun
tries of birth of U.S. immigrants and for 20 years (1972-1991), we
obtained Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimates of the
parameters of the model.
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The model generally performs well. Other things being equal, U.S.
numerically restricted immigrants tend to come from countries that are
growing relatively fast and that have high government revenues as a
percentage of GDP. More of all U.S. immigrants came from countries
that have relatively suppressive political regimes and that have rela
tively many naturalized U.S. citizens from the country. Source-country
factors discouraging migration include distance from the United States,
a high birth rate, a sickness and medical benefits system, relatively
many students from the country studying in the United States, and an
unemployment insurance system. Family allowance systems tend to
discourage numerically restricted migration to the United States, but
the influence of such programs is not great.
When immigrants are distinguished as numerically restricted versus
numerically exempt, differences in the empirical results are generally
as anticipated. The group that is the least constrained in expressing its
economic motivation is the exempt group, and this group has a ten
dency to originate in countries with lower incomes relative to the
United States. Because the exempt group is made up primarily of
spouses and parents of U.S. citizens, it tends to be somewhat older.
Probably as a consequence, the exempt group is not significantly dis
couraged from migrating due to the presence of an unemployment
insurance program, whereas the restricted group is strongly discour
aged. Moreover, the availability of health-care benefits discourages the
migration of the exempt group, as does the lack of portable pension
benefits. Finally, whereas greater distance and the associated higher
costs of migrating discourage each group from moving to the United
States, the coefficient on the distance variable is over twice as high in
absolute value for numerically restricted immigrants. Not only do
older exempt immigrants have greater assets to cover the costs of mov
ing over longer distances, but also their costs of moving are likely to be
subsidized by U.S. citizen relatives living in the United States.
In subsequent chapters, we use essentially the same variables to
develop models of the gender, age, and skill composition of U.S. immi
gration.
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Notes
1. The movement from country A to B to C is sometimes called "geographically
indirect" movement from A to C. The term "indirect immigration" has also fre
quently been used when an individual moves from country A to country B, but in
country B gains nonimmigrant status. At a later date, the person may adjust his/
her status to legal resident alien, in which case the immigrant is called "indirect."
The "indirect" here obviously refers to legal status in the receiving country and
not to the actual geographic path the individual took to get there.
Greenwood and Trabka (1991) used the INS Public Use Tapes to show that
between 1972 and 1987 the percentage of geographically indirect migration to the
United States ranged from 7.2 percent (1981) to 14.8 percent (1984). The
increased number of geographically indirect moves during the 1980s was clearly
due to the increased number of refugees accepted by the United States (Green
wood and Trabka 1991). Refugees were even more responsible for the increase in
legally indirect movement, which tripled in number and doubled in percentage
between 1972 and 1987. As noted in Chapter 4, refugees have been removed
from our data set. Their removal greatly reduces any problems stemming from
differences between countries of birth and countries of last permanent residence.
Thus, our choice of country of birth as the country of an immigrant's origin
appears to be acceptable for most migratory moves to the United States that we
study here.
2. Most migration models fail to incorporate information about alternative opportu
nities and focus solely on the chosen destination. This is particularly true of mod
els of the determinants of international migration, in large part due to
shortcomings of available data.
3. Gould (1979) provided a fairly comprehensive survey of the causes of European
emigation, with special emphasis on efforts to empirically model the determinants
of European intercontinental movements. Hatton and Williamson (1994) sur
veyed more recent studies of international migration that in many cases incorpo
rate improved historical data.
4. We use the term "appear" because some scholars argue that the flows were
already tapering off by the early 1920s and thus that immigration restrictions did
not have the force they may have had in earlier years. However, if the effects of
World War I are taken into account, the flows do not appear to have begun to fall.
In 1921, before the temporary entry restrictions that were imposed in that year
became effective, 805,228 persons entered the United States.
5. The term "Kuznets cycles" has also been used to denote long swings, which are
thought to be 15 to 25 years in length.
6. Tyree and Donato (1985) argued that fewer females immigrate to the United
States from Muslim countries. If their position is correct, we should be able to
detect this influence in our gender models.
7. Policy controls that have only a temporal dimension are picked up by the equiva
lent of the temporal fixed effects that we employ in estimating the model and can-
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not be introduced otherwise. However, certain temporal policy effects discussed
below apply only to specific sets of countries, and thus dummy variables reflect
ing these policies may be included.
8. The NP-5 program created by IRCA allotted visas on a first-come, first-served
basis. The OP-1 program was established by Section 3 of the Immigration
Amendments of 1988, and visas allotted under it were based on a bona fide lot
tery. Each program involved nonpreference visa allocations.
9. Pension programs that operate as social insurance systems base eligibility for pen
sions on the length of employment, and the amount of individual pensions is usu
ally related to the level of the worker's prior earnings. Such programs are
financed largely from special contributions (e.g., a percentage of earnings) by
workers and employers and in most instances are compulsory. On the other hand,
provident funds systems are essentially compulsory savings programs in which
regular contributions withheld from employees are matched by those of their
employers. These contributions are set aside in a special fund and then later
repaid to the worker, as a general rule, in a single lump sum.

6 The Gender Composition
of U.S. Immigration
The gender composition of U.S. immigration is important for sev
eral reasons. First, females are less likely than males to be "economic
migrants," migrants motivated by economic advantages and costs;
females are more likely to be "tied movers" as defined by Mincer
(1978). Partly as a consequence, female immigrants tend to have lower
labor force participation rates and lower earnings than their male coun
terparts. Second, the child-bearing capacity of female immigrants
increases the potential for growth of the second-generation immigrant
population. Because neither the 1980 nor the 1990 census asked a
question concerning the nativity of parents, we are not able to easily
assess the number of persons who in 1990 had foreign-born mothers.
Third, females have a longer life expectancy than males. Conse
quently, those female immigrants who qualify for social services and
benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) will, on average,
demand them for a longer period of time.
In this chapter, we discuss factors that influence the gender compo
sition of immigrant flows. Understanding the gender composition
requires consideration of the incentives surrounding the various
"modes" by which an immigrant may enter the United States. First, an
immigrant can enter independently, presumably with economic incen
tives primarily in mind. While such economic migrants often are
thought to be male, the gender composition of immigrant flows varies
across source countries depending upon source-country characteristics
(Donato 1992). Alternatively, immigrants may enter as either non-eco
nomic or tied migrants. Non-economic migrants move for the purpose
of family reunification or to form a family, for instance, as the spouse
of a U.S. citizen. Thus, consideration must be given to source-country
characteristics that determine the gender composition of immigrants
who marry U.S. citizens (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Tied migrants
enter the United States as part of an immigrant family unit. Given
independent economic migrants as primarily male and tied migrants as
primarily female, variations in the gender composition of immigration
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from various source countries will be a function of the relative incen
tives of family-unit migration (Borjas and Bronars 1991; Mincer 1978)
versus single-unit independent migration.

THE GENDER COMPOSITION MODEL
The general form of the model is that of Eq. 5.1. In addition to the
variables summarized in Chapter 5, the gender composition equation
includes two variables expected to specifically reflect the propensity of
females to migrate: the population sex ratio in country i (the ratio of
males to females in the indigenous population); and the relative educa
tion of females as compared with males (the percentage of country f s
female population that is at the third level relative to the percentage of
country f s male population at that level). The sex ratio controls for the
gender composition of source country f s indigenous population; the
relative education of females is substituted for the general population's
education level, which is used as the control for educational attainment
in the rate regression.
Consider economic migrants. The propensity of females to migrate
internationally is expected to be a function of their educational attain
ment and the degree to which they are economically active. Other
things being equal, highly educated individuals have higher propensi
ties to migrate, so as females attain higher levels of education relative
to males, the female share of the migration flow should increase. If we
view migration as another form of human capital development, eco
nomically active individuals are more likely to migrate than individuals
who do not participate in the formal labor market. Therefore, as the
extent of female labor force participation rises, the probability that they
will become international migrants is enhanced.
Economic migrants should be particularly responsive to the factors
that reflect differential economic advantage and relative migration
costs. For economic migrants, whether male or female, lower costs
and/or greater returns to migration should cause a larger flow. Ideally,
within the set of potential economic migrants, to distinguish between
the migration propensity of women versus men, we would want to
know gender-specific differences in the costs and returns to migration.
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For example, if the wage differential between the United States and the
country / were greater for women than for men, a larger proportion of
the flow should be women. Unfortunately, gender-specific data per
taining to source countries are generally unavailable.'
A distinction between female and male migration does exist, how
ever: males are generally presumed to be economic migrants, but the
same is not true of females. As noted by Tyree and Donate (1986, p. 40)
"the majority of immigrant women do not move alone, but are married
and move with their husbands." Whereas the extent of this character
ization may have changed over time, and although it may be different
for different source countries, females still are characterized frequently
as either non-economic or tied migrants in international migration
flows. Given this characterization of females, the proportion of total
immigrants that is female should vary with the ratio of economic to
non-economic/tied migrants: as the ratio falls, the proportion of total
immigrants who are females should rise.
The factors included in the differential economic opportunities vec
tor are expected to be of particular importance in influencing the ratio
of economic to non-economic migrants. For example, a higher level of
development should lower the propensity to migrate of economically
active individuals (mostly male), and higher source-country income
should increase the relative flow of non-economic migrants (mostly
female) because higher income retards the flow of economic migrants.
Thus, such factors should cause an increase in the proportion of
migrants that is female.2
The effect of migration costs on the gender composition of migrants
should vary. For instance, given that a high birth rate in country / is
associated with larger family size, there will be higher migration costs
for family-unit migration, which should cause fewer females to come
from, nations with high birth rates. Certain other migration costs (e.g.,
skill losses) will be relevant only for economic migrants. The higher
the migration costs incurred by economic migrants (but not by noneconomic migrants), the lower the ratio of economic to non-economic
migrants. Thus, migration flows from source countries where skills are
relatively less transferable to the United States should have a greater
share of females. Moreover, certain evidence (e.g., Duleep and Sand
ers 1993; Long 1980) suggests that family investment strategies may
be used to facilitate adjustments for expected skill losses—during the
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initial years in the United States, the husband invests in U.S.-specific
skills, and the wife works to support these investments—thus relatively
more family-unit migration (and consequently more tied female
migrants) is induced under circumstances where skill losses are
expected to be greatest.
English-speaking persons typically bear lower costs of adjusting to
the U.S. labor market, and so English-speaking nations should have a
greater share of males in their migrant flows. However, this expecta
tion is somewhat ambiguous, since language familiarity facilitates
social and cultural assimilation, which are also important to non-eco
nomic migrants. Receiving an education at a U.S. university should
make it easier to transfer job skills to the United States. Hence, nations
with relatively large numbers of students attending U.S. universities
should have a greater share of males in their migrant flows. Jasso and
Rosenzweig (1990) argue that the number of immigrant husbands of
U.S. citizens would reflect the origin country's number of students in
the United States, and that immigrant wives of U.S. citizens would be
disproportionately drawn from countries that host U.S. military instal
lations.
The expected relationship between the costs imposed on all
migrants (e.g., political considerations, distance) and the gender com
position of migration can be complicated by a number of factors. For
example, countries with relatively unattractive political environments
also may have restrictions, such as emigration barriers, that distort (in
unknown ways) migration flows. A plausible argument exists for more
immigrant wives than husbands coming from more distant nations
(e.g., Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990), but other considerations also may
be at work. If men are disproportionately represented in the pool of
potential economic migrants, distance may actually discourage male
migration, because distance (among other factors) proxies intervening
opportunities and thus the opportunity costs of migrating to any given
destination; that is, the greater the distance, the greater or better are
likely to be the alternative opportunities within the given radius of a
move.
The Roman Catholic Church has the largest membership of any
single denomination in the United States and may be expected to play
an important role in the social and cultural assimilation of immigrants,
which would seem of particular relevance for non-economic migrants.
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Moreover, in countries where Catholicism is the principal religion, the
maintenance of family units may play a more prominent role in deter
mining migration decisions. Thus, we expect more family-unit migra
tion, and consequently relatively more females, from countries where
Catholicism is the primary religion. On the other hand, in countries
dominated by Muslim religious beliefs, females may feel inhibitions
regarding emigration, especially emigration as single and unattached. 3
Of the U.S. institutional considerations, the number of prior immi
grants from country / who have become U.S. citizens should be of par
ticular relevance in determining the gender composition of U.S.
immigration. An increased number of prior immigrants from country i
lowers the direct entry costs for potential migrants in i, which should
be particularly relevant for non-economic migrants. Hence, the num
ber of prior immigrants who become U.S. citizens should positively
influence the proportion of females in the flow.
In terms of social program variables, consider first the coverage of
the various programs. Programs that are universally available should
provide benefits that are of particular importance to potential non-eco
nomic migrants. Moreover, since universal programs are generally
financed from general government revenues and therefore supported
by taxes, the economically active population will bear the burden of
paying for the benefits. Therefore, universal social programs should
stimulate the flow of economic migrants and reduce the number of
female migrants, ceteris paribus. The effect of employment-related
programs will vary. For instance, the presence of unemployment bene
fits should retard the flow of economic migrants and thus increase the
proportion of female migrants. On the other hand, a family allowance
program is likely to be of particular importance in family-unit migra
tion decisions, and the female share of migration flows should be lower
from countries where such programs are available.
There is less certainty about the effects of sickness programs. To the
extent that these programs are employment-related and provide net
positive benefits to their participants, sickness programs should reduce
the flow of economic migrants and increase the proportion of females
who migrate. On the other hand, the availability of maternity benefits
in country / should retard the flow of female migrants.
Old-age programs are not typically gender-specific; however, they
can influence the ratio of economic to non-economic migrants.
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Because universally available old-age programs would be of particular
importance to potential non-economic migrants, the share of female
migrants from countries having such programs should be lower. Oldage programs related to employment (and thus primarily affecting eco
nomically active individuals) may retard migration, in the sense that
these individuals anticipate future benefits. However, once received,
such benefits may actually provide older individuals with the wealth
necessary to cover the costs of relocation. Where these old-age bene
fits are not payable abroad, the flow of individuals who have been eco
nomically active should be reduced if the old-age program is
employment-related.

ESTIMATION OF THE GENDER EQUATION
The methodology we used to examine immigrant composition has
long been employed by economists to analyze systems of consumer
demand/expenditure equations (e.g., Leser 1961; Pollak and Wales
1969; Parks 1969; and Barten 1977), as well as systems of cost-share
equations (e.g., Berndt and Wood 1975). We are unaware of any previ
ous attempt to use such an approach to study the composition of migra
tion, except for Greenwood, McDowell, and Waldman (1996). In the
context of immigration to the United States, the sum over various com
ponents gives total immigration during a given year (e.g., sum over g
gender groups, n age groups, or m occupational classes). The approach
also allows a natural transition to various subgroups. For example, the
immigrant population may first be distinguished by gender, and then
each gender group may be distinguished by age.
Let i represent source country, j represent the variable (/=!,...,«),
t represent the year, and g represent the gender. The approach employs
total immigration of a given type as the dependent variable and can be
expressed in the following way, where lMMigt represents total immi
gration from country i, of gender g, during year t:
Eq.6.1
where

lMMigl = P
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The conditions state that the coefficients on the control total (in this
case, total immigration) must sum to 1.0 across the two gender equa
tions. Moreover, the coefficients on each independent variable must
sum to zero. Thus, if each independent variable were set at zero, the
gender shares would sum to 1.0, as they logically must. Furthermore,
any change in an independent variable that increases (decreases) one
share (say, for males) must correspondingly decrease (increase) the
other so that the shares continue to sum to 1.0. The coefficients on the
various independent variables are interpreted as a change in the abso
lute number of immigrants of type g due to an incremental change in
the independent variable. Note, however, that (3g provides an estimate
of the share of total allocated to each gender. Each composition equa
tion is estimated as a system of equations.4
Estimation of the gender composition model is accomplished by
pooling time-series and cross-section data, and several econometric
issues arise. These issues were discussed in Chapter 5 in reference to
the estimation of the rate equation, and they remain equally relevant
within the current context. We have tested for appropriateness of the
random effects versus the within estimator. Since the null hypothesis
(that the random effects and the right-hand-side variables are uncorrelated) is rejected, we employ the Hausman-Taylor estimator described
in Appendix C.5

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 6.1 reports coefficients and significance levels for all male and
female U.S. immigrants. Table 6.2 reports comparable findings for
female numerically restricted and numerically exempt immigrants.
Although the gender-specific regressions presented in Table 6.1 for all
males and females are almost mirror images, we have reported both to
clearly show the properties of the modeling approach described above.

120 The Gender Composition of U.S. Immigration

Table 6.1 Gender Composition of Total U.S. Immigrants:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimate3
Variable

Male

Female

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP

142.90*
-222.03

% Urban

0.12
-5.92*

% Female in labor force

32.80***

Government revenues

-142.90*
222.03
-0.12
5.92*
-32.80***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.

105.38**

-105.38**

Birth rate

_11,94***

11.94***

U.S. military presence

-82.52***

82.52***

-91.52*
-2195.82***

91.52*
2195.82***

Relative female education15
English language
U.S. college students

51.94

-51.94

Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim

-1.33
-780.93***
539.28

1.33
780.93***
-539.28

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

-8.18
90.84**

8.18
-90.84**

Silva visas

-2717.11***

2717.11***

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-50.44
-1805.99***

50.44
1805.99***

Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age

-139.94

139.94

Employment-related old-age

66.49

-66.49

Provident fund old-age

-3.86

3.86

Old-age pension not portable

38.10

-38.10

Universal sickness
Cash sickness benefits

9.94
-186.96**

-9.94
186.96**
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Variable
Maternity benefits
Medical benefits

Male
-96.63*
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Female
96.63*

Unemployment insurance

-30.57
-189.71**

30.57
189.71**

Universal family allowance

-161.07

161.07

Employment family allowance

-157.73

151.73

Control
Sex ratio in /' s population
Total U.S. immigration from i

237.44
0.55***

-237.44
0 45***

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < r < 1.67. The
actual r-statistics are reported in Appendix Table El.
b Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.

Note that the coefficients on the control variable for total immigration
from country i during year t (Table 6.1, last line; = Z2 _ jIMM^- t )
sum across the gender equations to 1.0 and that the coefficients on each
other explanatory variable sum to zero. The /-statistics corresponding
to Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are reported in Appendix E, Tables El and E2.
When pair-wise comparisons are made in Table 6.2 between numer
ically restricted and exempt immigrants, considerable differences are
evident within many of the vectors. This finding highlights the impor
tance of disaggregating the immigration flows. Only the estimated
relationships between the female share of migrants and female labor
force participation, birth rate, and the Silva program maintain their
signs with significance across the groups. We expect exempt immi
grants to better reflect the force of economic incentives.
The vector of variables reflecting differential economic opportunity
should be relatively more important for economic than for non-eco
nomic migrants, and thus better source-country economic opportuni
ties should be associated positively with the female share of migrants.
The strongest support of this hypothesis is found in the extent to which
the source country is urbanized: enhanced domestic employment and
earnings opportunities significantly reduce the flow of economic
migrants and therefore increase the share of female migrants, espe
cially those numerically exempt. A significantly positive relationship
also exists between the relative size of central government and the
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Table 6.2 Female U.S. Immigrants By Entry Class:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Variable

Numerically
restricted

Numerically
exempt

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income

-16.18

Relative growth of GDP

-33.79
1.18**

Government revenues
% Urban
% Female labor force

-0.44
-3.93*

•-120.87
131.12
1.04
7 54***
-22.05***

Migration costs
-57.75

Birth rate

-4.71
5.25***

U.S. military presence

-4.02

6.59*
78.32***

Relative female education13

-7.46

115 44***

-114.04

2063.67***

Distance from / to U.S.A.

English language
U.S. college students from /

27.60*

-82.48*

-5.03*

0.86
748.73***

Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim

-28.58
-123.36*

-228.60

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas
Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76
Asia

3.49*
-8.53
675.80***
30.28**
1.72

-1.41
-88.76***
491.95***
44.90
1434.76***

Social programs
Employment-related old-age

12.02
52.31***

Provident fund old-age

53.33*

-66.08

30.29*
108.52***

-28.67

Universal old-age

Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness

103.75
-122.67*

-44.04
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Variable
Cash sickness benefits

Numerically
restricted
-54.58*
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Numerically
exempt
240.39***

Maternity benefits

14.02

53.16

Medical benefits

19.54

Unemployment insurance

14.17

43.87
151.62**

Universal family allowance

14.27

128.37

Employment family allowance

-7.80

149.09*

Control
Sex ratio in /' s population
Total numerically restricted
(or exempt)

38.77
0.51 ***

-109.58
0 45***

a *** Indicates t> 1.96; ** indicates 1.67<f< 1.96; * indicates 1.29<f< 1.67. Actual
^-statistics are reported in Appendix Table E2.
b Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.

female share in the numerically restricted category, perhaps reflecting
lower migration costs associated with leaving a relatively unattractive
source country.
In contrast to our expectation, however, higher source-country
incomes reduce the share of female migrants (Table 6.1). This finding
may reflect economic incentives that are operating in accordance with
underlying gender-specific wage differentials. Also contrary to our
expectations is a highly significant negative relationship between the
female share of migrants and the female percentage of the total labor
force. The reason for this finding may be that, as suggested by Mincer
(1978, p. 769), "trends toward equalization of labor market experience
of men and women may contribute to a decrease in migration rates of
married couples." That is, wives who are economically active may
reduce family-unit migration, thereby increasing the ratio of economic
to non-economic migrants and decreasing the female share of interna
tional migrants. Furthermore, the source countries where the female
percentage of labor force is high also may provide better relative eco
nomic opportunities for females (as compared with males). 6
The influence of distance from the United States is negative for
females (positive for males) in the regression for all male and female
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U.S. immigrants (Table 6.1). Therefore, this result does not support
the hypothesis that distance will discourage male migration, nor does it
support the role of distance suggested by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990)
in determining the gender of a spouse who enters the United States via
the marriage market. Rather, the evidence suggests that migration
costs that are incurred by all migrants, but for which only economic
migrants receive offsetting economic returns, will cause the ratio of
economic to non-economic migrants to rise. The female share of
migrants also may fall with distance if diseconomies are associated
with moving families over greater distances (for example, the higher
costs of return trips to visit with family members before full family
reunification occurs).
Perhaps the most surprising finding concerns the birth rate variable.
We hypothesized that higher birth rates (presumably, larger families)
would discourage family-unit migration, but a larger share of women
are represented in immigration flows from countries with high birth
rates. On the other hand, consistent with our hypothesis, as women
become more educated relative to men, the female share of immigrants
rises.
The influence of U.S. military personnel in the country of origin is
positive for females and is highly significant in the equations for all
males and females (Table 6.1). Our hypothesis with respect to U.S.
military personnel is further substantiated when immigrants are distin
guished by entry class. Because spouses of U.S. citizens are numeri
cally exempt and the U.S. military is predominantly male, the influence
of U.S. military personnel should be positive for numerically exempt
females, which it is. In the regressions for numerically restricted
immigrants, the presence of U.S. military personnel does not signifi
cantly influence the gender composition of migrants (Table 6.2). There
is also evidence of another marriage market. The female share is nega
tively related to the number of foreign students attending U.S. colleges
and universities (Table 6.1). Moreover, the foreign-students variable is
marginally significant in the equations for the numerically exempt
immigrants (Table 6.2). Thus, the number of immigrant husbands of
U.S. citizens is positively associated with the origin country's number
of students attending U.S. colleges and universities.
Other influences may be associated with foreign students as well.
For instance, we expect that skill losses would be lower from countries
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that send a relatively large number of students to the United States, so
the United States should receive relatively more economic (male)
migrants from these countries. Natives from English-speaking nations
also should experience greater ease in transferring their occupational
skills. However, the evidence does not support these hypotheses. If
attending a U.S. university facilitates skill transfer and therefore
induces more male economic migrants, this expected effect would be
supported by a negative coefficient in the regressions for female
restricted immigrants (Table 6.2), but this is not found. The influence
of English language is positive and highly significant for females
(Table 6.1) and for exempt females (Table 6.2), suggesting that lan
guage serves a crucial role in facilitating social and cultural assimila
tion (which appears to be of particular importance to female migrants).
Social and cultural assimilation also may be facilitated by religious
institutions, and the evidence is strong that larger shares of female
migrants come from nations where Catholicism is the primary religion.
On the other hand, Muslim nations provide relatively fewer female
immigrants, especially in the numerically restricted class.
We are surprised to find that naturalized U.S. citizens do not have
more influence on the gender composition of migrants. We hypothe
sized that such U.S. citizens would be relatively more important for
potential non-economic migrants and that the law ought to favor
women. Our evidence supports this hypothesis only for the numeri
cally restricted class (through which unmarried adult sons and daugh
ters of U.S. citizens, as well as brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens at
least 21 years of age, and their spouses and children, are allowed to
enter the United States).
For restricted immigrants, a higher share of female migrants entered
the United States from the Western Hemisphere nations during the
1972-76 period. Because Western Hemisphere nations were not sub
ject to the preference quota system until after 1976, and because the
preference quota system is heavily oriented toward family reunifica
tion, one might have expected relatively more economic (males) in the
migration flows that occurred prior to the change in law. In another
instance, for all immigrants (Table 6.1) and for numerically exempt
immigrants, a significantly higher share of Asian migrants are women.
This finding may be a result of pre-1965 discrimination in U.S. immi
gration policy, with our sample period being a period of catching up, in
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which family members (perhaps primarily female) are reunited with
the first wave of immigrants that arrived after the changes in immigra
tion law. This finding also may reflect some combination of the impor
tance of intervening opportunities for natives from Asian nations and/
or relatively lower wages for women in Asian nations. 7 The large num
ber of U.S. military personnel in Asia during the sample period also
may have a positive influence on the relative share of female migrants.
Although we did not attach an expectation to the effects of either pro
gram, we note that, while the lottery system for allocating visas
resulted in relatively fewer female migrants, the Silva program visas
resulted in a significantly larger share of female migrants.
Several of the social programs have a significant influence on the
gender composition of immigrant flows. For instance, as expected,
countries with unemployment insurance programs send relatively more
females to the United States. Old-age pension programs appear to
have more influence on the gender of numerically restricted immi
grants than on the exempt. For numerically restricted immigrants, as
expected, old-age programs that are employment-related reduce the
flow of economically active individuals, who are primarily male. For
the numerically exempt, some evidence exists of the opposite effect,
possibly because once the benefits are provided, these individuals have
the wealth necessary to cover the costs of relocation.
The results shown in Table 6.1 support the hypothesis that employ
ment-related sickness programs induce relatively more females to
migrate to the United States. We argued that employment-related cash
benefits for illnesses should reduce the flow of economic migrants, and
the evidence for all males and females supports this position. How
ever, between numerically restricted and exempt immigrants, a number
of striking differences are found. For instance, whereas the presence of
employment-related sickness programs is associated with a higher
share of females in the flow of exempt immigrants (as expected), uni
versal sickness programs also are associated with a higher share of
females among the numerically restricted immigrants (which was not
expected). We do not know the precise reason for these differences. In
addition, we are not clear about why the availability of maternity bene
fits (Table 6.1) or employment-related family allowance programs
(Table 6.2, numerically exempt) positively influence the share of
migrants that is female. Although this evidence is not strong, we had
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expected the opposite, since each of these programs should serve to
retard the flow of family-unit migration.

SUMMARY

We are somewhat surprised that the factors associated with eco
nomic opportunities do not provide more support for our hypotheses
regarding gender composition, especially the findings for the numeri
cally exempt class. On the other hand, the factors associated with
migration costs have considerable influence on the gender composition
of U.S. immigrants, and, with the exception of the birth rate variable,
the findings are not unexpected. One implication of this evidence is
that, if the level of education of females worldwide continues to rise
relative to that of males, the female share of U.S. immigrants also
should rise. English-language familiarity is a strong factor in female
immigration to the United States. The evidence also supports the
hypothesis that gender sorting occurs within the operation of marriage
markets and that this sorting provides a means of entry for foreignborn spouses of U.S. citizens. One such market appears to be linked to
foreign students at U.S. schools, increasing the entry of foreign-born
males. On the other hand, more foreign-born wives come from nations
hosting relatively large numbers of U.S. military personnel.
Our evidence suggests that the culture of Muslim nations tends to
restrict the movement of potential female migrants, but this relation
ship is not particularly strong. On the other hand, especially for
exempt females, the Catholic Church is a positive factor. U.S. immi
gration policy also has a significant influence on gender composition,
although this influence is probably an unintended side-effect. For
example, the recent lottery programs had a definite male tilt.
Regarding social programs in the source country, the findings for
numerically exempt immigrants provide more support of our hypothe
ses than those for the restricted class. However, except for employ
ment-related sickness programs and unemployment insurance, the
overall influence of the various social programs on gender share is not
very strong. In particular, the findings do not support our hypotheses
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concerning the influence of universal program coverage or specific
programs designed to provide maternity and family allowance benefits.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

Evidence concerning gender wage differentials is very limited. For example, con
sidering female to male hourly earnings in manufacturing in 17 advanced industri
alized countries, Blau and Ferber found "no uniform patterns emerge from an
examination of the data . . . except that women are always paid less than men"
(1992, p. 314). However, their data indicate that, in comparison with the other 16
industrialized nations in three time periods (i.e., 1973, 1982, and 1988), the ratio
of women's to men's hourly earnings is lower in the United States than in the
other country in 37 of 48 comparisons.
In stating this expectation, we assume that the gender wage differential does not
vary across countries, but as noted earlier, we have reason to believe that this dif
ferential does vary. For a sample of 36 countries in 1990, the United Nations
(1995, Table 5.20, p. 128) provides data on average female wages in manufactur
ing as a percentage of a comparable measure for males. Comparing the United
States with the other 20 countries classified as "developed" indicates that female
wages relative to male wages are higher in the United States in only 2 of 20 com
parisons. However, in comparison with the other 15 nondeveloped countries, rel
ative female wages in the United States are higher in 7 of the 15. This evidence
may suggest that, where a higher level of development or higher per capita
income exists in the source country, the wage differential between the United
States and country i is lower for females than males. If this is the case, then rela
tive income may be negatively related with the share of female migrants.
Tyree and Donato (1985) argued that, where the "status" of females is especially
low, they do not have sufficient control over their fates for emigration to be a via
ble option. Tyree and Donato also observe particularly high male-to-female ratios
for immigrants from Muslim countries.
An alternative to the specification described here is to employ actual shares as the
dependent variables. In this case, for any given country/year the dependent vari
ables of the system would sum to 1.0. Moreover, if the right-hand-side indepen
dent variables contain the same number of countries/years for each data partition
on the left-hand-side of the regression, the constant term would sum to 1.0 and the
coefficients of each independent variable would sum to zero. Greenwood,
McDowell, and Waldman (1996) employed this methodology to study the occupa
tional composition of a class of male U.S. immigrants.
We do not adopt this approach here because to "balance" the model requires
that entire countries be dropped from the data set. As immigrant groups are more
and more finely identified, zeros begin to appear in the data. For example, if in a
given year no females 20 and over from Tanzania reported an occupation, all
observations on Tanzania would have to be dropped from the analysis of occupa
tional composition (because the shares would be undefined due to division by
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zero). In fact, if the strict share methodology were followed, the occupational
runs reported below for certain entry classes would contain only 37 countries.
This lack of decomposability leads to sufficient lack of comparability for us to
dismiss this approach.
% = 20.19 rejects the random effects estimator.
Borjas and Bronars (1991) provided an analysis of the types of families that are
likely to migrate and of the types of individuals who are likely to characterize
links in the immigration chain.
Data from the United Nations (1995, Table 5.20, p. 128) indicate that female
wages relative to male wages are particularly low in Asian nations, where females
average only 63.6 percent of male wages, compared with 76.5 percent in nonAsian countries. This gender wage differential should serve to further stimulate a
higher share of female migrants from Asian nations.

7 The Age Composition
of U.S. Immigrants
The age composition of U.S. immigrants is important for several rea
sons. First, the age at which immigrants enter the United States is a
determinant of the benefits that will be derived by the United States
from the presence of the immigrants. The estimated present value of
immigrants' income earned in the U.S. economy has been suggested as
a measure of the immigrants' value (or gross benefit) to the economy
(McDowell and Singell 1993). Other things being equal, immigrants
who migrate at younger ages will also enter the U.S. labor force at a
younger age, and thus they provide greater benefits to the economy.
Evidence also strongly suggests that the age at migration is an
important determinant of how well immigrants do once they enter the
U.S. labor force (Smith 1991; Friedberg 1993; McDowell and Singell
1993). Immigrants who enter at a younger age appear to assimilate
more rapidly into the economy. Thus, the younger the age at which
immigration occurs, the more similar will be the career earnings pro
files of the foreign-born and native-born workers. Such similarity in
earnings profiles is in marked contrast to the situation that is often
ascribed to immigrants, where, when compared with native-born work
ers of similar characteristics, the immigrants suffer an earnings disad
vantage during their initial years in the U.S. labor force (Chiswick
1978).
Younger immigrants also tend to become more proficient in
English-language skills during their post-entry years than immigrants
who enter at older ages (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Chiswick and
Miller 1992; Chiswick 1993). Apparently, either learning new lan
guage skills is easier (i.e., less costly) for younger individuals or, given
the longer period over which to derive the benefits from human capital
investments, younger immigrants have a greater incentive to invest in
English-language skills. Greater proficiency in English further aug
ments the immigrants' labor force productivity and also facilitates their
more general social and cultural assimilation.
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The age composition of immigrants is also important because,
together with gender composition, it can influence the overall U.S. fer
tility rate in subsequent years. When immigration is concentrated in
the childbearing years, the United States may experience subsequent
augmentation in population growth rates. Moreover, relevant to the
social security system, the age composition of newly entering immi
grants may alter the extent of general population aging and thus affect
the overall U.S. worker-to-dependent ratio (Arthur and Espenshade
1988). In addition to the demographic implications, the age composi
tion of immigrants may influence the costs that they impose on the
U.S. economy, including, for younger immigrants and families, the
costs on social service providers such as the public school system, and
for older immigrants, the costs of social services such as health care.'
In this chapter, we discuss factors that influence the age composition
of immigrant flows. Our model of age composition is tied to the con
cept of the marginal migrant. In the context of the model, the marginal
migrant is the individual for whom expected U.S. utility minus homecountry utility just equals migration costs. By focusing on the mar
ginal migrant, we are able to generate hypotheses concerning how var
ious factors influence the age composition of immigrant flows.

THE AGE COMPOSITION MODEL
The general form of the age-composition model follows that of
Eq. 5.1. In addition to the variables noted in Chapter 5, the age
composition equation includes a control variable that reflects the
median age of the source country's population in year t. The median
age of source country populations varies widely, from a low of 14.6
years to a high of 38.3 years. The inclusion of this variable pro
vides at least a crude control for the age of the population at risk to
migrate. Relative to the gender composition equation (Chapter 6),
median age now replaces the population sex ratio as the basic con
trol variable; also in the age equation, the general education level
(which is measured in gender-specific terms in the gender-specific
model) is used as the measure of educational attainment.

Legal U.S. Immigration

133

The Concept of the Marginal Migrant
To understand who (i.e., younger versus older) among the source
country's indigenous population choose to emigrate, we use the con
cept of the marginal migrant. In general, individuals will decide to
move to the United States when the expected benefits from doing so
exceed the expected foregone home-country benefits by an amount that
is greater than the costs of migration. For the marginal migrant, the
returns (total U.S. benefits accruing from migration minus foregone
home-country benefits) must equal migration costs; thus, the net
migration benefit is equal to zero.
To illustrate the concept of the marginal migrant, we consider a sim
plified characterization of country /'s indigenous population in which
we allow members of the indigenous population to differ in age, while
assuming that all individuals are endowed with a given level of occupa
tional skills. We make this assumption about occupational skills in
order to focus on the age at which migration occurs. 2 In this simplified
form, the equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant may be
expressed as
Eq.7.1

Zf= jvv7.-vv^l+r)~(r ~° = Ct ,

where
a is the age of migration,
T is the age of the immigrant at death,
Wj and Wj are the respective U.S. and country-of-origin wage per
unit of occupational skill,
K* is the index of the occupational skill, and
r is a discount rate.
The left side of Eq. 7.1 therefore represents the discounted total
returns accruing to the marginal migrant who moves from country i toy
at age a; the right side represents the total migration costs (C/)
incurred by an individual who migrates from country /. Total migra
tion costs include direct entry costs, skill losses associated with lessthan-perfect international skill transferability, and the foregone relative
attractiveness of the country of origin.3
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For the marginal migrant who is age a, the decision to migrate is
one of indifference, since the expected benefits from migration are
exactly offset by the migration costs. However, within country /'s pop
ulation, other individuals who also possess the skill level K* will find
emigration beneficial if they are younger than age a, and individuals
older than a would incur negative net benefits from migration and thus
would not find migration beneficial. Therefore, given the age a at
which net benefits are zero, this equilibrium condition determines the
ages at which individuals will find migration beneficial, and hence
determines the age composition of immigrants. The younger the age of
the marginal migrant, the younger the overall age composition of
migrants from country i to the United States.
In this model, the age at migration is considered to be the choice
variable. The marginal migrant is presumed to be capable of adjusting
to any factors that would alter either the returns on or the costs of
migration ("adjusting" means choosing to migrate at a younger or at
an older age). Hence, the general age composition of migrants from
country / will be responsive to factors related to relative economic
advantage between / and the United States as well as to the total migra
tion costs.
Figure 7.1 diagrammatically shows these relationships. For those
for whom migration is profitable, the return on migration declines with
age, because those who migrate at older ages eliminate the returns that
are discounted least. Given costs of migration from country / to coun
try j of Cij and an expected differential return, /?,-(oc), that is a function
of age at migration, the marginal migrant would move at age oc0 . If
costs were higher, such as C • •', the marginal migrant would move at
an earlier age, cx^; for example, C--' could refer to migration from a
more distant country, from a politically more desirable country (where
the opportunity cost of departing is greater), or from a non-Englishspeaking country. In each case, the costs of transferring accumulated
occupational skills to the United States would be higher, and the mar
ginal migrant would move at an earlier age. (In Figure 7.1, we have
assumed that costs are independent of age, but this assumption easily
could be relaxed.) If expected returns to the marginal migrant were
higher at every age, as shown by Rff (oc) in Figure 7.1, the marginal
migrant would be older (a2). This could be the case, for example, for
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Figure 7.1 Age of Migration
Returns
and
costs

more highly educated individuals or for individuals in lower-income
source countries.
Clearly, this model could be complicated considerably by relaxing
various assumptions that were explicitly or implicitly made in develop
ing it.4 For example, the accumulated stock of human capital (K) could
be made a function of age, as could the costs of migration. However,
the model is sufficient to allow us to specify hypotheses concerning the
variables included in the model of migrant age composition.
Hypotheses
To illustrate the types of hypotheses that can be based on the con
cept of the marginal migrant, we consider the expected effects of the
factors in the differential economic opportunity vector. Other things
being equal, higher country-of-origin wages per unit of human capital
will decrease the returns to migration. In response, the marginal
migrant must adjust by moving at a younger age in order to raise
returns so that net benefits again equal zero. Therefore, if relative per
capita income is a proxy for the country-of-origin wages relative to
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those of the United States, younger migrants should come from source
countries with relatively higher per capita gross domestic product.
Employment opportunities in country / also should influence the age
composition of migrants. For instance, higher levels of development
and rapid economic expansion are generally associated with relatively
more and better employment opportunities, and so the expected bene
fits of migrating would be lower, ceteris paribus. Thus, younger work
ers will choose to migrate earlier, and relatively fewer older workers
will migrate at all. However, there may not be a neutral impact across
age groups, as our theory of the marginal migrant presumes. If more
rapid economic expansion and employment opportunities are of partic
ular importance for the younger members of the labor force, relatively
more of the older workers will migrate. Moreover, for individuals who
are not economically active (e.g., older individuals who are beyond
working age), employment opportunities should not inhibit their incen
tive to migrate. Thus, under these circumstances, a relatively larger
share of migrants from countries providing better employment oppor
tunities should be older. Given the competing hypotheses, we are
unable to attach an unambiguous expectation to the effect of employ
ment opportunities on immigrant age composition.
The marginal migrant also will adjust to differences in the direct
costs of migration. If higher migration costs are not linked to any agespecific cost differences, then they would cause the marginal migrant
to adjust by migrating at a younger age. However, the direct costs of
migration may not be spread evenly throughout all age groups. For
instance, the presence of U.S. military personnel reduces the costs of
migration primarily through the marriage market, where potential
wives of U.S. servicemen would benefit most. The parents of the for
eign-born spouses also may ultimately benefit from this connection,
but the presence of U.S. military personnel does not provide an obvi
ous advantage for other potential migrants. High birth rates may also
act differentially, being particularly relevant in the migration decisions
of younger individuals and their families; high birth rates and larger
families thus should reduce the flow of relatively younger individuals.
Less-than-perfect international transferability of skills also imposes
costs on migrants. Where skill-transfer costs are higher, the greater
expected skill losses should cause the marginal migrant to migrate at a
younger age. Therefore, since migrants from English-speaking nations

Legal U.S. Immigration

137

should experience lower skill losses, economic migrants from such
nations should be relatively older than migrants from other nations.
Moreover, relatively more older non-economic migrants should come
from English-speaking countries because language skills are important
for social and cultural assimilation and, if they do not possess Englishlanguage skills upon entry, older immigrants are less likely to become
proficient in English. Prospective migrants (especially non-economic
migrants) from countries where Catholicism is the primary religion
should face lower adjustment costs in terms of social and cultural
assimilation, and immigrants from these nations should be relatively
older.
Among U.S. immigration policy factors, the number of prior immi
grants from country / who have become U.S. citizens is of particular
relevance in determining the age composition of migrants. Because of
the lower direct entry costs for potential immigrants, the age of immi
grants should be associated with the number of U.S. citizens who orig
inated from a given country of origin, especially in the numerically
exempt class (spouses and parents of U.S. citizens); however, the pre
cise overall effect is unclear, because spouses tend to be younger and
parents tend to be older.5
In the vector of social programs, old-age pension programs that
transfer wealth from working-age individuals to older individuals
would be expected to discourage older persons from moving while
encouraging younger persons to move. However, not all pension pro
grams constitute an income transfer—provident fund systems are a
good example—and even if a transfer is involved, the net effect is not
necessarily to reduce the age composition of migrants. If benefit pay
ments are internationally transferable, the added income from the pen
sion program may induce relatively more older individuals to migrate.
Furthermore, younger workers may anticipate that the present value of
their future old-age benefits outweighs the current costs being imposed
on them and decide not to migrate. Therefore, the overall impact of
employment-related old-age programs on the age composition of
migrants is ambiguous.
Other features of old-age pension programs may cause a differential
impact on particular age groups. For instance, whether financed indi
rectly through income taxes or directly through employee and/or
employer contributions, universal pension programs transfer income

13 8

The Age Composition of U. S. Immigration

from the younger to the older, retired population. Under these circum
stances, workers are less likely to anticipate that their benefits will out
weigh their current costs, and therefore, such programs are expected to
induce a relatively larger flow of young migrants.
By similar reasoning, universal sickness programs also should
encourage the migration of younger individuals. However, specific
features of medical, cash sickness, and maternity benefits present a
more complicated picture. Women of child-bearing age should be dis
couraged from leaving countries with such programs both because of
the maternity benefits that accrue to themselves and because of the
medical benefits that accrue to their children; their husbands also
should be discouraged from emigrating. Likewise, older persons
should be less likely to leave countries with sickness and medical ben
efits. Cash sickness benefits should be relevant only to persons who
are working-age individuals, so these benefits should encourage the
flow of the oldest age group of potential migrants, which includes indi
viduals who are not economically active.
Unemployment insurance generally constitutes a transfer from older
working age groups with typically lower unemployment rates to
younger age groups with typically higher unemployment rates. As a
consequence, we expect the presence of unemployment insurance to
discourage the migration of younger persons and to encourage the
migration of older persons. Finally, family allowance programs should
discourage migration of individuals in the 20-34 age class and their
families.

ESTIMATION OF THE AGE COMPOSITION EQUATIONS
The statistical methodology used to estimate the age-composition
equation is essentially the same as that for estimating the gender com
position of immigrant except for the focus on age shares rather than
gender shares. In our age analysis, we do not present the results for all
age groups; we focus on only the shares of immigrants aged 20-34 and
those aged 55 and older, which are the two extremes of the migrationage spectrum. Individuals aged 20-34 are most likely to be interna
tional migrants and are more likely to be economically active, and
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therefore they are more responsive to basic economic incentives. Indi
viduals aged 55 and older are often out of the labor force.
Because we present the results for only two age groups, our inter
pretation of the coefficients in the regressions is slightly different than
for the gender regressions. In the gender equation, the coefficient on
the control total (e.g., total immigration of individuals aged 20 or older,
regardless of gender) must sum to 1.0 across all gender groups. How
ever, in this chapter we essentially present two separate models, one
focused on persons 20-34 relative to those 35 and older and the second
focused on persons 55 and older relative to those 20-54. Within each
set, the adding-up property holds. However, the two age groups that
occupy our attention (20-34 and 55 and older) are not estimated as
parts of the same system of equations.
A practical reason for examining only two age groups at a time is
that the generalized least squares feature of the Hausman-Taylor meth
odology, as well as its instrumental variables feature, destroy the add
ing-up property for all cases except the special case of a two-group
decomposition.6 Although multiplying each equation of the system by
a weight generally negates the adding-up property that is inherent in
data, that this is not true for two-equation systems. 7

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
All Immigrants

Table 7.1 reports coefficients and significance levels for all immi
grants (i.e., males and females combined) aged 20-34 and aged 55 and
older, where the totals are aggregated across the restricted and exempt
classes. (The corresponding /-statistics are provided in Appendix Table
Fl).
In the economic opportunities vector, we find strong support for our
hypotheses concerning how these variables will influence the age com
position of migrants. For instance, higher relative per-capita incomes
lower the returns to migration for individuals at every age, and conse
quently, individuals who choose to migrate do so at a relatively
younger age. A significantly larger number of migrants aged 55 and
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Table 7.1 Age Composition of Immigrants: Hausman-Taylor
Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Variable

Aged 20-34

Aged 55 and older

364.94***

-226.84**

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

-848.92*
7.08***

867.05***

-19.81***

17.42***

62.70***

-50.59***

-5.57***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education

English language
U.S. college students

-350.96***

150.42*

-7.92

-2.22

12.74
-10.01***
-860.70

22.87
6.50***
2077.68***

25.45

-6.15

20.05

6.86

Catholic

415.03

540.61

Muslim

-175.22

126.86

Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness

U.S. immigration policy
16.87*
245.85***

-10.82*
-132.18***

Silva visas

3097.98***

-2062.75***

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-424.99***

301.31***

Asia

1284.38*

294.69

251.30*
-242.68**

-91.92

Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age

208.12

31.24
-278.36***

Old-age pension not portable

-127.55

58.06

Universal sickness

-28.43
-472.01***

Provident fund old-age

Cash sickness benefits

40.82
386.07***
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Variable

Aged 55 and older

Maternity benefits

Aged 20-34
177.26**

Medical benefits

-145.53*

-82.46
143.87**

Unemployment insurance

-212.27*

164.30*

Universal family allowance
Employment family allowance
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-39.88

52.48

-165.22

165.34

Control
Median age in /
Total migrants from /
aged 20 and over

-77 21***

35.07***

0.44***

0.16***

1 *** Indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table
Fl reports the corresponding f-statistics.

older, and significantly smaller number of migrants aged 20-34, come
from source countries with higher levels of development (as reflected
by the degree of urbanization) and with more rapid growth of GDP.
The influence of relative government size is positive (negative) and
highly significant for the share of migrants aged 20-34 (aged 55 and
older). Thus, in countries where government revenues are large, the
flow of younger migrants is stimulated and that of older individuals is
lessened (apparently because of government benefits to older individu
als for which they are less likely to bear a proportionate share of the tax
burden).
We have considerably less evidence that either migration costs or
political/religious considerations significantly influence the age at
which migration occurs, with two exceptions. English language has a
particularly large and significant influence on the number of individuals
aged 55 and older who migrate to the United States: per year, over
2,000 additional individuals aged 55 and older migrate from an
English-speaking nation relative to a non-English-speaking nation.
This finding suggests that familiarity with language plays a particularly
critical role in facilitating the social and cultural assimilation of older
migrants. Second, the education level in the source country is signifi
cant; more highly educated individuals should be better able to adapt to
their new situation, and the lower adjustment costs should thus induce
relatively older persons to move, which is what the evidence indicates.
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On the other hand, contrary to our expectations, fewer migrants aged
20-34 come from nations that are more distant from the United States;
one possible explanation is that more potential intervening opportuni
ties attract relatively young economic migrants to locations other than
the United States.
Factors associated with U.S. immigration policy significantly influ
ence the age composition of migrants. While we did not develop an
hypothesis regarding either the lottery visas or the Silva program, the
evidence clearly indicates that each program resulted in significantly
fewer migrants aged 55 and older and more migrants aged 20-34. The
Silva program had a particularly large effect, with over 3,000 addi
tional migrants aged 20-34 from Mexico during both 1978 and 1981.
The differential treatment of migrants from the Western Hemisphere
during 1972-1976 had the opposite effect: the lower immigration bar
riers appear to have increased the relative age of migrants.
Old-age pension programs appear to have some influence on the age
structure of migrants, but contrary to our expectation, they do not sig
nificantly discourage the flow of older migrants. Younger persons are
only slightly influenced by old-age programs, but (as expected) they
have a higher propensity to migrate if pensions are universally pro
vided. Other specific features of employment-related programs have
very different effects. For instance, whereas employment-related old
age programs that are of the social insurance variety significantly
reduce the number of migrants aged 20-34, provident funds reduce the
flow of migrants aged 55 and older. A key difference in these programs
may be the waiting period before any benefits can be received. 8 Social
insurance programs generally provide benefits only at a specified
retirement age, but provident funds can often be received at an earlier
age, thus, providing the opportunity to accumulate assets and allow
persons to emigrate before the age of 55.
Within health-related programs, we do not find the anticipated effect
that universal programs retard the flow of older migrants, but cash sick
ness benefits available only to economically active individuals do
reduce the flow of younger migrants, as expected. Also as expected,
countries with unemployment social insurance programs send rela
tively fewer (more) young (older) migrants to the United States, though
the significance of the effect is not high. Contrary to our hypothesis,
significantly more migrants aged 20-34 come from nations where
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maternity benefits are provided, and the evidence does not indicate that
family allowance programs retard the flow of young individuals and
their families. Finally, that medical benefits positively influence the
number of migrants aged 55 and older is somewhat surprising.
Immigrants By Gender
Table 7.2 presents separate results for male and female immigrants
by age; corresponding f-statistics are presented in Appendix Table F2.
Certain factors have similar effects on the age composition of both
genders; these effects are most apparent for those aged 55 and older
and, in particular, in the differential economic opportunity vector. Sig
nificantly more older male and female migrants come from source
countries characterized by high levels of development and rapid
growth of GDP, and larger government revenues (and their associated
benefits and taxes) tend to retard the flow of older migrants, regardless
of gender. These effects are expected. Also as expected, employmentrelated sickness benefits that are specifically geared toward the eco
nomically active positively influence the flow of older migrants.
English-language skills also are particularly important in facilitating
the migration of persons aged 55 and older, whereas both the lottery
and Silva programs resulted in significantly fewer older migrants of
both genders.
For immigrants aged 20-34, the most obvious similarities across the
genders concern the influence of U.S. immigration policy, in particular,
the lottery program and the differential treatment of Western Hemi
sphere natives. In other areas, however, the differences across gender
are striking. For instance, evidence supporting the hypothesis that
higher source country incomes tend to decrease the relative age of
migrants is found primarily for males, but the other factors in the dif
ferential economic opportunity vector (except for female labor force
participation) are only significant in the regressions for females. 9
Moreover, factors associated with migration costs appear to be much
stronger forces in shaping the age composition of female migrants.
Certain U.S. immigration policy variables also influence the number of
female, but not the number of male, migrants. For instance, prior
immigrants who have become U.S. citizens, the Silva program, and
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Table 7.2 Age Composition of Immigrants by Gender: Hausman-Taylor
Instrumental Variable Estimates11
Aged 20-34
Variable

Male

Female

193.75**

93.85
-611.37***

Aged 55 and older
Male

Female

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

-275.91
2.78*
-2.27
35.96***

4 57***
—19 29***
24.14***

-108.23** -80.76*
377.00*** 490.64***
-2.38***

-3.34***

449***

12 81***

-26.73*** -20.27***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim
U.S. immigration policy

-85.84*
-8.10*
-27.89
2.81
-389.03

-228.16***
7.66**
39.17*
-10.33***
-1135.49

40.44
0.29

103.60*
-5.45**

20.66
-3.47
0.96
4.17***
807.09*** 1336.74***

23.30

-2.09

-16.74

-0.80

8.81

6.89

260.25

-206.05

4.04
154.65

3.27
446.78

388.23

-988.44

-221.02

520.76

14.20***
100.07***

-2.14
-8.25***
-74.77*** -50.55**

2972.35***
5.27
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 -161.08*** -227.20***
18.71
1088.95**
Asia

-382.48***-! 830.96***

Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

-0.86
145.06***

Silva visas

115.33*** 172.27***
332.89*

-106.99

-62.19

-48.94

Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness
Cash sickness benefits

152.22*
-150.50

130.79*
-154.55***

48.69
-36.18

179.46***
-92.49***

26.93
-156.74*

-8.65
-273.34***

29.07
11.56
-114.39** -167.66***
13.53

46.99

-5.30
28.89
170.02*** 192.92***
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Variable
Maternity benefits
Medical benefits
Unemployment insurance

Aged 20-34
Female
Male
114.14***
81.51*
-90.89**
-5.97
-122.05
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Aged 55 and older
Female
Male
-62.50**
-31.31
91.40***
38.24

-63.49

73.02*

-87.40

-7.66

22.99

36.85

Employment family allowance -132.90

-62.68

71.08

92.92*

—41.97***

15.90***

21.55***

0.39***

0.10***

0.21***

Universal family allowance

68.67

Control
Median age in i
Total sex-specific immigration
from i*

-43.77***
0.52="

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 <t< 1.67. Table F2
reports the corresponding /-statistics.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the education control variable is measured specific to
the respective gender.
c ln the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.

being from an Asian nation all positively affected the number of female
immigrants aged 20-34, while not significantly influencing the males.
For social programs, pair-wise comparisons across the gender regres
sions also indicate considerable differences. For males aged 20-34,
few social programs appear to have any effect even at the lowest level of
significance. However, several social program variables have a highly
significant influence on the number of female migrants aged 20-34.
For example, employment-related old-age programs significantly
reduce the number of young female migrants, but if the program is of
the provident funds variety, significantly more young females migrate.
On the other hand, if pension benefits are not internationally transfer
able, the number of young female migrants is reduced, which is unan
ticipated. The availability of maternity benefits positively influences
the number of female migrants aged 20-34, another unanticipated
result. More consistent with our hypotheses, the availability of other
health-related programs (i.e., sickness and medical) significantly influ
ence the number of young female migrants, but these effects are either
not significant or only marginally significant for males. The reason for
the differences in results across gender is not totally clear.
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Male and Female Immigrants By Entry Class
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 present age-composition results for numerically
restricted and numerically exempt immigrants; corresponding ?-statistics are found in Appendix Tables F3 and F4. As noted in the context
of gender composition, differences are evident within many of the vec
tors when comparing between the numerically restricted and exempt
classes. However, when we compare the effects of specific factors on
the age composition of male versus female immigrants, differences
across genders appear to lessen once the data are disaggregated by
entry class.
For numerically restricted immigrants, the factors included in the
differential economic opportunity vector do not play a strong role in
determining the age composition of either gender. Although providing
some evidence consistent with our hypotheses, the findings concerning
the factors listed under "migration costs" also are not found to be par
ticularly robust or highly significant. 10 Apparently (as with the gender
composition model), even though we have attempted to control for
U.S. policy-related considerations, immigration restrictions blunt most
of the expected effects of these economic incentives.
Political and religious considerations have some effect on the age
structure of numerically restricted immigrants. The effect is most
apparent for religion (Table 7.3), where significantly fewer males and
females aged 55 and older come from nations where Catholicism is the
primary religion, which is not what we anticipated. To an even greater
extent, U.S. immigration policy-related factors affect the age of numer
ically restricted migrants. For example, whereas the lottery program
significantly reduced the relative age of migrants, the Silva program
and the differential treatment of the Western Hemisphere generally
increased their relative age. Moreover, significantly fewer restricted
male and female immigrants aged 55 and older came from Asian
nations, ceteris paribus. The one factor for which a clear difference is
evident across genders is the influence of U.S. citizens." Significantly
fewer females aged 55 and older and more females aged 20-34 came
from nations from which more natives became U.S. citizens. Within
the class of numerically restricted immigrants, adult daughters and sis
ters who are less than age 35 are apparently the primary beneficiaries
of the lower entry costs associated with U.S. citizenship.
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Many of the social programs considered play a significant role in
affecting the age of restricted migrants, and the effects are generally
consistent across genders. For example, universal-coverage programs
that are likely to be important to older persons (i.e., universal old-age
and sickness programs) induce relatively more migrants aged 20-34
(Table 7.3). On the other hand, universal programs serving the inter
ests of younger individuals and their families (i.e., universal family
allowances) induce more individuals aged 55 and older of both genders
to migrate. Moreover, for both males and females, employmentrelated old-age pension programs tend to increase the relative age of
migrants, as do employment-related sickness benefits, which we
expected. Although the direction of the relationship is not expected,
the impact of maternity benefits also is consistent across genders.
Although social programs importantly affect the age of numerically
restricted immigrants, such is not the case generally for numerically
exempt immigrants (Table 7.4). Instead, the factors in the economic
opportunities vector serve as primary determinants of the age composi
tion of the exempt group. This is especially true for older male and
female migrants and for female migrants aged 20-34. For numerically
exempt males aged 20-34, only relative income and female labor force
participation are significant. The effect of relative income is as
expected. Although we did not predict the effect of female labor force
participation on the age of male migrants, this positive relationship
could have been caused by the added competition faced by males for
jobs in markets where females represent a relatively large percentage
of the labor force. For the other variables, as the findings relate to both
male and female migrants aged 55 and older and female migrants aged
20-34, the signs on all the coefficients are in the expected direction and
the level of significance is high, thus providing strong support for our
hypotheses concerning the influence of economic opportunities in
shaping the age composition of both male and female numerically
exempt immigrants, who we expect to better reflect the forces of eco
nomic incentives.
The influence of migration costs on exempt immigrants is similar to
that for numerically restricted migrants: migration costs are not pri
mary determinants of age composition, particularly for males. A nota
ble exception is the influence of English-language skills in shaping a
relatively older flow of exempt immigrants. The presence of U.S. mili-
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Table 7.3 Age Composition of Numerically Restricted Immigrants:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Aged 20-34
Variable

Males

Females

Aged 55 and older
Males

Females

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

19.65

49.96

-112.88

-141.95

-12.26

-17.36

49.77*

-0.09

-0.26

-0.15

0.53*
-3.90***

0.39
-1.54*

-35.26*

12.09***

8.32*

1.23

1.10**

2.38***

2.63

0.38

0.10
-64.18
9.59*

-0.03
-130.14***
25.58***

0.84

1.53*

-1.58
2.28

-3.85***
9.78***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education1*

-15.91
1.10
-8.42
0.92

-1.11
-4.48***

English language

-0.83

-64.97

U.S. college students

23.76

26.82

5.17

3.25

Polit. attract, and religion
Catholic

169.52**

202.56

-0.94
-2.17*
-80.29*** -105.40***

Muslim

52.83

100.23

-69.55*

Political competitiveness

-78.92*

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas
Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76

Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age

4.19
73.70***
-754.89***

6.33**
83.43***

-0.83
-13.59***

-5.17***
-9.42*

85.66

110.16***

124.93***

30.70***

47.05***

-23.93

-62.17***

102.27

181.26

-M4.89*** 136.91***
-110.68*** -146.65***

-65.80**

-80.79***

-13.96
32.29***

-7.09
24.65***

26.38

42.66

2.73

20.44*

Old-age pension not portable

-47.75*

-33.99

4.10

-0.38

Universal sickness

144.17***

126.31***

0.13

-5.14
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Aged 55 and older

Males
Females
-135.28*** -180.35***

Males
23.85**

Females
48.40***

70.35***

-12.75**

—32 39***

Maternity benefits

41.72*

Medical benefits

31.90

17.85

11.57*

Unemployment insurance

32.92

26.88

13.78

30.19
24.38**

Universal family allowance

-6.86

42.39

18.94*

31.69**

Employment family allowance

10.56

28.56

13.72

24.24*

-6.81

-7.24

1.67

-1.82

Control
Median age in i
Total numerically restricted
from ic

0.62***

0.62***

0.06***

0.06***

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <t< 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table F3
reports the corresponding ^-statistics.
In the gender-specific regressions, the education control variable is measured specific to
the respective gender.
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.

tary personnel positively affects the entry of females aged 20-34.
However, the reason that birth rate is associated with a larger number
of female migrants aged 20-34 is unclear. Moreover, while the rela
tionship is expected, we are uncertain of the reason that nations with
more highly educated females send relatively older female migrants,
while the age of male migrants is not affected by education.
U.S. immigration policy and political/religious considerations also
influence the age of numerically exempt immigrants. For instance, as
with numerically restricted immigrants, the lottery generally decreased
the relative age of exempt immigrants, whereas the differential treat
ment of Western Hemisphere natives during 1972-1976 increased their
relative age. 12 However, unlike restricted migrants, numerically
exempt males from Asian nations tend to be older than other migrants,
ceteris paribus. This finding may be due to the presence of intervening
opportunities that attract the younger economic migrants. More older
male and female exempt migrants came from nations with unattractive
political environments and from nations where Catholicism is the pri
mary religion. Both findings are as anticipated.
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Table 7.4 Age Composition of Numerically Exempt Immigrants:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Aged 20-34
Variable

Aged 55 and older

Males

Females

Males

Females

140.82*

74.48*
-579.23***

-95.54**
347.59***

-73.17
615.27***

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

-163.69
1.76

2.83***

-2.20***

—3 19***

1.60
32 37***

—8 92***

3.17**

992***

23.98***

-23.91***

-25.51***

10.44

-4.91

-69.26
8.67***

-1.51

37.33
—7 04***

-33.69

32.07**

19.08

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education1*
English language
U.S. college students

-14.96

_4 77***

0.43
-757.00*** -1337.99***
25.89

-19.07

-2.08
297**

1.27
968.11*** 1687.24***
-28.90

-10.87

Polit. attract, and religion
-3.07

-8.44*

7.68*

Catholic

-147.90

-481.59*

273.68*

Muslim

254.17

-553.45

Political competitiveness

-186.36

11.52***
600.60*
358.89

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas
Silva visas

-9.60*
83.48***

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-100.69
-90.59***

Asia

^17.51**

-2.55
35.62*

-0.04
-61.70***

-26.29
-87.06***

-35.21
70.76***

1.27
-31.49
12.95
92.08***

90.83

521.18***

3,75.70

14.69

-43.11

-24.24

Social programs
Universal old-age

23.64

Employment-related old-age

15.14

Provident fund old-age

33.39

Old-age pension not portable

2750

-4.88

-2.01

7.85

-65.01

-9.44

-28.91

-31.69

Universal sickness

33.67
118.85***

6.66
-3.36
117.81*** -160.42***
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Aged 20-34
Variable
Cash sickness benefits
Maternity benefits
Medical benefits
Unemployment insurance

Males

Females

29.18

-32.67
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Aged 55 and Older
Males
138.63***

Females
118.87***

32.84

7.88

-11.50

2.61

22.09
-129.68*

-8.03

9.71

23.59

-47.41

56.30

49.76

0.24

1.87

11.11

-35.37

53.50

62.53

-35.28***

-29.59***

15.00***

24.16***

0.57***

0.45***

0.10***

Q 22***

Universal family allowance

-97.17
-143.71*
Employment family allowance
Control
Median age in i
Total exempt from f

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <t< 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table F4
reports the corresponding /-statistics.
In the gender-specific regressions, the education control variable is measured specific to
the respective gender.
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.

SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to model the age composition of U.S.
immigrants in a fashion that we believe is unique, and with the inclu
sion of a vector of social programs variables. By using INS microdata
to identify and cross-classify various groups, we have been able to dis
tinguish the age composition of numerically restricted and numerically
exempt U.S. immigrants, by gender.
Our analysis has found that the economic opportunity variables are
generally strong and work in the expected directions. For example,
higher source-country incomes relative to the United States result in
more younger and less older immigrants. This finding is particularly
interesting because these same factors do not play an especially signif
icant role in explaining the rate of U.S. immigration. Migration costs
and political/religious forces are not particularly important determi
nants of age composition, in spite of the fact that certain of these costs
and forces are consistently important in explaining the rate of immigra-
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tion from the various source countries. One general conclusion from
these observations is that whereas the rate model identifies certain
forces that are critical in shaping the volume of movement from vari
ous source countries, it conceals forces that are important determinants
of age composition.
Another general conclusion is that U.S. immigration policy, perhaps
in indirect or unintended ways, has influenced the age composition of
immigrants. A larger number of prior immigrants who have become
U.S. citizens lowers the direct entry costs for potential immigrants.
These lower costs have primarily served to facilitate the entry of
young, adult, numerically restricted female immigrants, suggesting
that adult daughters and sisters less than age 35 are the primary benefi
ciaries. Moreover, whereas both the lottery and Silva programs
resulted in significantly fewer migrants aged 55 and older and more
migrants aged 20-34, the differential treatment of potential migrants
from the Western Hemisphere nations had the opposite effect. The
sensitivity of migrant age composition to such factors should be kept in
mind by policymakers in their attempts to formulate optimal immigra
tion policies.
Because we feel that this chapter breaks new ground in the study of
immigrant age composition, we are less concerned than we might oth
erwise be that a number of variables, particularly social program vari
ables, have unanticipated effects for which we do not have good
explanations. Nevertheless, many social program variables prove to be
significant determinants of age composition. As far as we know, this
study is the first to show that source-country social programs play any
role in determining the age structure of migrants to the United States.

Notes
1. Simon (1984) has noted that the largest single category of transfer payments or
services received by immigrant families is that for schooling costs of children
aged 5-17.
2. This assumption is relaxed in the next chapter that focuses on the skill composi
tion of immigrants.
3. The concept of relative attractiveness incorporates the idea that nonmonetary
characteristics associated with country / and the United States may enter the deci
sion maker's utility function and therefore influence the decision to migrate. If we
assume that these characteristics are included in a vector x, the foregone relative
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attractiveness of the country of origin could be expressed as (or,- - xj), where the
subscript j represents the United States. Therefore, more highly valued nonmonetary characteristics associated with the country of origin imply higher migration
costs. Alternatively, if Xj is actually higher than *,-, this concept may be better
interpreted as an opportunity cost of not migrating which, of course, would be
lower the higher x ,-. Moreover, if Xj is higher than jc,-, the individual will choose to
migrate only if the added value attached to the nonmonetary characteristics (plus
any net gains in earnings if he or she is economically active) exceeds the "other"
costs (i.e., direct entry costs and possible skill losses).
Measuring the benefits of migration solely in terms of earnings differentials
essentially presumes that individuals are all economically active which, of course,
is not realistic. Individuals may choose not to be economically active because of
their age (e.g., retirement from work) or for other reasons, perhaps related to gen
der differences in the propensity to work in the formal labor market. For such
individuals, employment opportunities would play a less important role in the
decision of whether to migrate, though for spouses of economically active mar
riage partners such considerations still play a critical role. Rather, for individuals
who are not economically active, the decision of whether to migrate would entail
a more direct comparison of the other migration costs incurred and the change in
the value of the nonmonetary characteristics associated with the move.
This effect on age composition may be clearer for the numerically restricted
immigrant class, where unmarried adult sons and daughters as well as brothers
and sisters of U.S. citizens 21 years old and over may enter.
This "problem" results in at least three options. First, we could live without the
adding up property and argue that this property now holds only approximately.
Because we view the adding-up property as inherent to the estimation of a system
of share equations, we reject this option. Second, we could use a simple econo
metric technique like one- or two-way fixed effects. However, Appendix C makes
a strong case for the Hausman-Taylor approach over these alternatives. Finally,
we could estimate a series of two-equation systems that satisfy the adding-up
property. This last option is preferable to the use of a still more sophisticated
approach suggested by Berndt and Savin (1975) that requires a number of addi
tional simplifying assumptions.
Consider a two-equation system that includes an adding-up property:

Eq. Fl

y = a, T + a2x + e, , and

Eq.F2

T-y = P 1 r +

where T is the "control total," y is a component of T, x is a vector of explana
tory variables, and £j and e2 are error terms. Now subtract T from both sides
of Eq. F2 to yield
Eq.F3

154 The Age Composition of U.S. Immigration
If we multiply Eq. F3 through by -1, we obtain
Eq.F4

y = (l-pjjr-pjjr-e^

Even if we multiply all terms in Eq. Fl and F2 by a weight (w), the following con
ditions hold in the two-equation system:
Eq.FS

a, = 1 - p^ anda2 = -p2

8. Another difference is that provident funds programs are generally associated with
developing countries, whereas employment-related social insurance old-age pro
grams are more frequently found in developed nations with at least a relatively
high degree of industrialization.
9. For potential female migrants, higher rates of female labor force participation
may reflect generally better earnings opportunities for female workers, and there
fore relatively more young female migrants should come from source countries
where the female percentage of total labor force is relatively high.
10. The evidence indicating that, for both males and females, birth rate is positive and
significant for immigrants aged 55 and older is consistent with our hypotheses.
However, the findings that more immigrants aged 55 and older come from nations
that are more distant from the United States and that fewer women aged 55 and
older come from English-speaking nations are not expected.
11. Note also that, whereas both the Silva program and the differential treatment of
Western Hemisphere natives during 1972-1976 have a significantly positive effect
on both males and females aged 55 and older, a significantly negative effect
occurs on migrants aged 20-34 only for males with the Silva program and only
for females from the Western Hemisphere during 1972-1976. We suspect that
information related to specific policy-related features of these programs may
explain these differences.
12. We do not understand why the lottery and Silva programs influence exempt immi
grants, because these variables reflect admission programs that affected restricted
immigrants. Exempt immigration could be affected in later years after the
restricted immigrants acquire U.S. citizenship, but how the exempt category
would be influenced in the years of the programs is not clear.

8 The Skill Composition
of U.S. Immigration
A strong focus of current debates regarding U.S. immigration pol
icy is the issue of whether a decline has occurred in the quality of U.S.
immigrants (e.g., Borjas 1985 and 1987b) or not (e.g., Chiswick 1986).
Recent literature seems to indicate that the quality of immigrant skills
has in fact declined (Borjas 1995) relative to those of native-born
Americans.
The skill composition of immigrants has many potential effects on
the U.S. economy. The supply of highly skilled immigrant workers is
often stressed as critically important to maintaining a vibrant and com
petitive U.S. work force in an economy that is increasingly becoming
more globalized. Moreover, in an era of rapid technological change,
high-skilled workers are necessary to maintain productivity at the fron
tiers of technological developments.
Skill levels have many other potential influences, including many of
the influences discussed earlier in the context of the age composition of
migrants. High-skilled workers are more economically productive
than low-skilled workers and therefore add more to overall U.S. pro
ductivity. Moreover, their higher incomes contribute more to the pri
vate sector in terms of consumption expenditures and to the public
sector in the form of tax payments. High-skilled workers also are less
likely to experience periods of unemployment and thus are less likely
to impose a net burden on the U.S. economy. Furthermore, by virtue of
their education and innate abilities, high-skilled workers are likely to
be more proficient in English or to learn English-language skills more
quickly, and therefore they are able to assimilate more rapidly in the
U.S. economy. Given the linkage between skill level and income/edu
cation levels, the skill composition of immigrants also may have links
to the dependency ratio within immigrant families and may affect the
overall U.S. fertility rate in subsequent years. Moreover, crime rates
are related to income and education levels. Therefore, the skill level of
migrants may affect the extent to which immigrants impose a net cost
on the U.S. society.
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THE SKILL COMPOSITION MODEL
The Marginal Migrant Once Again
The general form of the skill composition model follows that of
Equation 5.1, and we again use the concept of the marginal migrant. In
our prior discussion in the context of age composition, we assumed
that all members of the indigenous population were endowed with a
given amount of human capital. Clearly, in order to discuss skill com
position, this assumption must now be relaxed. We here assume that,
over time, potential immigrants accumulate occupational skills through
formal schooling and occupational experience. Individuals differ in
terms of the rate at which these occupational skills are accumulated
(e.g., different innate abilities). As a consequence, within any particu
lar age group of country f s indigenous population (e.g., those individu
als aged a*), individuals possess different skill levels. While we
presume that the skill levels of the indigenous population are a contin
uous spectrum from low to high, for convenience we categorize mem
bers of the population as being either low- or high-skilled workers.
In its modified form, the equilibrium condition for the marginal
migrant in age group a* now may be expressed as:
Eq. 8.1

Z

^(w •- VV;)^**(1 + r )

= Ci »

where
a* is age at migration for a specific age group,
T is the age of the immigrant at death,
Wj and W} are the respective U.S. and country-of-origin wage per unit
of occupational skill,
A'** is the index of the marginal migrants occupational skill,and
r is a discount rate.
The left side of Eq. 8.1 therefore represents the discounted total returns
accruing to the marginal migrant who possesses skill level K** and
moves from i to j at age a*. The right side of Eq. 8.1 represents the
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total migration costs incurred by an individual who migrates from
country /. Once again, these total migration costs (C,) include direct
entry costs, skill losses associated with less-than-perfect international
skill transferability, and the foregone relative attractiveness of the
country of origin.
For the marginal migrant in age group a*, the decision to migrate is
one of indifference, since the expected benefits from migration are
exactly offset by the migration costs. However, within country f s
indigenous population, other individuals who are also aged a* will find
it beneficial to migrate if they possess a skill level that is higher than
£"**, since such individuals would receive net positive benefits from
migrating. Therefore, within the group of individuals of age a*, given
the skill level K** at which net benefits are zero, the marginal migrant
equilibrium condition determines the skill levels at which other mem
bers of the indigenous population would find migration beneficial and
hence determines the skill composition of immigrants. The higher the
skill level of the marginal migrant, the more highly skilled the overall
skill composition of migrants.
Since we are now focusing on a particular age group (a*), the skill
level of the marginal migrant is now considered to be the choice vari
able. Once again, the marginal migrant is presumed to be capable of
adjusting to any factors that would alter either the returns to or the
costs of migration ("adjusting" here means choosing to migrate at a
higher or lower skill level). 1 Such an adjustment would be expected if,
for example, migration costs were higher; the marginal migrant will
adjust by moving at a higher skill level and, by doing so, increase the
returns to migration in order to offset the higher costs. Hence, the
overall skill composition of migrants from country / will be responsive
to factors related to relative economic advantage between / and the
United States, as well as to the total migration costs incurred by those
who choose to migrate from i to the United States.
Figure 8.1 illustrates these relationships. The return on migration
increases with the skill level of the potential migrant, because those
who migrate at a higher skill level receive the same wage per unit of
occupational skill but over more units of skill than the low-skilled indi
vidual. Given costs of migration from country i to country j of C,y and
the expected differential return, /?,•(£), that is a function of the skill
level possessed at migration, the marginal migrant aged # * would
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Figure 8.1 Skill Level at Migration
Returns
and
costs

move at skill level A'Q**. If costs were higher, however, such as C-•',
the marginal migrant would move at a higher skill level, A"2 **. For
example, C-'could refer to migration from a more distant country or
from a non-English-speaking country. If the expected returns on
migration were higher at every skill level, such as shown by R^(K)—
for example, for individuals in lower-income source countries—the
marginal migrant would possess a lower skill level (A^**). Other
things being equal, any factors that would result in higher returns or
lower costs to individuals who migrate would induce relatively fewer
of the high-skilled individuals to become international migrants.
One important feature of Eq. 8.1 should be noted. This equation
specifies the equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant (i.e., net
benefits to migration equal zero) for only the a* age group. In a more
complicated form of the model, a similar condition may be specified
for the marginal migrant in all other age groups. Other things being
equal, the only difference in the specifications for the other age groups
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is that the indexed skill level of the marginal migrant in younger
(older) age groups would be associated with a lower (higher) skill level
than K**. However, the adjustments made to differences in the returns
and/or the costs of migration would be the same within each age group.
Therefore, within each age group, the skill level of migrants would be
responsive to factors related to relative economic advantage between
country / and the United States, as well as to the total migration costs
incurred by those who choose to migrate. Hence, if individuals are
allowed (conceptually) to adjust within all age groups, any factors that
are associated with lower returns to individuals who migrate would
induce a relatively more skilled flow of international migrants. Simi
larly, the higher the costs imposed on migrants, the more highly skilled
the international migrants.
Hypotheses
Consider the expected effects of the factors included in the differen
tial economic opportunity vector, other things being equal. Higher
country-of-origin wages per unit of human capital will decrease the
returns to migration at all skill levels, so migrants should possess a rel
atively higher average skill level if they come from source countries
with relatively higher per capita gross domestic product. 2 Djajic
(1989) also notes that a lower wage differential will induce migration
of individuals with a higher average skill level.
Other factors may influence relative earnings as well. For instance,
high government revenues are likely to be associated with higher taxes,
which will tend to increase the relative after-tax wage differential.
However, given their progressive nature, these taxes should fall dispro
portionately on the higher-income (highly skilled) individuals, lower
ing the net wage of the higher income workers relatively more than that
of the lower-income workers. 3 Thus, high government revenues should
induce relatively more high-skilled individuals to migrate.
Higher levels of development and more rapid short-term expansion
of country /'s economy are both generally associated with enhanced
employment opportunities, meaning the expected benefits from migrat
ing are generally lower, ceteris paribus. Thus, relatively more highskilled workers would choose to migrate. However, if the level of
development is particularly relevant in determining the employment
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opportunities for the more highly skilled individuals, a negative rela
tionship may exist. Rapid economic expansion and the associated
enhanced employment opportunities may be of particular importance
for the economic prospects of the low-skilled workers, which would
tend to reinforce our hypothesis that relatively more high-skilled work
ers would migrate. However, while this is certainly plausible, the ulti
mate impact of growth in real per capita GDP depends on how relative
wages within the source country are affected. If the relative employ
ment and wage opportunities of high-skilled workers improve with
short-term expansion, then the average skill composition of migrants
would be inversely related to the rate of economic expansion. Since
little evidence exists concerning the relationship between short-term
growth and relative employment or wage opportunities, we do not pre
dict the sign concerning the relationship between economic growth and
the skill composition of migrants.
The marginal migrant also will adjust to differences in the direct
costs of migration. For example, greater distance from the United
States would impose higher direct entry costs on all migrants, so
migrants from more distant countries should have relatively higher
average skill levels. Less-than-perfect international transferability of
skills also imposes costs, and greater expected skill losses should cause
the marginal migrant to adjust by migrating at a higher skill level.
However, others (e.g., McManus, Gould, and Welch 1983) assert that
whereas direct migration costs (e.g., distance) do not vary with skill
level, the negative effects of losses associated with less-than-perfect
international skill transferability should be proportionately greater in
the more skilled occupations. Therefore, other things being equal,
migrants from English-speaking nations should be relatively more
skilled than migrants from non-English speaking nations.
We expect migrants to be relatively more skilled if they come from
source countries that have more highly educated indigenous popula
tions. Furthermore, given per capita income, an increase in the relative
number of highly educated individuals should decrease the wages of
high-skilled relative to low-skilled occupations in country /, thereby
affecting the relative propensities of high- versus low-skilled individu
als to migrate. Acquiring an education at a U.S. university should
reduce skill losses for those who immigrate to the United States, by
increasing the probability that their knowledge will be easily trans-
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ferred to U.S. occupations and by creating a better flow of information
back to country i concerning U.S. opportunities. Consequently, larger
numbers of students from country / should increase the skill level of
migrants from i.
The less politically attractive the country of origin, the lower the
opportunity costs of departing; therefore, ceteris paribus, migrants
from politically less attractive countries should be less skilled. How
ever, evidence suggests that as political and civil rights are deprived,
professionals respond vigorously by emigrating (Huang 1987).
The number of prior immigrants from country i who have become
U.S. citizens should also be relevant in determining the skill composi
tion of migrants. Because migration costs are lower for persons who
have citizen relatives in the United States, the average skill composi
tion should be higher for countries having a low number of naturalized
citizens. In addition, to the extent that the differential treatment of
Western Hemisphere natives during 1972-1976 represents a lower
immigration barrier (i.e., fewer restrictions), the average skill level
should also be lower.
The anticipated effect of social programs on skill composition is not
straightforward, and consequently our reasoning is somewhat indi
rect. To the extent that a social program entails a transfer from higher
income (high-skilled) to lower income (low-skilled) individuals, we
expect the program to increase the relative share of high-skilled
migrants, because those bearing the greatest burden are generally the
least likely to benefit from the program. Thus, countries with pro
grams that provide universal coverage should have relatively more
high-skilled migrants in their immigration flows.
Likewise, unemployment insurance constitutes a transfer from highskilled workers to low-skilled workers, who typically have higher
unemployment rates; consequently, we expect unemployment insur
ance to discourage the migration of low-skilled workers and to encour
age the migration of the high-skilled. Because the number of children
in a family is likely to be inversely related to the family's income, fam
ily allowance programs should be relatively more important in reduc
ing the flow of lower-income (low-skilled) migrants. Fixed payments
per child would increase the income of the low-income family rela
tively more (as a percentage of unaugmented base income); hence, we
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expect employment-related family allowance programs to encourage
more highly skilled migrants.
Not all social programs constitute an income transfer, however. For
instance, employment-related old-age pension programs and cash sick
ness programs present a complex situation in which both costs and
benefits are most often roughly proportional to income levels. There
fore, without additional information concerning specific programs, we
are unable to ascertain precisely how they would affect the skill com
position of migrants. However, some sickness-related programs may
transfer wealth from high-skilled to low-skilled workers and therefore
should increase the relative skill level of migrants.

ESTIMATION OF THE SKILL COMPOSITION EQUATION
The statistical methodology used to estimate the skill-composition
relationships is essentially the same as that used for the gender and age
composition of immigrant flows. Because our empirical analysis is
designed to study the composition of occupational skills, we limit our
analysis to immigrants who are aged 20-64. (Immigrants over the age
of 64 are excluded because they are not likely to be economic migrants
who possess skills that will be used in the U.S. labor market.) More
over, by necessity, our empirical analysis is limited to only those immi
grants aged 20-64 who declare an occupation upon their admittance as
permanent resident aliens. For these immigrants, a separate analysis of
skill shares is performed for each of three age groups: all immigrants
aged 20-64; immigrants aged 20-34; and immigrants aged 35-64. The
shares of migrants in two skill classes are considered: 1) high-skilled,
which includes all individuals who declare an occupation in one of the
professional, technical, and kindred (PTK) occupational categories, as
well as managers, officials, and proprietors (except farm); and 2) lowskilled, which includes all other individuals who declare an occupa
tion. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 provide an overall picture of these groups
broken out by gender and entry class.
Since within each group the two skill classes together equal the sum
of all individuals examined, the interpretation of the coefficients in the
regressions is similar to that used with the gender regressions. Thus,
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the coefficient on the control total (e.g., total immigration of individu
als aged 20-64) must sum to 1.0 across the two skill groups. The
interpretation of the other independent variables is the same as in
Chapters 6 and 7 in the sense that these coefficients are interpreted as
a change in the absolute number of immigrants in a particular skill
group and the coefficients sum to zero across the skill classes. Within
all groups analyzed, the results for the high- and low-skilled classes
are essentially mirror images, and therefore we present the results only
for the high-skilled group. Moreover, the explanatory variables
include a measure of the percentage of individuals who do not declare
an occupation. This variable is measured specific to the age (and gen
der) group under consideration and is included to partially correct for
selectivity into the group of immigrants who declare an occupation.
The variable is treated as endogenous, or correlated with unobserved
country-specific effects, and thus falls into the *2 vector (as described
in Appendix C).

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
All Immigrants
For highly skilled immigrants, Table 8.1 reports coefficients and sig
nificance levels for all immigrants aged 20-64, those aged 20-34, and
those aged 35-64, where the totals are aggregated across gender and
entry classes (i.e., numerically restricted and numerically exempt).
Under the economic opportunities vector, we hypothesized that
migrants will possess a relatively higher skill level if they come from
higher-income source countries. Borjas (1987b), in particular, has
argued that if income distributions are more unequal in the home coun
try than in the United States, then individuals who migrate will be
drawn from the lower tail of the home country's income distribution
(i.e., lower skill levels). If the extent of source-country income ine
quality is negatively related to the country's average income level, this
consideration of income inequality should reinforce our expectation.
However, contrary to expectations, source-country income levels do
not significantly affect skill composition.
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Table 8.1 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Age: Hausman-Taylor
Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Variable

Total

Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

40.43
-599.43***

73.27
-564.32***

-5.16

1.89
-10.23***

2.06*

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

73.51
-0.44
-3.00**

21.85***

-3.39
34.74***

-11.68***

-293.40***

-171.52***

-72.88***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education
English language
U.S. college students

6.81**

0.49

30.61
-9.70***

20.28
-9.62***

18.58*

2721.00***

1724.09***

5.42

-49.35

13.50

0.56
1050.23***
-43.49*

Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim

4.16
1284.60***
340.84

-1.35
991 52***
666.05*

0.94
316.10**
-162.62

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

-2.28
76.80**

-5.72
68.12***

-0.57
19.39
-250.85***

-597.58***

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-358.94**
-212.84***

Asia

2456.86***

1430.92***

-15.21
842.17***

92.96
-146.52***

130.61**

6.51

-119.43***

^7.81*

164.50**

219.34***

-50.67

-102.50**

-95.89***

Silva visas

-150.99***

Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness
Cash sickness benefits

-82.31

-36.94

12.98

-80.12

6.17
-7.36
149.83***
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Variable

Total

Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

Maternity benefits

48.66

59.75*

-7.51

Medical benefits

65.84

74.78*

34.69

Unemployment insurance

-27.22

35.34

Universal family allowance

143.35*

-10.39
179.05***

Employment family allowance

14.68

54.89

-284.73***

-102.99*

31.95
15.79

Control
% No occupation15
Total U.S. immigration from ic

0.08***

Q J2***

25.80
O.io***

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Corre
sponding r-statistics are reported in Appendix Table Gl.
b The control for the percentage of immigrants that does not declare an occupation is mea
sured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and aged 35-64).
c The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and
aged 35-64).

The findings for the other economic opportunity variables provide
only mixed support for our hypotheses, and these findings are sensitive
to the actual age group considered. We hypothesized that relatively
more high-skilled migrants would come from source countries that pro
vide enhanced employment opportunities, which would lower the earn
ings differential, but, to the extent that higher levels of development
and more rapid short-term growth are associated with enhanced
employment opportunities, the evidence suggests that the propensity of
high-skilled workers to migrate is reduced by such opportunities. For
level of development or degree of urbanization, this finding may not be
surprising, but we do not understand why this would be the case only
for those individuals aged 35-64. Apparently, more rapid short-term
expansion of the economy also improves the wage and employment
opportunities of high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers, especially
among migrants aged 20-34.
The impact of the relative size of government is positive and margin
ally significant for the high-skill share of migrants aged 20-34. The
findings concerning the relationship between female labor force partic
ipation and the skill level of migrants are sensitive to the age group
considered. Among migrants aged 20-34, a higher percentage of
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females in the labor force is associated with a significantly larger num
ber of high-skilled migrants; however, among the migrants aged 3564, the opposite is found. This may reflect the fact that in countries
where female labor force participation is relatively high, a generally
higher skill level exists among the population, thus resulting in the
migration of relatively more high-skilled workers. However, this argu
ment does not explain why the high-skilled share is lower for the
migrants aged 35-64.
The results indicate that English-speaking nations send relatively
more high-skilled migrants to the United States: other things being
equal, over 2,700 additional high-skilled workers annually migrate to
the United States from these countries. This finding is expected. On
the other hand, the findings indicating that fewer high-skilled workers
come from nations with relatively highly educated populations is sur
prising. This evidence may indicate that, in these countries, the labor
market provides more favorable returns to human capital.
Because greater distance from the United States imposes higher
direct entry costs on all migrants, we anticipated that, in order to over
come these higher costs, migrants would tend to be relatively more
skilled. The findings strongly suggest the opposite. Greater distance
from the United States could entail more potential intervening opportu
nities that serve to attract the relatively skilled migrants to locations
other than the United States, but the exact reason for this finding is not
clear.
Our findings indicate that high birth rates differentially affect mem
bers of the indigenous population, depending on their skill (income)
level. If births within families are inversely related to family incomes,
then higher migration costs would be particularly imposing on the
migration decisions of lower income (low-skilled) individuals and their
families. The evidence suggests that these higher costs do fall dispro
portionately on the low-skilled workers, especially among the group
aged 20-34 where young children are most likely to be present.
We did not attach a prior to the religion variables. Our results indi
cate that a particularly large number of skilled migrants come from
nations where Catholicism is the primary religion. For reasons that are
not altogether clear, Catholicism increases the high-skilled component
of U.S. immigration for both age groups, and it is especially important
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for the group aged 20-34. The Muslim variable is positive and margin
ally significant for this same age group.
The family reunification provisions of U.S. immigration law have
long been suspected as one cause of declining skill composition of
U.S. immigration. The results shown in Table 8.1 fail to support this
position. Although the signs on the naturalization variable are negative,
as anticipated, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Given
the level of skill aggregation used in this study and given these find
ings, we must look elsewhere for the cause of declining immigrant
quality.
The differential treatment of Western Hemisphere natives during the
1972-1976 period resulted in significantly fewer high-skilled workers
among the total migrants and particularly among those aged 20-34.
Thus, lower immigration barriers appear to decrease the relative skill
level of migrants. Although we did not attach a prior to either lottery
or Silva programs, both programs resulted in significant changes in the
number of high-skilled migrants: the Silva program resulted in fewer
high-skilled migrants, and the lottery visas in more. These lottery find
ings are similar to those of Barrett (1996), who observed that lottery
winners were more highly skilled than family immigrants. Thus, these
results illustrate that, whether intentional or not, U.S. policy does influ
ence the skill composition of U.S. immigrants.
In terms of magnitude, the control for Asian nations indicates a par
ticularly large effect, with approximately 2,500 additional high-skilled
migrants coming from Asian nations, ceteris paribus. The earnings
differential between high- and low-skilled workers may be relatively
low in Asian nations, thus inducing relatively more high-skilled work
ers to migrate. Alternatively, potential migrants from Asia may
encounter intervening opportunities that provide relatively better alter
natives for the low-skilled. However, we noted above that intervening
opportunities may provide the opposite set of incentives for potential
migrants from more distant non-Asian nations.
Of the social programs considered, those that appear to have the
greatest influence on the skill composition of migrants involve univer
sal coverage and generally are related to old-age pension programs. As
expected, the presence of universal old-age programs provides a signif
icant incentive for an increased flow of younger (aged 20-34) highskilled workers. Employment-related pension programs also signifi-

168

The Skill Composition of U.S. Immigration

cantly influence the skill composition of migrants. Whereas the pres
ence of old-age social insurance programs reduces the number of highskilled migrants, provident funds programs tend to increase their num
ber. Moreover, if the pensions are not internationally transferable, the
number of high-skilled migrants is reduced. These results are not
unexpected. Employment-related pension programs that are of the
social insurance variety often entail a cost to the insured individual that
is equal to some fixed percentage of his or her earnings and, in turn, the
benefits derived from such programs generally take the form of pay
ments that equal some percentage of the average or highest earnings
during some specified period. Apparently, where social programs pro
vide benefits that are positively related to income levels, the higherincome, high-skilled workers find such programs to be relatively
attractive inducements to stay at home. High-skilled workers also are
less likely to migrate and leave their pensions behind, which would be
necessary under situations where the pensions are not transferable. On
the other hand, provident funds programs provide the opportunity for
individuals to save an amount that would be sufficient to cover reloca
tion expenses. Therefore, such programs may be positively associated
with the skill level of migrants because the high-skilled (higherincome) individuals would be able to accumulate these savings more
quickly. Thus, within a given age group of potential migrants, the
highly skilled are more likely to migrate than less-skilled individuals if
provident funds are available.
Universal family allowance programs also provide a significant
incentive for an increased number of high-skilled migrants aged 2034. However, our more direct measure of coverage within healthrelated programs does not provide evidence of the anticipated effect
that universally provided sickness programs increase the flow of highskilled migrants. The findings concerning certain features of sickness
programs provide some support for the expected relationships, how
ever. For instance, among the group of migrants aged 20-34, the avail
ability of maternity and medical benefits positively influence the
number of high-skilled migrants, though the level of significance is not
high. We would expect these programs to generally increase the skill
level of migrants, since the primary beneficiaries (women) tend to have
lower skills. Among migrants aged 35-64, programs that provide cash
sickness benefits also increase the relative share of the highly skilled,
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perhaps again reflecting that the availability of such programs is partic
ularly important to women.
Immigrants By Gender

Table 8.2 presents the findings for total male and total female immi
grants classified as highly skilled, as well as for the gender-specific
subgroups aged 20-34 and 35-64, where within each of these groups
the immigrants are aggregated across entry classes.
In general, most factors have similar effects on the skill composition
of both males and females. The similarities are most apparent in the
pair-wise comparisons of the factors included in the economic opportu
nity and migration costs vectors. For educational attainment and dis
tance from the United States, the only substantive differences across
gender are for the subgroup aged 35-64, where (as expected) countries
with higher education levels send more high-skilled (female but not
male) migrants, and nations more distant from the United States send
fewer high-skilled (male but not female) migrants. Concerning relative
economic growth and English-language skills, the findings concerning
the effects on skill composition are essentially the same in both the
male and female regressions. Thus, the incentives created by eco
nomic expansion and language skills do not appear to entail any gender
tilting. The relationship between female labor force participation rates
and the skill composition of migrants also is essentially identical
across genders.
Certain factors in these vectors have a different effect on females
than males, but the most notable differences are expected. For exam
ple, high birth rates should impose a relatively higher migration cost on
potential low-skilled migrants; the fact that the evidence supports this
hypothesis for females but not males is consistent with the notion that
child rearing costs fall more heavily on the female marriage partner.
The finding that the presence of U.S. military personnel has a signifi
cant influence on the composition of female but not male migrants is
also not surprising, since this variable should reflect the operation of a
marriage market that focuses on the wives of U.S. servicemen. 4 Con
trary to the evidence, however, we expected U.S. military personnel to
represent lower cost of entry and therefore to have a negative effect on
the skill level of female migrants. The observed effect could be due to

Table 8.2 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Gender: Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Males
Variable

Total

Aged 20-34

Females
Aged 35-64

Total

Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues

39.31
-272.28*

54.70
-341.43***

1.50
102.23

11.02
-248.05**

1.37

19.81
-193.46**

-6.24

0.69

-0.20

% Urban

0.77
-4.06**

% Female in labor force

17.12***

0.14
22.59***

-5.55***

5.18*

-1.21
10.88***

—194 35***

—1 13 41***

-60.82***

-85.50***

-43.13***

-0.72

5 3-7***

5 49***

10.14

21.41*
-2.61***

15.09*
-4.Q4***

7.56
1.60***

1164.51***

613.62***

452.87***

1.07

-0.31
_2 41***

0.86
-3.48***

-0.31
_g 24***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education11
English language
U.S. college students

0.87

2.48

14.56
—3 48***

8.96
—2.89***

1835.57***

1313.00***

-28.60

2.89

-0.71
629.61***
-26.30*

-11.09

20.61

-9.82
1.35

-17.05

Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim

11.90***

4.78**

761.32***

3.97
670.13***

133.81

429.82

634.87***

-110.71

-6.58*

-3.64**

649.43***

-5.13*
412.41***

183.56***

130.98

184.37

-28.85
(continued)

U.S. immigration policy

-2.03
68.54***

-2.65
50.30***

-1.09
24.88***

-97.35
Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 -115.01***
1499.97***
Asia

-173.04***

-138.61***

-85.36***

Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

-2.28

-5.02***

0.27

10.10
^64.41***

16.49
-702.48***

-4.27
-136.42***

-11.54
564.48***

—72 77***

-33.60***

908.34***

516.54***

2.62
272.82***

91.80**

-18.27

-82.22***

-27.57

80.13*
-55.63*

872.11***

Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age

45.62
-101.85***

120.84***

Old-age pension not portable

84.97*
-53.75*

-57.90***

Universal sickness

-65.49*

-23.49

15.51

-54.73

Provident fund old-age

Cash sickness benefits
Maternity benefits
Medical benefits
Unemployment insurance
Universal family allowance
Employment family allowance

-3.59

28.60

-37.98
7.56
-19.06
93.05***
-24.55*

67.01**
-38.81*
89.18***

80.64*
-42.32*

-30.40*

4.75

3.19

17.35
49.39**

-0.23

24.39
-8.28
-7.62
-0.20
14.55
56.48***

25.64*
48.64***

17.60
34.35*
20.16
11.03

40.43

37.72

26.46*

34.89

-34.87

8.83

34.88

85.55

-11.83
105.15**

22.34

80.33*

32.73
99.74***

9.75

32.76

11.99

21.84

45.80

9.12

Table 8.2 (continued)
Males
Variable

Total

Aged 20-34

Females
Aged 35-64

Total

Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

Control
% No occupation0
Total U.S. immigration from id

—149 97***
0.07***

-85.88**
Q QO,***

2.31
0.09***

-56.65*
Q 14***

-9.26
Q 24***

3.41
0.16***

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in Appendix
Table G2.
b In the gender-specific regressions, the education control is measured specific to the respective gender.
c The control for the percentage of immigrants that does not declare an occupation is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., male
total, aged 20-34, aged 35-64; female total, aged 20-34, and aged 35-64).
d The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., see note c).

Legal U.S. Immigration

173

marriage sorting that pairs better-educated females in source countries
with U.S. military personnel.
Like the findings presented earlier concerning all immigrants, sig
nificantly more of both male and female high-skilled migrants come
from nations where Catholicism is the primary religion, but genderspecific differences are evident in the other factors of this vector. For
example, significantly more high-skilled male migrants aged 20-34
come from Muslim nations. Apparently, high-skilled males are able to
exercise their choice to migrate, but the same may not be true of poten
tial female migrants for whom social customs inhibit movement (Tyree
and Donato 1985). Unattractive political environments have very dif
ferent impacts on the skill composition of male and female migrants: a
larger share of male migrants from politically less attractive nations is
highly skilled, but a smaller share of female migrants is, perhaps
reflecting different emigration restrictions. For males, this evidence
also may suggest that general economic opportunities for high-skilled
workers are relatively less desirable in countries that are politically less
attractive. For female workers, either the supply of potential highskilled migrants is low (e.g., suppressed opportunities to acquire the
skills necessary to become a high-skilled migrant) or, compared to
their low-skilled counterparts, the economic opportunities are rela
tively good.
For many of the factors in the U.S. immigration policy vector, the
findings are similar for both males and females and are essentially the
same as the findings discussed earlier in the context of all immigrants
(i.e., males and females aggregated). However, whereas the findings
for all immigrants do not support our hypotheses concerning natural
ized U.S. citizens, among females aged 20-34, significantly fewer highskilled migrants come from nations with a relatively high number of
natives who have become U.S. citizens, which is as anticipated. The
effect of the lottery program also suggests a very different impact on
males than females. The lottery visas are associated with a significantly
larger number of high-skilled male migrants, but this program had little
effect on the skill composition of female migrants. Apparently (per
haps because their numbers were relatively large among the nonimmi
grants already present in the United States at the time the lottery
program was initiated), high-skilled male workers were in a better posi
tion than other potential migrants to take advantage of the lottery visas.
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In the social programs vector, we hypothesized that universal bene
fits would provide incentives for relatively more high-skilled workers
to migrate, which is supported by evidence for both males and females
for universal old-age and family allowance programs. The effects on
skill composition of various other features of old-age pension pro
grams do not appear to generally differ by gender, though the signifi
cance of the findings is higher in the male regressions. However,
certain social programs exert a different influence on males than on
females. For instance, the availability of unemployment insurance
increases the number of high-skilled female migrants aged 35-64,
which is expected, but the same is not true for males.
Other notable differences in the findings for male versus female
migrants relate to variables associated with sickness programs. Poten
tial female migrants appear to be more sensitive than males to the
availability of sickness-related programs; in particular, maternity and
medical benefits primarily affect the skill composition of female
migrants, which is not surprising. Concerning medical programs,
apparently the higher income (high-skilled) workers bear a dispropor
tionate share of the costs for such programs, thus inducing an increase
in the skill level of female migrants. Moreover, if birth rates are
inversely related to income levels, then maternity programs should
increase the skill level of female migrants, since the low-skilled (lowincome) female workers benefit most from the provision of such bene
fits. Programs providing cash sickness benefits, which are generally
tied to some percentage of the insured workers earnings, increase the
high-skilled share of both male and female migrants aged 35-64; such
benefits appear to be viewed by both genders as lowering the perceived
earnings differential between the country of origin and the United
States, thus inducing relatively more high-skilled workers to migrate.
Male and Female Immigrants By Entry Class
Table 8.3 presents the findings for both male and female numeri
cally restricted and exempt immigrants classified as highly skilled and
aged 20-64. In large part, the findings for the numerically restricted
class of immigrants are similar to those found when the data were not
disaggregated by entry class. However, some differences are apparent,
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particularly within many of the vectors when pair-wise comparisons
are made between numerically restricted and exempt immigrants.
Earlier, within the context of gender and age composition, we found
that economic incentives served better in forming the composition of
numerically exempt immigrants. With respect to skill composition,
this does not appear to be the case; at least in terms of the number of
significant relationships, the skill composition of numerically restricted
immigrants seems to be more influenced by economic opportunities.
Moreover, in terms of directional influence, the differences across
entry class are readily apparent. For instance, whereas the extent of
female labor force participation and the relative size of government
both positively influence the number of high-skilled migrants within
the numerically restricted class, these same factors negatively influence
the number of high-skilled migrants in the exempt class. Our hypothe
ses are more generally supported by the evidence relating to restricted
immigrants.
In terms of migration costs, whereas similarities are apparent con
cerning the effects of distance and English-language skills, differences
across entry classes are again noteworthy. On the one hand, we are not
surprised that the presence of U.S. military personnel affects the com
position of exempt but not restricted immigrants. On the other hand,
we do not understand why (as expected) relatively more high-skilled
female numerically restricted workers migrate from countries with
high birth rates, but the same relationship is not found among exempt
migrants. Perhaps numerically restricted female immigrants more fre
quently move within the context of a family unit, where family size and
its associated costs would be particularly relevant to migration deci
sions.
The difference across entry class in terms of the effect of education
also is quite striking. For exempt migrants, as expected, more highskilled migrants come from nations where the level of educational
attainment is relatively high. However, the evidence points more
toward a brain-drain phenomenon for the numerically restricted immi
grants. Apparently, within this class, the heavy orientation toward fam
ily maintenance considerations serves to retard the entry of potential
high-skilled migrants from nations with high levels of education, per
haps because these nations have fewer recently formed family linkages
with the United States.
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Table 8.3 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Entry Class: Hausman-Taylor
Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Numerically restricted
Variable

Males

Females

Numerically exempt
Males

Females

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

77.52*
30.57
-369.93*** -252.42***

-29.15

1.43

1.86**

1.08**

47.60
-0.87***

-0.95
26.25***

-0.99
11.22***

-1.03
-6.13***

-138.24***

-21.06
6.43***

-31.98*
1.17

1.36

10.34
-3.55***

10.49*

15.55*
1.72**

22.18
-0.62
-0.22
-8.05***

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate

-2.72

U.S. military presence

6.42
^03***

Education*5
English language
U.S. college students

1609.82***
-4.64

-0.59

383.20**

0.80*
333.32**

434.56***

30.63*

-29.71***

-25.74

-6.22**

4.06**

Polit. attract, and religion
Catholic

3.10
835.27***

338.00***

Muslim

808.31***

175.54

Political competitiveness

14.15
-142.04

-6.22**
125.78*
-68.50

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

-1.50
64 j4***

-3.01*
27.34**

-1425.81*** -1608.63***

Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 -126.61***
1055.99***
Asia

-25.73*
421.96***

-1.95
-0.06
83.61**

-2.69
-21.65*

28.54***

107.85*
35.15***

293.91***

224.11**

Social programs
Employment-related old-age

38.51
-81.50***

Provident fund old-age

104.32**

Old-age pension not portable

-34.90

Universal old-age

Universal sickness

24.85

53.00*

-18.00

24.29

-14.35
100.41***

-5.64
-9.80
-56.59*** -30.28

-18.44
50.64**

14.60
-29.54*

0.17
-0.24
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Numerically restricted

Numerically exempt

Cash sickness benefits

Males
-97.75**

Males
93 41***

Maternity benefits

-26.13

Variable

Medical benefits
Unemployment insurance

49.32*
-49.52

Universal family allowance

94.31*

Employment family allowance

20.41

Females
-49.67*

Females
105.86***

0.56

-7.71

20.65

31.73*

5.28

25.08

40.28
106.46***

7.17

51.41*

2.93

42.38

5.25

38.85

47.35

Control
% No occupation0
Total U.S. immigration from /d

-174.09***
0.17***

-21.55
0.33***

-26.34*
0.05***

-16.32
0.17***

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Corre
sponding f-statistics are reported in Appendix Table G3.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the education control is measured specific to the respec
tive gender.
c The control for the percentage of immigrants that do not declare an occupation is measured
specific to the group examined (i.e., male numerically restricted, numerically exempt;
female numerically restricted, numerically exempt).
d The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., see note c).

Within the numerically exempt class, the influence of foreign stu
dents should exert itself through the operation of a marriage market, in
which we anticipated that the composition of males would be more
influenced than that of females. The evidence is consistent with this
interpretation. However, for restricted migrants, the marriage market
would not appear relevant for explaining why significantly more highskilled female (but not more male) migrants come from nations where
relatively large numbers of the population attend a U.S. college or uni
versity. Rather, the explanation may be that acquiring a U.S. education
provides potential independent migrants with an opportunity to take an
initial first step toward an ultimate goal of more permanent immigra
tion to the United States. Various potential cultural and social con
straints may make this alternative relatively more attractive to females
than males.
The findings concerning political and religious considerations are
much the same as found previously when the data were disaggregated
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by entry class. However, whereas source-country political conditions
appear to be more likely to affect the composition of exempt migrants,
the effects of religious considerations are more pronounced for
restricted migrants. This difference is not unexpected, since within
families religious considerations are a matter of importance, and for
the potential numerically restricted migrants a heavy emphasis is
placed on family reunification. On the other hand, individuals seeking
freedom from political repression are not necessarily linked so closely
to religious considerations.
As found earlier, significantly more high-skilled migrants come
from Asian nations, regardless of gender or entry class. The potential
exists for naturalized U.S. citizens to affect the composition of both
numerically restricted and exempt immigrants, but an effect is found
only for restricted female migrants, where (as expected) fewer highskilled migrants are associated with lower entry costs. With the other
U.S. policy controls, the effects were expected to be more pronounced
for numerically restricted than exempt migrants, which is the case with
lottery visas, where significantly more of both male and female highskilled migrants are found to enter under this program. Moreover, the
findings relating to the Silva program and the Western Hemisphere
treatment (1972-1976) indicate, as expected, that fewer high-skilled
numerically restricted migrants are associated with lower immigration
barriers. However, that these factors have such a strong association
with the skill composition of exempt migrants is somewhat surprising.
Opening the door to allow relatively more low-skilled migrants to enter
through the numerically restricted class has apparently caused highskilled migrants to turn to other avenues of entry which, in this case, is
manifested in the exempt class of migrants.
The factors included in the vector of social programs appear to have
more influence in shaping the skill composition of restricted than
exempt migrants. The skill composition of restricted female migrants
appears to be particularly sensitive to the provision of programs relat
ing to sickness and family allowances, as well as program coverage.
For instance, the evidence relating to female migrants supports our
expectation that universal old-age, sickness, and family allowance pro
grams all provide incentives that increase the number of high-skilled
migrants. Moreover, as expected, programs providing health-care or
medical benefits increase the number of high-skilled female migrants,
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and (to a lesser extent) cash sickness benefits tend to decrease that
number. Whereas the skill composition of male restricted migrants is
also influenced by the availability of these programs, old-age pension
programs have a greater influence on the composition of male than
female migrants. For countries with employment-related social insur
ance old-age pension programs, the flow of migrants includes signifi
cantly fewer high-skilled male migrants.
The social programs that influence the composition of exempt
migrants also do so in a manner that appears quite different from that
found for restricted migrants. For instance, the evidence indicates that
unemployment insurance increases the number of high-skilled exempt
migrants, but no such evidence is found for restricted migrants. Fur
ther, the availability of cash sickness benefits is negatively related to
the skill level of restricted migrants but is positively related to skill
level of the exempt. The impact of provident funds old-age programs
also differs across entry class, suggesting that the opportunity to save
resources necessary to cover relocation costs may be less critical in the
decisions of exempt migrants. The reasons for differential impact of
the sickness-related programs are not immediately obvious.

SUMMARY
Economic opportunities are more influential in determining the skill
composition of numerically restricted migrants relative to those
exempt, The evidence relating to exempt migrants is, in large part,
contrary to our expectations. On the other hand, the findings for
numerically restricted migrants, as well as the evidence from data that
are not disaggregated by entry class, are generally as expected. These
findings have several implications. For example, as the level of devel
opment increases around the world, source countries will increasingly
provide employment and earnings opportunities that are particularly
attractive tp high-skilled workers. Economic expansion also appears to
improve the job-related opportunities of high-skilled workers. Thus,
from countries experiencing increasing development and economic
expansion, the skill composition of migrants to the United States will
be relatively lower. On the other hand, as the relative extent of female
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participation in formal labor markets increases, the skill level of U.S.
migrants may increase because the relative number of potential highskilled migrants is increasing. Moreover, to the extent that government
sectors around the world become larger in terms of their share of gross
domestic product, the number of high-skilled workers moving to the
United States should increase.
Migration costs also significantly influence skill composition; in
particular, English-language familiarity is of considerable importance,
regardless of gender or entry class. Certain other cost factors have
effects that are gender-specific, but these differences are generally
quite understandable.
Like our findings relating to the other composition models, political
and religious considerations and U.S. immigration policy play major
roles in forming skill composition. The findings relating to the social
program variables also provide support for many of our hypotheses
and, as with economic opportunities, these influences are more appar
ent with numerically restricted than numerically exempt migrants.
Moreover, interesting differences exist across males and females for
certain types of programs. The skill composition of female migrants is
particularly sensitive to program coverage and the availability of sick
ness and family allowance programs.

Notes
1. Given that vv(- and w/ measure the wage rate per unit of occupational skill, a level
of skills that is higher than K** would imply a larger discounted value of benefits
(Eq.8.1).
2. Of course, this presumes that the differentials in return are not skill specific. If the
earnings differentials between country i and the United States are larger for lowthan high-skilled workers, this expectation may be reversed.
3. Moreover, if government revenues provide some measure of the extent of transfer
activity in country i, such transfers are likely to benefit most the low-income (lowskilled) individuals, thus further increasing the relative incentive for high-income
(high-skilled) workers to migrate.
4. In Chapter 7, we also found that certain factors associated with migration costs
(i.e., birth rate, U.S. military, education, and distance) have gender-specific differ
ences: these factors appeared to be much stronger in shaping the age composition
of female migrants than of male migrants.

9 Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we attempt to model the gender, age, and skill compo
sition of legal U.S. immigration. Our empirical work is based on fairly
simple and intuitive human capital models relating to the rate of legal
immigration from various countries to the United States, as well as to
the gender, age, and skill composition of the immigrants. The models
emphasize the differential economic advantages and costs of migrat
ing, including the costs of transferring accumulated occupational
skills. We hypothesized'that the gender composition of immigrant
flows should vary across source countries depending upon sourcecountry characteristics that serve to place females in the pool of poten
tial economic migrants. The proportion of immigrants that is female
also should be determined by factors that influence the ratio of eco
nomic to non-economic/tied migrants. To study age and skill composi
tion, we introduce the concept of the marginal migrant, a hypothetical
individual for whom the costs and benefits of migrating just balance.
Conceptually, the marginal migrant is able to adjust to changes in any
benefit or cost associated with migration, so that for a given skill level,
he or she would become younger or older and for a given age would
become more skilled or less skilled. The concept of the marginal
migrant yields testable hypotheses concerning the age and skill compo
sition of U.S. immigration.
Legal U.S. immigration is emphasized in this study for both sub
stantive and practical reasons. The substantive reason is that U.S.
authorities have control over legal immigration and can influence
immigrant composition in terms of gender, age, and skills (though they
have rarely exercised this ability). Moreover, the composition of
migration has not been widely modeled, so this study has some interest
and policy relevance of its own, particularly in terms of the influence of
social programs in source countries. The practical reason is that the
data used in the study refer only to legal immigrants. The annual data
were drawn from the Immigration and Naturalization Service Public
Use Tapes, which provide a record on every legal resident alien admit
ted into the United States beginning in 1972. Our focus is on the
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period 1972-1991, because a new immigration policy regime began in
Fiscal Year 1992.
The empirical results of the study, which were obtained by the
demanding Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable approach, yield two
broad conclusions.
• Source-country characteristics significantly shape the rate and
composition of U.S. immigration. The importance of these char
acteristics holds across the board in the sense that, for the rate of
immigration and/or for some components of migrant composi
tion, each variable proves to be significant (although very few
variables are significant for every feature of immigration studied
here). To the extent that source-country characteristics help
shape the rate and/or composition of migration to the United
States, the U.S. government at best has only limited control.
• U.S. immigration policy also importantly shapes the rate of
immigration, as well as the immigrants' characteristics. Many
effects of U.S. policy, especially regarding immigrant composi
tion, are probably unintended. The importance of policy is
reflected directly by various policy variables in the models and by
the distinction between numerically restricted and numerically
exempt immigrants.
This chapter consists of two major sections. The first recaps the
importance of the various variables in explaining the rate and composi
tion of migration to the United States. The second is oriented toward
the implications of this research for U.S. immigration policy.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE U.S. IMMIGRATION—
SOURCE-COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Differential Economic Opportunities
From the economist's perspective, differential economic opportuni
ties are expected to play a key role, if not the key role, among the deter
minants of U.S. immigration and its composition. Differential
economic opportunities in large part explain migration from various
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European countries to the United States during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Such opportunities also explain more recent
migration to the United States (Greenwood and McDowell 1991).
However, in the modern era, emigration restrictions and immigration
barriers impede the free international flow of labor and blunt the force
of economic incentives. Such constraints present investigators with
difficulties and probably conceal the true effects of variables that
reflect economic opportunities and significance.
In this study, we have attempted to account for institutional impedi
ments to U.S. immigration in two ways. First, our models include a
vector of variables whose presence is intended to control for different
treatment by U.S. authorities of countries or regions at different times.
Second, we distinguish between immigrants who are numerically
restricted versus those who are numerically exempt under U.S. law.
Restricted immigrants clearly confront entry barriers, whereas exempt
immigrants possess the required family ties to enter the United States if
and when they wish. Consequently, economic incentives ought to be
more clearly reflected by exempt immigrants.
As noted in Chapter 5, per capita GDP in source countries relative to
that of the United States is not statistically significant as a determinant
of the overall rate of U.S. immigration. This result is somewhat sur
prising given that similar measures were important explanatory vari
ables in roughly comparable studies, including our own earlier work
(Greenwood and McDowell 1991). The current result is clearly due in
part to the econometric technique adopted for this study, the HausmanTaylor instrumental variable approach. We stand by our current find
ings: in the aggregate, per capita GDP in source countries relative to
that of the United States does not appear to influence the rate of migra
tion to the United States. However, for those persons for whom U.S.
immigration is an institutionally unconstrained option, the force of dif
ferential earnings opportunities is more apparent: the rate of such
migration is higher if the source country has lower per capita GDP.
This finding emphasizes the importance of accounting for institutional
restrictions and specifically distinguishing numerically exempt immi
grants.
Relative per capita GDP does not perform well in the gender equa
tions, where its t-value never exceeds 1.67. We anticipated that by
especially discouraging potential economic migrants (and therefore
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males), higher values of this variable would be negative in the regres
sion for males and correspondingly positive in that for females. One
possible explanation for its lack of significance is that the variable fails
to appropriately distinguish gender-specific returns. A better variable
would be the ratio of female to male earnings in source countries ver
sus the same measure for the United States, which would better reflect
the relative position of females in the source country. Unfortunately,
data on female wages or earnings are nonexistent for most countries in
our sample, but the available data for the manufacturing sectors of a
few advanced, industrial nations are illustrative (Table 9.1).
The data in Table 9.1 have been calculated from information pre
sented in Blau and Ferber (1992, Table 10.4). The evidence is clear
that, relative to the United States, the remuneration of females com
pared to males in various countries around the world varies greatly.
Females do relatively better in most European countries than in the
United States, but if Japan is a reasonable proxy for other Asian
nations, they do relatively worse in Asia. Although this richness of
information is missing from our models, the strong positive influence
of the Asia dummy variable on female immigrants (especially those
who are exempt from numerical restrictions; see Table 6.2) is precisely
what would be expected from the information provided in Table 9.1.
In our model of age composition, we argue that the age of the mar
ginal migrant ought to increase (decrease) as relative per capita GDP
decreases (increases), because for source countries with smaller wage
differentials relative to the United States, the marginal migrant must be
younger in order to enjoy the smaller differential return over a longer
period of time to just cover the cost of migrating. In the age composi
tion equations, relative income plays the expected role: a one-percent
age-point increase in relative per capita GDP causes about 365 more
immigrants aged 20-34 and about 227 fewer immigrants aged 55 and
over to annually enter the United States from country / (see Table 7.1).
Moreover, the magnitude of the effects is larger and generally more
significant for males than for females, which also is anticipated,
because relatively more males are likely to be economic migrants.

Legal U.S. Immigration

185

Table 9.1 The Ratio of Female to Male Hourly
Earnings in Manufacturing Relative to
the Same Measure for the United States
1973

1988

Australia

1.12

1.13

Belgium

1.11

1.06

Denmark

1.33

1.20

Finland

1.16

1.10

France

1.24

1.13

Germany, FR

1.15

1.04

Greece
Ireland

1.06

1.11

0.97

0.98

Japan
Luxembourg

0.87

0.69

0.90

0.83

Netherlands

1.22

1.07

New Zealand

1.07

1.06

Norway

1.24

1.20

Sweden

1.36

1.28

Switzerland

1.06

0.96

United Kingdom

0.98

0.97

Country3

SOURCE: Calculated from Blau and Ferber (1992), Table 10.4.
a See Blau and Ferber for details concerning the measures for
specific countries.

Short-term growth of job opportunities, as reflected in country /'s
rate of growth of GDP relative to that of the United States, encourages
higher rates of migration to the United States (see Table 5.1). On the
surface, this finding may be surprising, but other considerations per
haps soften this surprise. First, more rapid growth may allow potential
migrants in country i to accumulate the assets needed to cover the costs
of an international move. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
short-term growth is likely to be of most benefit to young persons who
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have recently entered the labor force or are about to enter it (see Table
7.1), particularly females (see Table 7.2). Thus, higher values of the
relative growth variable ought to discourage the emigration of the
young while at the same time encouraging that of older potential
migrants. The empirical results indicate that the effects of this variable
are as anticipated, but the effect appears to have a more significant
influence on older persons than on younger persons, which in itself
could increase migration rather than decrease it.
The effect of relative growth of GDP is strongest for exempt
females, for whom the variable has a particularly sizable influence on
the oldest age group (see Table 7.4). Because the exempt group in gen
eral consists mostly of spouses and parents of U.S. citizens, the financ
ing argument takes on added relevance. Older exempt females are
likely to consist mainly of mothers of U.S. citizens. By affecting the
assets of older females or those of their children in source countries,
migration to the United States becomes a viable option for reuniting
with other children who moved there previously.
With respect to skill composition, considerable differences are evi
dent between the empirical results for restricted and exempt immi
grants (see Table 8.3). Short-term growth in source countries relative
to the United States strongly discourages the migration of numerically
restricted persons with the highest skills. On the other hand, the skill
composition of numerically exempt immigrants is unaffected. This
result suggests that economic growth in source countries differentially
benefits those with better skills and higher incomes, thus tilting skill
composition of U.S. immigrants toward the less skilled, especially
those who are younger (see Table 8.2). (If migration from Mexico to
the United States follows the same pattern, any growth induced by the
North American Free Trade Agreement could have the result of
increasing the rate of movement to the United States while at the same
time decreasing the skill composition.) 1
High government revenues as a percentage of GDP (and hence pre
sumably high taxes in source countries) boost the rate of migration to
the United States, as well as influencing age and skill composition.
The effects on age composition tend to operate almost exclusively
through the numerically exempt class (young spouses and older parents
of U.S. citizens). These results make sense: high government revenues
(high taxes on workers) encourage the migration of more young per-
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sons (especially females) and discourage the migration of older per
sons, both males and females (see Table 7.4). The effect is that when
the appropriate family ties to parents exist, the parents move to the
United States only when their expected receipt of transfers in the
source country is low.
Generally, the urbanization variable works as anticipated. The rate
of immigration to the United States from more highly urbanized societ
ies is clearly lower (see Table 5.1). Moreover, relatively more females
come from such societies, presumably because urban employment
opportunities for women attract them into the labor force, where they
expand the pool of potential economic migrants (see Table 6.1). The
positive effect of percent urban is particularly important for numeri
cally exempt females (see Table 6.2), and especially for older exempt
females (see Table 7.4), although the effect is also of some importance
for older exempt males. Urban job opportunities are likely to be of
most importance to young persons, and the empirical results bear this
out for young females, especially those who are exempt (see Table 7.4).
Historically, urban areas have provided opportunities for the most
highly skilled workers; thus, that relatively few highly skilled persons,
especially older male workers, migrate from more highly urbanized
countries is not surprising (see Table 8.2). Indirectly, this finding also
may suggest a "brain drain" from less-developed, less-urbanized coun
tries to the United States.
Female labor force participation in source countries reduces female
migration and tilts the gender composition toward males (see Table 6.1),
particularly for the exempt class (see Table 6.2). Our theory of the mar
ginal migrant suggests that both lower differential returns and higher
costs will cause an increase in the skill composition of U.S. immigrants.
Since greater female labor force participation presumably reflects better
earnings opportunities and generally higher skill levels, females from
countries with high levels of female participation ought to be more
skilled. Moreover, the costs of migrating are higher for numerically
restricted immigrants, which should reinforce the higher expected skill
level for this group. Female labor force participation behaves in the
expected fashion for restricted immigrants, but it does not for the exempt
group (see Table 8.3). Although the lower migration costs for exempt
migrants may result in quantitative differences for the two groups, the
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qualitative differences are difficult to understand. The results are con
sistent for both males and females.
Migration Costs

Distance proxies both the monetary and nonmonetary costs of
migration, each of which should rise with greater distance from the
United States. On average, per 1000-mile increase in distance from the
United States, immigration falls by 300 persons per million population
of the origin country, other things being equal (see Table 5.1). This
drop off with distance is about twice as sharp for numerically restricted
as for numerically exempt immigrants, whose transportation expenses
in many cases may be subsidized by their citizen relatives. Moreover,
distance plays a role in shaping the composition of immigration to the
United States: in other words, the costs represented by distance help
determine who migrates. Writing during the last century, Ravenstein
(1885) observed that females were overrepresented in short-distance
moves. This observation is reinforced by our findings, which suggest
that contemporary movement to the United States consists of signifi
cantly more males if the migration originates in more distant countries
(see Table 6.1).
Our theory of the marginal migrant predicts that immigrants from
more distant countries will consist of relatively more young persons,
because to offset the higher costs of moving requires that the marginal
migrant move at an earlier age. The empirical results reject this
hypothesis. Relatively few young persons (20 to 34 years of age),
especially young females, move to the United States from more distant
countries (see Table 7.2); relatively more older persons (55 years old
and over), especially numerically restricted males (see Table 7.3),
move from more distant countries.
U.S. military presence clearly influences the composition of U.S.
immigration, especially gender composition. Female migration is
boosted, specifically for the numerically exempt (see Table 6.2), and
especially for young exempt females (see Table 7.4), reflecting the
working of the marriage market. Although the evidence is not strong, it
does point toward more highly skilled exempt young women (and men)
from source countries with U.S. military presence (see Table 8.3).

Legal U.S. Immigration

189

As female educational opportunities (relative to male opportunities)
rise in potential source countries, the female share of U.S. immigrants
increases as anticipated, especially for the exempt class (see Table 6.2).
Our theory of the marginal migrant predicts that older persons will
move from countries with higher levels of education. The empirical
results are consistent with this prediction and are due mainly to fewer
young exempt females and more older exempt females coming from
such countries (see Table 7.4). Contrary to the predicted direction of
the effect, fewer highly skilled immigrants, especially young males and
females, originate in countries with high general levels of educational
attainment (see Table 8.2). This finding is consistent with a drain of
talent from countries with generally lower levels of education.
Familiarity with the English language should facilitate the transfer
of occupational skills and education to the United States, as well as
facilitate social and cultural assimilation. However, the rate of immi
gration from English-speaking countries is not significantly higher
than from other countries; yet, the English variable is an important
determinant of the composition of the flows. 2 The share of female
immigrants, especially numerically exempt females, is significantly
higher from English-speaking countries (see Table 6.2), which sug
gests that social and cultural assimilation are particularly important in
female migration.
Our theory of the marginal migrant predicts that older migrants will
originate in English-speaking countries because they will experience
lower skill losses than migrants from other countries. Moreover,
because their returns to learning English are generally lower, older per
sons have a lesser incentive to migrate from non-English-speaking
countries because they will find social and cultural assimilation harder.
The empirical results indicate that higher shares of older immigrants,
both female and male, come from English-speaking countries (see
Table 7.2), and this observation is particularly true for the numerically
exempt class (see Table 7.4). Immigrant workers from English-speak
ing nations also are more highly skilled.
Political Attractiveness and Religion
Political conditions in source countries importantly influence U.S.
immigration. The rate of migration to the United States is signifi-
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cantly higher from countries with less competitive political systems
(see Table 5.1). This effect is especially strong for older, numerically
exempt females (see Table 7.4). Moreover, countries with such politi
cal systems provide the United States with significantly more highly
skilled males but significantly fewer highly skilled females (see Table
8.2); this may be due to more limited opportunities for females in
these countries to attain high levels of education and generally to
access highly skilled occupations.
Religions in source countries affect the composition of immigration
to the United States. More numerically exempt females originate in
countries that are heavily Catholic (see Table 6.2). Countries that are
predominantly Catholic also are the sources of more highly skilled
immigrants, particularly young males and females, as well as older
females (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Countries that are predominantly
Muslim are the source of more highly skilled young males who enter
the United States as numerically restricted (see Table 8.3).
Source-Country Social Programs

To determine the impact of various social programs on the volume
and composition of immigration, it is necessary to ascertain the pro
gram's net cost-benefit impact on the indigenous population. In terms
of volume, the primary concern is with social program impacts on the
young workers, who are otherwise more likely to migrate than other
individuals. Thus, other things being equal, to the extent that young
workers receive net benefits from a program, their propensity to migrate
should be reduced, and the overall rate of migration should be lower.
Unemployment insurance is an example of a program from which
young workers are most likely to benefit and, as shown in Table 5.1, the
existence of unemployment insurance systems in source countries sig
nificantly reduces the rate of migration to the United States.
Compositional effects also should be determined by the extent to
which a wealth transfer occurs as a result of a program's presence. The
members of the indigenous population who receive net gains (losses)
should be less (more) likely to migrate. For example, unemployment
insurance affects primarily the economically active. Because men are
more likely to be economically active than women, unemployment
insurance should more directly reduce male migration, and shift immi-
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gration flows toward a relatively higher share of female migrants (see
Table 6.1). Unemployment insurance also generally constitutes a
transfer from individuals typically having lower unemployment rates to
those having higher unemployment rates. Therefore, countries with
unemployment insurance should show an effect of encouraging the
flow of older individuals; the evidence concerning the effects of unem
ployment insurance on age composition is particularly strong in the
findings for female migrants (see Table 7.3). This result may suggest
that the variation in unemployment rates across age classes is more
pronounced for females than males.
Provident funds may affect migration by providing old-age benefits
that are portable (often immediately available to those who perma
nently emigrate). Thus, our finding that fewer older individuals migrate
from countries having provident funds (see Table 7.2) may indicate that
if potential migrants can take their pension benefits, they are more
likely to migrate and reunite with their families at an earlier age. An
added incentive may be that, if they did not emigrate, these individuals
would have to wait longer before they receive their benefits at retire
ment. The evidence also indicates that more numerically exempt
females aged 20-34 migrate from these countries (see Table 7.4). Since
these young females are most likely spouses of U.S. citizens, provident
funds appear to facilitate their flow by providing relatively liquid assets
that can be transferred internationally.
The availability of provident funds also tends to stimulate the flow
of young male and female high-skilled workers (see Table 8.2), espe
cially in the numerically restricted class (see Table 8.3). Here, provi
dent funds may provide an opportunity to accumulate the assets
necessary to cover the costs of relocation. Given the general nature of
such funds (i.e., fixed percentage of earnings going into compulsory
savings that is matched by employers), these savings will more quickly
accumulate for the young high-skilled workers, who are more likely to
migrate than low-skilled workers.
Employment-related old-age programs have the potential to result in
a transfer of wealth from younger workers to older retired individuals,
but the rate of migration does not appear to be affected by such pro
grams (see Table 5.1), and therefore such transfers may not exist to the
extent that is commonly believed. Employment-related old-age pro
grams do affect the composition of immigrants, however, increasing
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the female share of restricted migrants (see Table 6.2). Moreover, these
programs discourage (encourage) the flow of younger (older) male and
female restricted migrants (see Table 7.3). These effects on composi
tion are very similar to those found for programs that provide cashsickness benefits to individuals unable to work. This similarity is per
haps linked to the fact that, in these employment-related programs, the
costs imposed on workers and the benefits received both tend to rise or
fall in accordance with an individual's income level.
The empirical results support our view: whereas cash-sickness bene
fits increase the flow of older high-skilled workers, employmentrelated old-age programs discourage the migration of younger highskilled workers (see Table 8.2). With numerically exempt migrants,
employment-related old-age programs have little effect on gender, age,
or skill composition, but cash-sickness benefits affect the composi
tional aspects of these migrants.
Universal old-age pension and universal sickness benefit programs
are expected to transfer wealth from the younger, economically active
population to the older inactive population. While neither of these
programs significantly influences the overall immigration rate (see
Table 5.1), each program is critical in terms of composition. Both
programs increase the number of young, numerically restricted male
and female migrants (see Table 7.3). Moreover, universal old-age pro
grams increase the number of young male and female high-skilled
migrants (see Table 8.2), and universal sickness programs increase the
flow of highly skilled, numerically restricted female migrants (see
Table 8.3). This impact on skill share is expected, since universal pro
grams supported by taxes would be expected to fall disproportion
ately on the high-skilled (high-income) workers.
Universal programs of family allowances for families with children
are expected to transfer benefits to younger families, particularly those
that have low-skilled (low-income) family heads or heads who are not
economically active. The evidence provides support for our hypothesis
in the sense that such programs encourage the migration of young
high-skilled workers (see Table 8.1). Moreover, the age of female
numerically restricted migrants is relatively older for migrants from
countries with these programs (see Table 7.3). That the age effect is
apparent primarily for females is probably because the program's ben
efits are primarily family-related rather than employment-related.
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Other programs providing family-related benefits include maternity
benefits, employment-related family allowances, and possibly pro
grams providing medical benefits. In general, employment-related
family allowance programs have little effect on either the volume or
composition of immigrants, but maternity and medical programs
increase the number of high-skilled female migrants (see Table 8.2).
Given the nature of these benefits, we expected that the composition of
females would be more influenced than that of males. While the evi
dence concerning skill composition supports our hypotheses, the find
ings relating to age composition do not. For instance, the reason or
reasons that more young individuals, particularly young females (see
Table 7.2), come from countries providing maternity benefits is not
immediately clear.
General Comments
In general, the empirical results of this study are quite strong in
terms of anticipated signs and significant coefficients, but in many
equations specific variables do not perform as anticipated. Because
much of the original research described above is new in terms of mod
els and econometric procedures, we are not overly concerned with the
surprises we have received. We hope that many of these issues will be
addressed in future research and that concepts such as that of the mar
ginal migrant will be further refined.

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE U.S. IMMIGRATION—
U.S. POLICY
The importance of U.S. immigration policy is certainly reflected in
our results. After the 1965 changes in U.S. immigration law were fully
implemented, family reunification became the primary policy focus.
One major aspect of family reunification is that immediate relatives
(spouses, children, and parents) of U.S. citizens 21 years of age and
older are exempt from numerical limits, but other relatives enter as
restricted. Through 1991, at least 80 percent of the numerically
restricted visas went to relatives. Of the remaining 20 percent, spouses
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and children of individuals who qualified under the occupational pref
erences also counted against these preferences.
With all of the potential for family ties to play a role in admittances,
we are not surprised to find that the more (naturalized) U.S. citizens
who were born in country i, the greater the rate of migration from / to
the United States (see Table 5.1). 3 Although the naturalization variable
has a very strong influence in the immigration-rate equation, it plays
only a limited role in shaping immigrant composition. Among the
numerically restricted immigrants, the family ties proxied by the natu
ralization variable increase young females and decrease older females
(see Table 7.3). This is the expected pattern, because the restricted cat
egory is inherently oriented toward younger persons more than the
exempt category, which includes parents of U.S. citizens. Most effects
of naturalization work through skill composition, but these effects are
not dominant. Family connections to U.S. citizens reduce the skill
level of young females (see Table 8.2). However, in general, while
increasing the number of immigrants in any given year, the family-ties
variable does not appear to greatly influence the composition of those
entering. This is an important finding for policy purposes.
Between 1946 and 1994, programs such as the NP-5 program (for
countries adversely affected by the 1965 immigration program) and the
OP-1 program (for natives of underrepresented countries) added
"irregular" immigrants to those admitted through the normal system.
The NP-5 and OP-1 admittances are included in our lottery variable.
The lottery program not only increased the rate of immigration, specif
ically of numerically restricted immigrants (see Table 5.1), but it also
skewed immigration toward males (see Table 6.1). Even after control
ling for numerous forces that influence migration to the United States,
the model reflects the favoring of males during episodes of irregular
immigration. The lottery program increased the number of young
migrants (but especially males), while decreasing the share of older
migrants (see Table 7.2). This program also increased the skill compo
sition of young male immigration (see Table 8.2). In general, then, the
NP-5 and OP-1 programs reflected in the lottery variable favored
young, highly skilled males.
Our model results indicate that Asia is the source of relatively many
female immigrants to the United States, other factors held constant (see
Table 6.1). This observation is especially true for exempt females (see
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Table 6.2) and for young females (see Table 7.2). It is also true for
older exempt males. Moreover, relatively many highly skilled males
and females, both young and old (but especially young males), origi
nate in Asian countries. We have argued that with respect to females,
the Asian dummy variable may reflect lower wage rates (relative to
males) in Asian countries. Although we have no data reflecting wage
differences by skill level, this variable could also reflect a lower wage
gap between more and less highly skilled workers in Asian countries.

POLICY OPTIONS

To this point, we have discussed actual U.S. policy regarding immi
grant admittances. However, many other policy options are open to
U.S. lawmakers that, if implemented, would almost certainly influence
the source-country, gender, age, and skill composition of U.S. immi
gration. In this section, we discuss certain of these options and their
implications.
Legal Immigration

The extreme positions with respect to legal immigration are to bar it
altogether or to place no (or few) restrictions on it. The United States
never has barred immigration completely, not even for a short period,
and thus the first position does not appear to be likely. On the other
hand, the United States has had periods during which few restrictions
were imposed. Until 1882 (when the Chinese were barred), most indi
viduals were free to enter the United States; until 1921, all were basi
cally free to enter with the exception of the Chinese and persons from
the Asian "barred zone." Although this open policy has proponents
today, it too is unrealistic.
Some have proposed taxing immigrants, especially highly skilled
and educated individuals who were trained at public expense in poor
countries (and therefore presumably had their education expenses sub
sidized), but such a policy would be seen as discriminatory in the
United States. U.S. immigrants pay certain processing fees that are
somewhat controversial in their own right. The idea of taxing immi-
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grants in general has not been well received in the United States,
because many of the immigrants are poor and such taxes could be con
siderable burdens. The U.S. Congress recently considered taxing the
employers of certain highly trained and educated immigrants, but
employer groups vehemently protested such a policy and its consider
ation quickly ceased. Taxing employers would have the effect of
reducing job opportunities for highly educated immigrants.
Most countries have settled on quotas as a means of controlling
legal entry for permanent residence. The quotas may be fixed or flexi
ble, and they frequently involve selection criteria, as with the U.S. pref
erence categories, or the points systems used in Canada and Australia.
Binding quotas also clearly impose costs on potential immigrants, who
must wait for their number to come up, and thus quotas discourage
migration or deflect it to other alternative destinations. Many countries
have humanitarian concerns and establish separate quotas to accommo
date refugees. Auctioning a fixed number of immigration permits to
the highest bidders also has been proposed as a means of allocating
U.S. entry visas, but such a policy option is highly unlikely to be
adopted. However, visa allocations set aside for entrepreneurs and
investors in countries like the United States and Canada provide a
means of entry for those who possess considerable wealth.

Illegal Migration
The United States clearly has a problem with illegal immigration,
but it is not the only country with such a problem. However, what sets
the United States somewhat apart is that it is a high-income country
with an extensive land border with Mexico, a relatively poor country
where job prospects have not been good.
Guestworker programs are one option for dealing with illegal migra
tion, but such programs in Western Europe and the United States
(Bracero program) have proven to be as much a cause as a solution.
After the programs are discontinued, employment demand remains,
along with a plentiful supply of potential migrants, and the guestworkers have various ties to the host country that give them access to the
employment opportunities. Currently, the United States maintains var
ious nonimmigrant temporary worker programs to satisfy seasonal
employment needs.
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For many years, the United States practiced a policy of benign
neglect along its border with Mexico. Although many illegal aliens
were apprehended for entering without documents, many made it
through the border area where U.S. Border Patrol resources were con
centrated. Significantly tightening the border required far more expen
ditures than Congress was prepared to provide. U.S. employers and
landowners were clear beneficiaries of the flow of illegal migrants, so
their lobbies worked against the imposition of tighter controls. The
consequence of the policy of benign neglect was that the estimated
number of individuals residing illegally more or less permanently in
the United States grew into the millions.
Congress responded with the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA), which provided for the eventual legalization of about
2.7 million persons. IRCA also provided for fines against employers
who knowingly hired illegal migrants, but employer fines were not dif
ficult to avoid and were not sufficiently high to be effective. Presently,
an estimated 5.0 million illegal aliens reside in the United States,
approximately 2.0 percent of the nation's population.
The United States currently is pursuing two types of policies that
may affect the flows of both legal and illegal migrants. In the short
run, welfare reform legislation that bars illegal aliens (as well as cer
tain legal aliens) from using various federal public service programs
may affect the flows. However, Mexicans appear to enter the United
States for jobs and higher wages, and they do not appear to be particu
larly heavy users of welfare programs when they enter or for some
years thereafter. Thus, this legislation may not be especially helpful in
discouraging illegal migration from Mexico.
Although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was
not passed to discourage illegal migration, in the long run it could have
such an effect. In the short run, it may cause even more illegal migra
tion from Mexico (Martin 1993), because much illegal migration origi
nates in rural Mexico, where agricultural practices are frequently
primitive. The agricultural sector of Mexico will be hard-hit by com
petition engendered by NAFTA, which will release even more labor
from rural Mexico. Several years may be required for the Mexican
economy to feel the positive impacts of NAFTA and thus for NAFTA
to discourage migration to the United States.
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Finally, individuals born in the United States, even to illegal alien
mothers, are U.S. citizens. This fact may provide an incentive for mi
gration to the United States. Congress is considering various changes
in citizenship requirements.

Compositional Consequences of U.S. and Canadian Policies
The United States and Canada are two of the world's major immi
grant-receiving nations. Their immigration histories are similar: each
experienced "mass" immigration during the laissez-faire period of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; each was populated
mainly by persons of European ancestry; and, until the 1960s, each had
exclusionary policies against persons of Asian ancestry. When they
opened their doors to Asian immigrants at about the same time, migra
tion from Asia soon displaced that from Europe as a major source for
each country. However, while the United States maintained a policy
oriented toward family reunification, Canada adopted a policy that
stressed domestic economic conditions and the likelihood that the
immigrant would assimilate into the Canadian economy and society.
Historically, immigration has played a relatively far more important
role in Canada than in the United States. During the 1950s and 1960s,
when legal U.S. immigration was attracting little attention from policymakers or the public, Canadian immigration accounted for 9.8 and 7.1
persons per 100 population, respectively; corresponding figures for the
United States are 1.5 and 1.7. During the 1970s and 1980s, when the
Canadian figures were 6.3 and 5.2, U.S. immigration amounted to 2.1
and 3.1 persons per 100, respectively.
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 has moved the United States
toward slightly more emphasis on employment considerations, U.S.
entry requirements remain strongly oriented toward family ties. In
1993, 63.9 percent of the legal immigrants who entered the United
States did so based on family relationships, and only 5.9 percent (of
nonlegalizations) entered as a result of the skills or education they pos
sessed. However, in spite of its points program and the selective nature
of its admittance system, in 1993 Canada accepted 62.4 percent of its
immigrants based on family ties, almost the same percentage as the
United States.
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Tables 9.2 and 9.3 provide comparative details on U.S. and Cana
dian immigrants. The Canadian system recognizes the importance of
age and gives points to prospective immigrants based on age. In spite
of its preferences, Canada attracts only a slightly higher percentage of
persons 20 to 39 years old (48.9 percent of all immigrants during
1981-1993) than the United States (47.0 percent) (Table 9.2).
Although the percentage of immigrants of age 50 and over has been
trending up for the United States and down for Canada, for the entire
period the percentages are similar (13.0 percent for the United States,
14.1 percent for Canada).
Because human capital accumulates with increased age (i.e., experi
ence), age and skills are somewhat correlated. The Canadian admit
tance system appears to allow for more selectivity on account of skills
than does the U.S. system. However, over the 1982-1993 period (and
excluding IRCA legalizations from the U.S. data) the percentage of
each country's immigrants who were presumably highly skilled (pro
fessional, technical, and kindred workers, as well as managers and pro
prietors) differed very little (11.2 percent for the United States and 10.4
percent for Canada). With the new U.S. law in effect during 1992 and
1993, the U.S. data show a slight upward break in the series (Table 9.3).
Thus, in spite of having admittance programs that on their surface
appear considerably different, and in spite of having a somewhat dif
ferent source-country composition of their immigrants, the United
States and Canada have remarkably similar immigrant composition in
broad terms.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
Aspects of the New Law
Effective October 1, 1991, U.S. immigration law changed consider
ably. These changes were the result of the Immigration Act of 1990
which, while retaining the basic principles of earlier legislation, pro
vided the most comprehensive change in legal immigration since 1965.
Our data relate to the old law, but this change does not negate nor
reduce in any important way the relevance of the U.S. data we have
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Table 9.2 Age Composition of U.S. and Canadian Immigration,
1982-1993 (%)
Year
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1981-93

Age 20-39
Canada
U.S.A.3
47.5
44.2
50.4
43.6
44.4
52.2
49.8
45.5
49.6
47.2
46.7
48.5
50.5
48.9
50.1
49.0
47.6
50.1
47.0
49.2
45.7
49.6
47.4
47.5
45.4
46.8
48.9
47.0

Age 50 and over
Canada
U.S.A.3
13.9
13.9
13.6
14.1
13.3
15.4
14.7
12.0
11.2
13.6
12.5
13.7
13.0
12.8
15.6
12.8
18.1
11.8
19.9
11.4
10.8
20.6
17.4
11.3
11.2
17.8
14.1
13.0

1 Does not include legalizations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

Table 9.3 Percentage of U.S. and Canadian Immigrants
Classified as Skilled,8 1982-1993
Year
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1982-93

U.S.A.
12.4
12.7
10.9
11.5
11.0
10.1
10.7
10.5
10.9
10.8
10.5
10.9
11.2

Canada
8.9
7.5
8.9
11.4
12.1
12.9
12.1
10.0
9.4
8.7
10.3
15.2
10.4

1 Refers to professional, technical, and kindred workers and managers
and proprietors. U.S. figures exclude IRCA legalizations.
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analyzed, because the new law has so many similarities to the earlier
law.
Several changes made by the 1990 act are of particular relevance.
Under the previous law, the annual allocation of numerically restricted
visas was only 270,000. The 1990 act established a "flexible" world
wide cap on family-based, employment-based, and diversity immigrant
visas. Beginning in fiscal year 1995 (after a "transition" period during
which the annual quota was set at 700,000), the worldwide limit is
675,000. Separate ceilings are set for each of the immigrant catego
ries: for diversity visas, 55,000; for employment-based visas, 140,000;
and for family-sponsored visas, 480,000. While immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens remain exempt from numerical limitations, the number of
spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens are subtracted
from the overall numbers available for family sponsorship. However,
under no circumstances can the number of numerically restricted fam
ily-sponsored visas be less than 226,000. Therefore, if the number of
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens exceeds 254,000 (i.e , 480,000226,000), the flexible worldwide cap of 675,000 may be pierced.
In addition to setting a higher overall limit on admissions, the 1990
act altered per-country limitations; previously, the per-country quota
was 20,000 visas per year. The 1990 act provides that family-based
and employment-based visas made available to citizens of a single
independent foreign state may not exceed 7 percent of the total avail
able. Given the minimum of 226,000 family-sponsored and 140,000
employment-based allocations, the per-country ceiling for an indepen
dent country is thus raised to 25,620. Additional flexibility is provided
by the fact that the 7 percent limit is not subdivided between familysponsored and employment-based allocations.
In many respects the new law concerning family-based immigrants
is similar to the previous law. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
remain exempt from numerical limitation. Moreover, the annual floor
of 226,000 numerically restricted family-sponsored visas is a relatively
small increase over the 216,000 available under the previous law's
family-related preference categories. However, the new law's provi
sions should alter the mix of immigrants within the family-sponsored
categories. The major change involves spouses, minor children, and
unmarried adult children of permanent resident aliens (i.e., second
preference). For these immigrants, the new law increases the allotment
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from 70,200 to at least 114,200. Moreover, at least 77 percent of these
visas are designated for spouses and minor children of permanent resi
dent aliens, and three-quarters of these are not subject to per-country
limits. The other family-based categories (i.e., first, fourth, and fifth
preference) either had their allocation remain essentially unchanged
(i.e., fifth) or reduced by the new law.
The new law also accommodates more skill-based immigrants, and
it provides for more source-country diversity. Prior to the 1990 act,
54,000 visas were available for occupation-based immigrants. The
new law allows up to 140,000 employment-based visas and also places
more emphasis on skilled migrants within this category. The so-called
"diversity" immigration allocations, made available for the first time
by the 1990 act, are designed to facilitate the entry of potential
migrants from countries adversely affected by the 1965 law. Effective
in 1995, the diversity quota is 55,000 visas to be allocated to natives of
countries that have sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United
States over the previous five years. No single country may receive
more than 7 percent (3,850) of the total. To be eligible for a diversity
visa, a prospective immigrant must have at least a high school educa
tion or its equivalent and at least two years of work experience in an
occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience.
Diversity immigrants are therefore a kind of occupational immigrant.
Immigration under the New Law
The present study relies on data that relate to immigration under the
1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Data relat
ing to present legislation are now available for five years (FY 1992, FY
1993, FY 1994, FY 1995, FY 1996), and the recent data are informative.
Table 9.4 bridges immigration under the old law and immigration
under the Immigration Act of 1990. Data in this table are averages for
1990 and 1991 (the last years of the old law), 1992-1994 (the three
transition years of the new law), and 1995 and 1996 (the first two years
during which the more or less permanent cap and quota numbers were
in effect). Between 1990-1991 and 1995-1996, family-based immi
gration increased by 16.9 percent to 528,551 and employment-based
immigration increased by 72.3 percent to 101,418. Immigration not
subject to the numerical cap fell by 7.7 percent, and in 1995-1996
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accounted for 16.3 percent of total immigration, compared with 21.1
percent in 1990-1991.
Between 1990-1991 and 1995-1996, immigration subject to the
numerical cap increased 27.0 percent and 29.4 percent of this increase
was due to employment-based immigrants. Between 1992 and 1996,
employment-based immigration accounted for 17.3 percent of total
immigration under the cap. During 1990-1991, employment-based
immigration accounted for only 11.0 percent of the cap total; thus the
Immigration Act of 1990 clearly has had the effect of boosting employ
ment-related immigration, which was one of its major objectives.
However, professionals with an advanced degree or with advanced
ability declined steadily after the first year that the new law was in
effect: 58,401 in 1992, 29,468 in 1993, 14,432 in 1994, and 10,475 in
1995 (an exception was in 1996, at 18,462). This pattern suggests a
pent-up demand for entry by such individuals that was relieved by the
Immigration Act of 1990.
Sorensen et al. (1992) point out that the percentage of employmentbased visas received by professionals declined from 50 percent in 1976
to 30 percent in 1988. Moreover, during the same period, the percent
age of sixth-preference principals who were certified to work in service
jobs increased from 20 to 45. These authors argue that these trends
were important factors in the decision of Congress to cap unskilled
workers at 10,000 in the Immigration Act of 1990. In turn, this cap has
the potential to shift the composition of employment-related visas
toward more highly skilled occupations.
Table 9.5 also bridges the old and new laws, but it provides occupa
tional detail for persons 16 to 64 years of age. Consistent with Table
9.4, Table 9.5 shows that executive (and especially professional)
immigration increased. However, Table 9.5 shows not only that bluecollar workers increased, but also that they increased as a percentage
of the total (from 14.3 percent during 1990-1991 to 15.4 percent dur
ing 1994). Professional and executive white-collar workers as a per
centage of the total increased only slightly during this period (from
15.0 percent to 16.0 percent).

Table 9.4 Average Immigrant Admissions by Major Category, FYs 1990-19963
Category of Admission

1990-91

1992-94

Total

680,058

829,681

813,730

Not subject to the numerical cap (NX)b

143,557

150,591

132,521

Refugees and those seeking asylum

118,222

121,938

121,615

25,335

Other

1995-96

28,653

10,907

Subject to the numerical cap

536,502

679,090

681,209

Family-based immigrants

452,028

513,295

528,551

234,392

246,769

260,395

172,509

185,582

202,855

61,883

61,187

57,541

2,317

2,010

1,777

215,319

217,287

266,148

15,623
Xd

12,829

18,046

Spouses and children of LPRsc

120,473

163,685

Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens

26,933

22,590

23,164

Siblings of U.S. citizens

63,857

61,349

61,254

Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (NX)
Spouses and children
Parents
Children born abroad to alien residents (NX)
Family-sponsored immigrants
Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens

Legalization dependents (NR)e
Employment-based immigrants (NR)
Priority workers

X

47,230

231

58,859

128,834

101,418

X

15,874

22,420

Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of adv. ability

X

34,100

14,469

Skilled, professionals, other workers (CSPA)

X

70,738

56,501

4,520

7,542

7,291

Special immigrants

X

362

738

Professionals or highly skilled (old 3rd)

27,147

113

X

Needed skilled or unskilled workers (old 6th)

27,192

104

X

25,616

36,961

53,018

Investors

Diversity programs
Diversity transition (NR)
Nationals of adversely affected countries (NR)
Natives of underrepresented countries (NR)

X

36,145

3,745

16,320

522

X

9,296

294

X

SOURCE: For 1990-1994, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1995), Chart 1; for 1995-1996, U.S. Immigration and Naturaliz
tion Service (1997), Tables 4 and 5.
a Excludes persons granted legal permanent resident status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
b NX = numerically exempt.
c LPR = legal permanent resident.
d X = not applicable.
e NR = numerically restricted.
f CSPA = Chinese Student Protection Act.
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Table 9.5 Immigrant Admissions of Persons Aged 16 to 64,
by Occupation, 1990-1994
Average
1990-91

Average
1992-93

1994

Total

495,944

616,600

578,647

White-collar workers

111,054

140,708

126,362

Occupation

Professional

53,132

75,081

66,310

Executive

21,406

29,317

26,185

Sales

12,698

13,525

12,591

Clerical

23,819

22,786

21,276

Blue-collar workers

71,019

85,694

89,019

Skilled craft

25,186

25,820

23,497

Operator, fabricator, laborer

45,833

59,874

65,522

12,805

13,357

12,261

Farming, forestry, fishing
Service

45,722

50,549

48,430

222,690

287,606

262,812

Homemaker

81,558

106,404

98,452

Student

75,295

90,284

83,307

68,838

90,919

81,053

29,656

38,688

39,763

No occupation

Unemployed or retired
Not reported

SOURCE: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1995), Chart 4.
Implications for Immigration under the Act of 1990

Several factors should be kept in mind when applying our data and
findings to the situation under the new law. First, immediate relatives
of U.S. citizens remain exempt from numerical restriction, and thus our
findings concerning numerically exempt immigrants should remain rel
evant. For instance, relative differential economic opportunities will
be particularly important in shaping the age composition of exempt
migrants. On the other hand, the new law does have an immediate
impact on the number of numerically restricted immigrants. Given the
new "flexible" cap, the number of restricted immigrants has risen.
Therefore, at least in the near term, the share of total U.S. immigrants
who are subject to numerical restriction will be relatively larger than in
our sample. Because our findings suggest that the composition of
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numerically restricted immigrants is more sensitive to the availability
of social programs than is true of exempt migrants, one implication is
that such programs will play more prominent roles in determining the
overall composition of U.S. immigrants under the new law. For
instance, trends toward universal program coverage will tend to reduce
the age and increase the skill level of U.S. immigrants.4 Moreover, as
employment-related programs such as unemployment insurance and
cash-sickness benefits become more available worldwide and as oldage pension programs become more of the social insurance variety and
less in the form of provident funds, U.S. immigrants will tend to
become older. 5 Another implication is that, if source-country social
program availability is more crucial in determining migration deci
sions, the use of U.S. social programs by those who come to the United
States also may be affected. In other words, immigrants under the new
law may be more inclined to use U.S. benefits such as unemployment
insurance and sickness benefits.
Certain other features of the new law also may have a more direct
influence on the composition of immigrants. For instance, increasing
the allocation of numerically restricted visas should lower the wait
time in the backlog of immigrant visa applications; consequently, the
average age of migrants may be lowered. This effect may be only short
term, however, as the shorter wait time may have the unintended effect
of increasing the number of visa applications.
In addition to increasing the number of numerically restricted visas,
the new law alters the mix of visas allocated to specific subgroups
within the numerically restricted class. The subgroups most positively
affected will be employment-based immigrants and the spouses and
minor children of permanent resident aliens. Additional provisions
relating to employment-based visas should increase the relative skill
level of these employment-based immigrants. Using our data, the
understanding of the various forces that will influence the composition
of employment-based immigrants under the new law would require a
close examination of those immigrants who enter the United States
under the previous law's third and sixth preference categories (with,
perhaps, the third preference entrants receiving a larger weight than
those who enter under the sixth preference). For numerically restricted
family-sponsored immigrants, the application of our data to the new
law also requires a more detailed examination of the individual prefer-
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ence categories (where, for instance, the second preference category
should be separated out for analysis that is distinct from the first,
fourth, and fifth preference categories).
Given our analysis, the incorporation of diversity visas should be
fairly easy, in the sense that the analysis could be refocused to provide
a separate study of a sample that includes only those nations that would
qualify for the diversity visas. A comparison of our findings with the
findings for this group easily could be made, thus revealing any change
in importance of the factors that influence the composition of U.S.
immigration. However, for understanding the composition of total
immigrants under the new law, the comparison to the old law is more
complicated than simply accounting for the additional 55,000 diversity
visas. While certain countries will likely benefit from the availability
of diversity visas, this benefit is somewhat limited because any single
nation is restricted to 3,850 of these visas.
Certain features of the new law will provide potentially even more
benefit to previously oversubscribed nations. For instance, the new law
provides for a larger per-country quota of 25,620, or an increase of
5,620 over the previous law's quota. Moreover, the number of visas
made available for spouses and minor children of permanent resident
aliens is substantially increased, and three-quarters of these are not
subject to the per-country limits. The removal of the per-country limit
was intended to address the increasing backlog of visa applications.
Thus, countries that sent large numbers of immigrants under the old
law should substantially benefit from these relaxations, and, to the
extent that they do, the attempt to diversify the source-country mix of
U.S. immigrants will be mitigated.
Rolph (1992, p.32) noted that the legalization program, as well as
the lotteries of the late 1980s, "established a strong precedent for pro
grams that provide for entry outside of the worldwide ceiling." She
also argues that political forces, including immigrant advocacy groups,
the business community, and even states themselves (to gain additional
revenue-sharing funds), tend to work in favor of expanding immigra
tion. Although Congress stressed that the legalization program was a
one-time occurrence, Rolph's arguments suggest that other such pro
grams indeed may occur again. We noted above that "irregular" immi
gration tends to be strongly male-dominated. If future special
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opportunities were to operate like those of the late 1980s, we anticipate
that they too would be gender-biased in favor of males.
The empirical results of this study indicate that social programs in
source countries influence decisions regarding immigration to the
United States. Even if immigrants do not use U.S. social programs in
greater proportion than native-born persons, they still use social pro
grams such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In August 1996,
President Clinton signed a welfare reform bill that restricts the welfare
usage of legal immigrants in the-United States. Such a program could
influence not only the volume of U.S. immigration, but also its compo
sition (especially the age composition).
The Immigration Act of 1990 provided for somewhat higher annual
levels of legal immigration, but due to the substantial backlog of immi
grant visa requests, the quota ceilings of the 1990 act have been met
(except in 1995) and promise to continue to be met. As has occurred
previously in world and U.S. history, immigrants have been singled out
by many native residents (whether in part rightly or, more frequently,
wrongly) as an important source of domestic "problems" such as high
crime rates, high unemployment rates (for some), increased welfare
utilization, an increased gap between the wages of the most highly edu
cated and the least highly educated, and many more. Whatever the
economic and social effects of immigration, they are closely tied to the
demographic and economic composition of the immigrants them
selves. As a consequence of substantial levels of annual immigration
that promise to continue well into the future, many of the issues con
cerning immigrant composition raised in this monograph will remain
before the American people for years to come.

Notes
1. Since much of the migration from Mexico consists of persons in the "other" skill
category, this conclusion may be somewhat questionable without further disaggregation of the "other" group.
2. In the immigration-rate regressions, the coefficient most affected by the inclusion
of the social program variables is that on the English-language variable, which
loses significance in their presence. This result suggests that systematic differ
ences exist in social program availability in English and in non-English speaking
countries.
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3. Not only are the legal ties themselves improtant, but religious, social, and infor
mational ties also play a role in the naturalization variable. U.S. immigration
grew dramatically, from 384,685 in 1972 to 704,005 in 1991, not counting
I,123,162 persons legalized under IRCA. Different immigrant groups have dif
ferent propensities to naturalize. For example, of the 1982 immigrant cohort, only
II.9 percent of those from Mexico had naturalized through fiscal year 1993 (U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1996', p. 133). On the other hand, by
1993, 68.3 percent of the 1982 cohort from Taiwan and 60.2 percent of that from
the Philippines had naturalized. Overall, 37.6 percent of the 1982 cohort had nat
uralized by 1992. For those countries of birth like Mexico for which naturaliza
tion propensities are low, the potential exists for naturalizations to occur, thus
forming additional qualifying relationships with U.S. citizens and opening the
door to more exempt and restricted immigration in the future. Thus, in the wake
of California's Proposition 187, which denied access of illegal aliens and their
children to certain social services and public education, an increase occurred in
naturalizations of persons born in Mexico. Thus, the link to U.S. citizens provides
an on-going and perhaps cumulative effect of migration that certain scholars refer
to as the "immigration multiplier." Indeed, various scholars argue that the exempt
category of immigration has resulted in a lower skill level of U.S. immigrants.
Sorensen et al. (1992) examined immigrant categories and occupational out
comes of U.S. immigrants. Their main finding was that immigrants who enter
under an employment preference earn more than those who enter under a fmaily
preference and are also more likely to be employed as PTK workers and managers
than their family-presence counterparts. Their work bears only indirectly on the
exempt versus restricted debate, but is relevant nonetheless.
4. Each univeral program studied here became more common over the 1972-1991
period: 1) for old-age programs, an increase from 13 to 15 countries; 2) for sick
ness programs, an increase from 10 to 14; and 3) for family allowance programs,
an increase from 11 to 15.
5. Between 1972 and 1991, unemployment insurance became slightly more common
in our 60-country sample (from 26 to 28 countries), cash sickness benefits
remained the same (44 countries), and provident fund old-age programs became
more common (from 7 to 9).
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Table Al Coefficients of Multiple Determination (R2) in Gender
Regressions Obtained for Individual Countries: 1980,1981,
1982, and 1983
Country
Africa
Botswana
Burundi
Egypt
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Tanzania
Tunisia
Zimbabwe
Asia
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Europe
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary

1981

1982

1983

NAb

0.55
0.48
0.42

NA
NA
NA
0.49
0.40
0.58
0.62
0.74
0.45
0.58
0.51

NA
NA
0.46
0.43
0.49
0.45
0.79
0.47
0.53
0.46

0.47
0.49
0.44
0.62
0.46
0.48
0.44
0.53
0.59
0.50
0.47

0.52
0.53
0.44
0.62
0.46
0.50
0.50
0.51
0.56
0.47
0.49

0.49
0.50
0.44
0.63
0.45
0.52
0.48
0.51
0.54
0.52
0.51

0.47
0.49
0.46
0.62
0.42
0.54
0.47
0.51
0.55
0.46
0.51

0.52
0.58
0.55
0.58
0.55
0.61
0.42
0.54

0.50
0.60
0.52
0.61
0.52
0.62
0.44
0.59

0.58
0.55
0.56
0.58
0.52
0.61
0.42
0.50

0.54
0.55
0.55
0.58
0.52
0.61
0.44
0.54

1980
a
-

0.48
0.35
0.63
0.47
0.71
0.47
0.41
0.52

NA
0.46
0.54
0.38
0.64
0.62
-
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Country
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain

1980
0.56
0.49
0.45
0.51
0.49
0.44

1981
0.39
0.44
0.44
0.50
0.43
0.47

1982
0.48
0.48
0.44
0.53
0.48
0.41

1983
0.54
0.45
0.45
0.52
0.45
0.45

Sweden
0.54
0.53
0.50
0.53
Switzerland
0.53
0.52
0.47
0.55
United Kingdom
0.50
0.50
0.51
0.49
Yugoslavia
0.47
0.51
0.51
0.49
North and
Central America
Barbados
0.54
0.52
0.55
0.56
Canada
0.51
0.49
0.50
0.49
El Salvador
0.47
0.51
0.49
0.52
Haiti
0.47
0.46
0.47
0.49
Honduras
0.54
0.50
0.51
0.50
Jamaica
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
Mexico
0.43
0.40
0.41
0.46
Nicaraqua
0.49
0.52
0.50
0.51
Panama
0.49
0.48
0.49
0.51
Trinidad & Tobago
0.50
0.51
0.50
0.55
Oceania
0.54
Australia
0.50
0.53
0.50
Fiji
0.47
0.47
0.44
0.49
New Zealand
0.51
0.50
0.49
0.50
South America
Argentina
0.48
0.48
0.48
0.50
Brazil
0.53
0.53
0.51
0.55
Chile
0.48
0.46
0.48
0.46
Ecuador
0.47
0.48
0.51
0.50
Paraguay
0.56
0.56
0.53
0.43
Uruguay
0.53
0.51
0.49
0.48
Venezuela
0.48
0.51
0.46
0.48
a A dash indicates too few observations to estimate. Observations with missing data
were dropped for these countries/years,
b "NA» indicates no missing information on any record.

Appendix B
Definitions of Variables
Definition

Dependent variable
Rate of migration from
country / to U.S.A.

The rate of U.S. immigration from country i
during year t, where the rate is defined as
the ratio of total immigration from i during
t to the population of i during t; in econo
metric discussions, this variable is referred
to as mit.

Independent variables
1. Differential economic opportunity
Relative per capita income

Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in
country i during year t relative to a compa
rable measure for the U.S.A. during t, mea
sured in U.S. dollars (IMF, International
Financial Statistics: Yearbook).

Relative growth of GDP

The rate of growth of GDP in / measured in
constant prices and averaged over the previ
ous three years relative to a comparable
measure for the U.S.A. (IMF, International
Financial Statistics: Yearbook).

Government revenues

Country f s central government revenues in
year t, expressed as a percentage of GDP
during t (IMF, International Financial Sta
tistics: Yearbook).

% Urban

The percentage of country fs population
that resides in an urban area (UN, Demo
graphic Yearbook).

% Female in labor force

Female labor force as a percentage of coun
try i's total labor force (World Bank, World
Tables).
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2. Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.

Estimated airline mileage from the principal
city of country / to the nearest major U.S.
city (John S. Swift Co., Inc., no date).

Birth rate

Country f s crude birth rate in year t (UN,
Demographic Yearbook).

U.S. military presence

The number of U.S. military personnel and
civilian military employees in country / dur
ing f, expressed relative to f s total popula
tion in t (U.S. Department of Defense,
Selected Manpower Statistics).

Education

The number of students at the third level of
education in / expressed as a fraction of f s
total population (UNESCO, Statistical
Yearbook}.

English language

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i's
official United Nations language is English,
and otherwise equal to zero (Greenfield
1992).

U.S. college students

The number of persons born in country i who
attended a U.S. university during t as a pro
portion of /'s total population (UNESCO,
Statistical Yearbook).

3. Political attractiveness and religion
Political competitiveness

An index of political rights ranging from 1.0
for countries with a fully competitive elec
toral process to 7.0, indicating least free
(Gastil 1987).

Catholic

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country f s
primary religion is Catholic (i.e., at least 50
percent of population is Catholic) and other
wise equal to zero (World Almanac).

Muslim

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country z's
primary religion is Muslim (i.e., at least 50
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percent of population is Muslim) and other
wise equal to zero (World Almanac).
4. U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations

Lottery visas

The number of naturalizations to U.S. citi
zenship of persons born in country i,
summed over year t and the prior four years,
and expressed relative to the population of i
during t (U.S. INS, Annual Reports and Sta
tistical Yearbooks).
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country fs
number of NP-5 (OP-1) admittances is
greater than 5 percent of the number of nu
merically restricted (numerically exempt
for OP-1) immigrants for year t who were
born in /, and otherwise equal to zero (INS
files).

Silva visas

A dummy variable that reflects significant
admissions from country i (Mexico) in year
t under the Silva program; equal to 1 for
Mexico for 1978 and 1981, and otherwise
equal to zero.

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is
in the Western Hemisphere and t is 1972,
1973, 1974, 1975, or 1976, and otherwise
equal to zero.

Asia

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is
in Asia (except Israel), and otherwise equal
to zero.

5. Social programs
Universal old-age

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t had an old-age pension program that
was universally available for all residents or
resident citizens, and otherwise equal to ze
ro.

Employment-related old-age

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t had an old-age social insurance pro-
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gram available for wage earners, salaried
employees, and/or employed persons, and
otherwise equal to zero.
Provident fund old-age

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t had an old-age provident fund system,
and otherwise equal to zero.

Old-age pension not portable

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country / in
year t had an old-age program and the oldage pension was not payable abroad or was
payable abroad only under "limited condi
tions."

Universal sickness

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t had a universal medical benefits pro
gram, and otherwise equal to zero.

Cash sickness benefits

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country / in
year t paid cash sickness benefits when
short-term illnesses prevented the insured
from going to work, and otherwise equal to
zero.

Maternity benefits

A dummy variable equal to 1 if for country
i in year t provided maternity benefits, and
otherwise equal to zero.

Medical benefits

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t provided health care, hospital, and
pharmaceutical benefits, and otherwise
equal to zero.

Unemployment insurance

A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t had an unemployment insurance pro
gram, and otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country / in
year t had a family allowance program that
provided universal benefits to residents
with children, and otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in
year t had an employment-related family al
lowance program, and otherwise equal to
zero.

Universal family allowance

Employment family allowance
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6. Other
Population of i

A total population of country / during year t.

Sex ratio in i's population

A ratio of males to females in the population
of i during year t.

Median age in i

A median age of the population of i during t.

% No occupation

A percentage of a given gender, age, and en
try class of immigrants from / that reported
no occupation when entering the United
States in year t.

Total U.S. immigration from /

Control total for a given model, or the num
ber of immigrants from i in year t who had
a specific characteristic.

Appendix C
Econometric Considerations
The use of panel data presents many potential econometric problems, but it
also provides valuable econometric opportunities. Here we discuss a number
of issues pertinent to the estimation of models based on panel data. 1 As de
scribed in Chapter 4, the panels used in this study are immigrant countries of
birth, which are followed annually through time from 1972 to 1991. We have
full information on the independent variables in our models for 60 countries.
The appendix concludes with tables comparing various estimators that are de
scribed below. We settled on the use of Hausman-Taylor estimators; these es
timators were employed in all regressions that appear in Chapters 5,6,7, and 8.
We retain in this section the notation m,,, representing the migration from
the Ith country during period t, but we partition the set of explanatory variables
into two groups that cut across the various vectors. In the discussion below, we
pay particular attention to the econometric treatment of the time-invariant vari
ables of the model (distance from country i to the United States, whether coun
try i is English speaking or not [a dummy variable], and three additional
dummy variables that indicate whether country i is in Asia, is predominately
Catholic, or is predominately Muslim). Let Vit = [Jt'.Jz1 .] where xit is a
K x 1 vector of variables that measures characteristics of country i in period t,
and z, is a G x 1 vector of time-invariant variables. The model of migration,
then, is
Eq. Cl

mit = cc. + 8, + $x it + yz,- + £,-,, /=!,... ,60;r = 1,... ,20,

where the f3 and y are vectors of unknown parameters, eit is a random distur
bance, and the a, and 5, are unobserved country-specific and time-specific vari
ables, respectively.
The eit are assumed to have zero mean and to be independent across coun
tries. They may be correlated over time according to a first-order autoregressive process (Berndt and Savin 1975). Note that the model allows different
cross-sectional and time-specific intercepts. Various assumptions about these
are dealt with in the estimation procedures discussed below.
Equation Cl is a straightforward example of a cross section-time series data
model (Kmenta 1986), apart from the additional consideration that some exog
enous variables do not vary in the time dimension. In the ideal case, Eq. Cl is
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true for all / and t, that part of migration unaffected by measured covariates
does not vary over time or country, and the eit are white noise. That is, no misspecification of the form of the migration equation exists, either with respect to
functional form of the variables or the choice of factors that are thought to in
fluence migration. Migration corrected for the influence of the covariates is the
same in each country and for each period (i.e., only one constant is in the mod
el), and the errors are homoskedastic over country and time and are uncorrelated with one another. In this case, the 20 observations for each of the 60
countries may be "stacked" and linear regression applied to the entire 1,200 ob
servations. Nothing is learned from the time series-cross section organization
of the data, and nothing disrupts the optimality of linear regression.
The above case is "ideal" only in the sense that no econometric complica
tions are evident. That such a simple representation of reality could capture the
complex migration process is unlikely, however. For example, immigration of
a given class of migrants could be different for different countries and for dif
ferent time periods and variables potentially correlated with the time or country
effects may be omitted or poorly measured. Part of the advantage of panel data
is that it is possible to control for effects unique to time periods or to countries,
since repeated observations over time and countries are available.
Time- and Country-Specific Effects
It would seem wise to allow for the possibility that the 8, of Eq. Cl are in
deed different for different time periods (vary with /)• This can be done by
specifying a model where the time-specific effects are assumed to be either ran
dom or fixed.
If it is assumed that the individual time effects are drawings from a normal
distribution and that they are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the
model (i.e., they are random), the effects may be absorbed into the error term,
leaving the deterministic part of the equation unchanged, and the random ef
fects model fitted. The force of such an assumption is that the new vector of
disturbances (which now includes the random time effects) no longer has a sca
lar covariance matrix. The reason is that the random time effect does not
change for a particular period across countries. Therefore stacking the obser
vations and using linear regression is no longer optimal, and a generalized least
squares estimator must be fit to the data.
It may not be reasonable to assume that the individual time effects are un
correlated with the explanatory variables. If this is the case, fitting the random
effects model will produce biased estimates. For example, suppose that gov
ernment revenues as a percent of GDP have no real effect on the migration of
a given class of immigrants. If migration of this group has increased over time
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and government revenues as a percent of GDP have similarly risen, then as
suming a random effects model would attribute to the government revenues
variable the effect of the drift over time in the migration of that class. An al
ternative to the random effects model that alleviates this problem is the fixed
effects model, where the data are augmented to include a constant for each pe
riod. To estimate this model, Eq. Cl may be represented in group mean-devi
ated form: Let m it = m it - m it and x it = x it - xt . The new regression is
Eq. C2

m it = a,.* + pi,., + yz t* + eit

i = 1,.... 60; /= 1,.... 20,

where z* = Zi~z and a( * = a, - a have zero mean, and e- r is defined anal
ogously to m it and x it . If desired, the time-specific means may be recovered
after estimation.
A similar situation occurs with respect to the country-specific effects. That
is, suppose that the migration of various immigrant groups across countries is
different for reasons that are not attributable to measurable variables. Then the
country-specific constants, a,*, must be considered in estimating the parame
ters of the model. This can be done as discussed above for random time effects.
It could be assumed that the a,* are random variables uncorrelated with the oth
er variables in the model, and the random effects model fit. But there are sev
eral reasons to question the assumption that the a,-* are uncorrelated with other
variables in the model, especially the time-invariant variables. For example,
more distant countries may have lower levels of migration in every period. In
that case, the coefficient of the distance variable would be biased if the model
were estimated under the random effects assumption. A second possibility in
volves misspecification of the time-invariant variables. Exactly which vari
ables are relevant to the migration decision? This is difficult for economic
theory to predict. The possibility exists that some important variable will be
omitted.. If this is the case, and these omitted variables are correlated with the
country-specific effects, then the random effects model will again produce bi
ased parameter estimates.
To examine the fixed country effects model, we may proceed analogously
to the case of fixed time effects. Assuming the a,* are fixed given the values
in the sample, Eq. C2 is averaged over time, producing
Eq. C3

m = a,-* + pi (. + YZ,* + e/ i=l, ...,60,

and subtracted from Eq. C2 to produce
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Eq. C4

m it = mit -mi = ^xit + Eit , i = 1,. . ., 60; t = 1,..., 20,

where xit and £it are defined analogously to mit . This regression produces
unbiased parameter estimates of p\ since the country-specific constants have
been eliminated. These estimates, PW , are reported for a single immigrant
class in Table Cl in the column headed "Within." Because only the withintime variation in the data is utilized, identification of the coefficients in the vec
tor y is lost. Note that the term involving y and z has disappeared in Eq. C4.
This situation did not occur when considering time-specific effects since no
country-invariant variable is in the data.
To recapitulate, the existence of a panel of data on migration behavior al
lows controlling for time-specific and country-specific effects. These effects
may be treated in a parallel manner, with either the random or the fixed effects
model. The fixed effects model requires fewer assumptions than the random
effects model, so that it is the model of choice for the time dimension. How
ever, when the same model is applied to the country dimension, some parame
ter estimates are lost. Thus, the fixed effects model cannot be fit in this case.2
For the random effects model to produce consistent estimates requires the as
sumption of no correlation between the random effects and the explanatory
variables. Since it is unlikely that this condition will be true in the data, an al
ternative technique, that of instrumental variables, is proposed.
If this white noise assumption concerning the random time effects is not
made a priori, then the within estimates of (5 may be retained and the coeffi
cient estimates of y recovered by an instrumental variables (IV) approach of
Hausman and Taylor (1981).3 Conventional IV estimation is often plagued by
the problem of finding convincing instruments for the endogenous variables.
This is a problem because usually no reason is evident to exclude from the
model any variables correlated with m and jc, given the imprecise nature of
economic models and data. This is not the case here, however, due to the
structure of the data and the nature of the variables for which instruments are
needed. The data have two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension (coun
tries) and a time dimension (years). The variables that need instruments vary
only in the former dimension. Hence, if it can be assumed that some of the
variables in x are uncorrelated with the a,, then they may be used in two ways
because of their variation across both country and time: 1) using deviations
from country means, they produce unbiased estimates of the (3's (Eq. C4), and
2) using the country means themselves, they serve to identify the endogenous
variables in z. Therefore, the instruments are already "in" the model, elimi
nating the objection to IV estimation mentioned above.

225

To calculate the IV estimates of 7, partition x and z so that x = (x 1 jc 2 ) and
z = (z jIZ2 ), where it is assumed that the k} elements of *, and the g, elements
of Zi are uncorrelated with the country effects, whereas this is not true for the
k2 x 1 and g2 x 1 (respectively) vectors x2 and z2-4 First, $wxit is subtracted
from both sides of Eq. C2 to produce
Eq. C5

mit - $wx it = a.* + yz/* + eit

where Eit is now to be interpreted as e.it + (P - Pw)*j f • Then, the left side of
Eq. C5, is averaged over t, and the variables in z2 are regressed on z, and the
time-averaged variables in *,. This procedure gives consistent estimates of y
regardless of the endogeneity of the a,-.
Although these estimates are consistent, they are not fully efficient, since
the covariance structure of the random term, ct( * + ejr , has been ignored. This
omission is the same as ignoring the random effects in the random effects mod
el and simply fitting least squares to the data, as discussed at the beginning of
this section. To produce fully efficient estimates, the components of the dis
turbance variance must first be estimated. This is possible, since (3 is consis
tently estimated from the within regression and y is consistently estimated from
the IV regression. With these estimates in hand, m, or, and the instruments for
z may be transformed and generalized least squares performed. This will pro
duce consistent, efficient estimates of all parameters under any hypothesis re
garding correlation. Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable estimates are
reported in the fourth column of Table Cl; the corresponding /-statistics are in
Table C2.

Notes
1. We are grateful to Donald Waldman for this section, which mainly is drawn from
Greenwood, McDowell, and Waldman (1996).
2. The intercountry variation may also be utilized by noticing that Eq. C3 contains
all the parameters of the original model. A random effects estimation of this
equation is known as the "Between" estimator. However, as with the least squares
and generalized least squares estimators and unlike the Within estimator, Between
estimators are consistent only if the time effects are white noise.
3. For related work, see Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), and Breusch, Mizon, and
Schmidt(1989).
4. The method of partitioning variables into those potentially correlated with unob
served country-specific effects and those that are exogenous is discussed in Chap
ter 5 under "Empirical Findings."

Table Cl Alternative Estimates of the Rate of U.S. Immigration, 1972-199P
Variable

10

ON

Random effects
(GLS)

One-way fixedeffects, time

One-way fixed-effects,
countries (Within)

HausmanTaylor IV

_0 474***

-0.815***

-0.014
0.542**

-0.016
0.603**

0.293*
-2.049***

0.288*
-1.707***

-1.208*

-1.304**
-0.324***
-2.550***

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income (x\)
Relative growth of GDP (xj)

0.884***

Government revenues (x2)

0.507***

0.541

—1 114***

0.053
-0.496***

0.892***

1.599***

Distance to U.S.A. (zj)

-0.259***

-0.156***

Birth rate (x2)

-1.964***

—1.409***

-2.603***

-0.010
-0.468**

-0.034***

0.078***

0.074***

-0.775***

0.270
-

0.298
2.100***

% Urban (x{)
% Female in labor force (x2)
Migration costs

U.S. military presence (x2)
Education (jc2)
English language (z2)
U.S. college students (x2)

0.656***
-0.025

0.333***
0.267***

-0.316***

-0.307***

-0.065***

0.033***

0.034***

Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness (x2)
Catholic (zj)
Muslim (zi)

0.011
-0.191***
0.020

-0.119***

-

0.274

0.221***

—

0.282

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations (jc2)

0.085***

0.189***

0.057***

0.056***

Lottery visas (jq)

0.101***

0.084

0.070*

0.073*

0.158
-0.267***

0.160
-0.260***

-

0.637***

Silva visas (x\)
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 (jcj)
Asia(zj)

0.179
-0.121***
0.450***

0.344
0.219***
0.157

Control
Population of / (jcj)
Constant (z\)

-0.125***

-0.071***

-0.098*

-0.152***

-

0.950***

-

-

a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table C2 reports the
corresponding f-statistics.

Table C2 Alternative Estimates of the Rate of U.S. Immigration, 1972-1991: /-Statistics

to
oo

Random effects
(GLS)

One-way fixedeffects, time

One-way fixed-effects,
countries (Within)

HausmanTaylor IV

-5.025

-9.821

-0.133

-0.158

Relative growth of GDP (x])

2.491

1.244

1.704

1.910

Government revenues (x2)

2.750

0.349

1.540

1.518

-6.073

^.457

-4.921

^.909

2.464

7.541

-1.567

-1.718

-16.072

-15.980

-

-6.170

Birth rate (x2)

-5.816

-6.344

-5.308

-5.231

U.S. military presence (x2)

-0.758

^.321

2.489

2.425

Education (x2)

-1.770

-3.509

1.097

8.547

8.302

0.985
-

2.926

-0.412

4.045

-5.328

-5.183

1.036

-6.161

3.525

-2.392

-2.884

3.425
-

0.743

3.173

-

0.575

Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income (xj)

% Urban (x,)
% Female in labor force (jc2)
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A. (z\)

English language (z2)
U.S. college students (jc2)
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness (jr2)
Catholic (Zj)
Muslim (zj)

0.153

U.S. immigration policy

Per capita naturalizations (x^
Lottery visas (x^)
Silva visas (x\)
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 Oq)
Asia (z\)

10.981

19.656

8.234

8.163

0.715

1.000

0.731

0.740

1.961

1.194

1.560

1.615

-2.375

3.212

-5.778

4.249

2.686

-5.931
-

-3.819
-

^.002

-1.295
-

-2.418
-

2.035

Control
Population of i(x l )
Constant (zj)

2.060

Note:
1. Within - between test of no endogeneity:
HO: individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors; X2(5) = 442.6 —> reject null.
2. Test of random effects:
HO: individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors; %2(5) = 56.52 —> reject null.
3. Test of exogeneity of Hausman-Taylor instruments:
HO: instruments are not endogenous; X2(5) = 0.81 —» do not reject null.

Appendix D
Supplementary Tables for
Chapter 5
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Table Dl Means and Standard Deviations of Econometric Variables
Variable3
Rate of migration from / to U.S.A. (10~3)

Mean

Std. Dev.

0.387

0.941

341.355

932.555

Relative per capita income

0.336

0.356

Relative growth of GDP

1.013

0.039

Government revenues (102)

0.256

0.117

% Urban

0.547

0.251

% Female in labor force

0.327

0.094

Population in /(105)

5.036

2.577

26.675

12.730

U.S. military presence

0.528

2.246

Education in (10-')b

0.139

0.103

English language

0.350

0.477

U.S. college students (10'3)

0.230

0.369

Political competitiveness

3.143

2.097

Catholic

0.367

0.482

Muslim

0.083

0.277

Per capita naturalizations

0.969

2.338

Lottery visas

0.078

0.269

Silva visas

0.002

0.041

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

0.071

0.257

Asia

0.167

0.373

Distance to U.S. A. (103)
Birth rate

Universal old-age

0.221

0.415

Employment-related old-age

0.660

0.474

Provident fund old-age

0.142

0.349

Old-age pension not portable

0.172

0.377

Universal sickness

0.210

0.408

Cash sickness benefits

0.719

0.450

Maternity benefits

0.699

0.459

Medical benefits

0.668

0.468

Unemployment insurance

0.482

0.500
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Variable

Mean

Universal family allowance

0.218

Std. Dev.
0.413

Employment family allowance

0.245

0.430

Male education per capita (10"')

0.155

0.111

Female education per capita (10" 1 )

0.122

0.103

Relative female education

0.736

0.341

Median age in i
Sex ratio in i's population

25.258

7.073

1.011

0.096

a For variables carrying exponents, the reported data should be multiplied by the expo
nent to give the actual coefficient.
b ln the regressions of Chapter 5, this variable has been multiplied by 102. All other
variables are defined as reported in this table.

Table D2 The Rate of Migration to the United States, 1972-1991—Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable
Estimates: /-Statistics
Variable

No social
program variable

All
immigrants

Numerically
restricted

Numerically
exempt

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income (x^

-0.158

0.052

0.950

-1.470

Relative growth of GDP (jq)

1.910

1.424

1.482

0.469

Government revenues (x2)

1.518

2.198

2.235

0.532

% Urban (jq)

^.909

-5.421

-4.279

-2.958

% Female in labor force (x2)

-1.718

1.076

1.399

-0.464

Distance to U.S.A. (z\)

-6.170

-3.888

-3.586

-3.913

Birth rate (x2)

-5.215

-4.615

Migration costs
-5.231

-6.625

U.S. military presence (;c2)

2.425

1.217

1.404

0.236

Education (x2)

1.097

1.323

1.892

-0.338

English language (z2)

2.926

-0.025

0.213

0.334

-5.183

^.355

-4.618

-0.775

Political competitiveness (x2)

3.525

3.512

2.851

2.376

Catholic (z,)

0.743

-0.692

-0.638

0.234

Muslim (zi)

0.575

0.033

0.185

0.307

U.S. college students (x2)
Polit. attract, and religion

U.S. immigration policy

Per capita naturalizations (^2)

8.163

8.812

5.401

8.815

Lottery visas Oq)

1.615

1.852

2.604

-0.665

Silva visas (x\)

0.740

0.759

1.266

-0.683

Western Hemisphere 1972-76 (x{)

-5.778

-6.143

-5.305

-3.288

Asia (z\)

2.035

-0.256

-0.555

0.788

Social programs
Universal old-age (x^)

_

0.090

0.632

-0.349

Employment-related old-age (x2)

-

-0.670

-0.737

-0.473

Provident fund old-age (x^)

-

-0.459

-0.121

-0.991

Old-age pension not portable (x2)

-

-1.487

-1.000

-1.333

Universal sickness (^2)

-

-0.187

-0.855

1.236

Cash sickness benefits (jc2)

-

-5.734

-3.298

-5.881

Maternity benefits (x^)

-

3.070

2.945

1.198

Medical benefits (*2)

-

-1.335

0.672

-3.976

Unemployment insurance (A^)

-

-9.263

-10.046

-1.178

Universal family allowance (jc2)

-

-1.283

-1.473

0.271

Employment family allowance (^2)

_

-1.588

-1.509

-0.401

No social
All
____________Variable_____________program variable___immigrants

Numerically
restricted

Numerically
exempt

Control
Population of i'<jes )
Testofex«jgeneity<ofH-TiBSdmments

-2,418

-0.878

-0.175

-1.364

0.81

1.60

1.62

2.73
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Table El Gender Composition of Total U.S. Immigrants: /-Statistics
Variable

Male

Female

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban

1.328

-1.328

-0.670

0.670

0.060

-0.060

-1.587

1.587

3.904

-3.904

1.788

-1.788

Birth rate

-2.248

2.248

U.S. military presence

-2.496

2.496

Relative female education3

-1.595

1.595

English language

-3.562

3.562

0.800

-0.800

Political competitiveness

-0.130

0.130

Catholic

-2.087

2.087

Muslim

1.045

-1.045

-1.115

1.115

% Female in labor force
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.

U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

1.898

-1.898

-11.291

11.291

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-1.003

1.003

Asia

-5.040

5.040

-1.251

1.251

0.800

-0.800

Silva visas

Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age

-0.033

0.033

Old-age pension not portable

0.571

-0.571

Universal sickness

0.112

-0.112

-1.700

1.700

Cash sickness benefits
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Variable

Male

Female

Maternity benefits

-1.523

1.523

Medical benefits

-0.428

0.428

Unemployment insurance

-1.881

1.881

Universal family allowance

-1.242

1.242

Employment family allowance

-1.265

1.265

0.958

-0.958

122.851

100.507

2.08

2.08

Control
Sex ratio in i
Total U.S. immigration from /
Test of exogeneity of H-T instruments

a Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.
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Table E2 Female U.S. Immigrants By Entry Class: '-Statistics
Numerically
restricted

Numerically
exempt

Relative per capita income

-0.495

-1.254

Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues

-0.324

0.441

1.811
-0.484

-0.562
2.303

-1.548

-2.938

-0.492

-1.174

3.219
-0.430
-0.412
-1.055
1.360

2.658
2.241
3.927
-1.416

-1.561
-0.410
-1.356

0.094
2.353
-0.524

1.499
-0.565
6.574
1.913
0.030

0.215
-2.066
2.395
0.997
4.823

0.351
2.014
1.430
1.434
3.832
-1.581

1.037
-1.646
-0.622
-0.479
-0.554
2.436

Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity

% Urban
% Female in labor force
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Relative female education2
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim
U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas
Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76
Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness
Cash sickness benefits

1.384
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Numerically
restricted

Numerically
exempt

Maternity benefits

0.696

0.933

Medical benefits

0.882

0.688

Unemployment insurance

0.456

1.675

Variable

Universal family allowance
Employment family allowance

0.370

1.107

-0.216

1.388

0.513

-0.494

175.779

103.184

1.25

2.59

Control
Sex ratio in /
Total U.S. immigration from i
Test of exogeneity of H-T instruments

a Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.
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Table Fl Age Composition of Immigrants: /-Statistics
Variable

Aged 20-34

Aged 55 and old

2.166

-1.900

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP

-1.638

2.362

2.265

-2.516

-3.149

3.893

4.645

-5.290

Distance to U.S.A.

-2.556

1.516

Birth rate

-0.948

-0.376

0.245

0.620

Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force
Migration costs

U.S. military presence
Education

-2.156

1.975

English language

-0.654

2.190

U.S. college students

-0.251

-0.086

Political competitiveness

1.266

0.612

Catholic

0.512

0.925

Muslim

-0.150

0.151

Per capita naturalizations

1.498

-1.356

Lottery visas

3.315

-2.517

8.377

-7.876

Polit. attract, and religion

U.S. immigration policy

Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76
Asia

-5.581

5.587

1.513

0.481

Social programs
Universal old-age

1.419

-0.732

-1.892

0.344

1.136

-2.146

Old-age pension not portable

-1.239

0.796

Universal sickness

-0.208

0.421

Cash sickness benefits

-2.792

3.225

Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
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Variable
Maternity benefits

Aged 20-34

Aged 55 and older

1.820

-1.195

Medical benefits

-1.330

1.856

Unemployment insurance

-1.357

1.483

Universal family allowance

-0.195

0.361

Employment family allowance

-0.879

1.241

Median age in i

-3.605

2.309

Total migration from i aged 20 and over

62.832

31.980

3.33

2.33

Control

Test of exogeneity of H-T instruments
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Table F2 Age Composition of Immigrants by Gender: ^-Statistics
Variable

Aged 20-34
Male
Female

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP

1.797
-0.823

1.234
-2.622

Government revenues

1.372

3.252
-6.334

Aged 55 and older
Male
Female
-2.007

-1.317

1.735
-2.000

2.606
-2.939

3.925

2.360
-5.761

5.326
-4.088

-2.426

1.481
0.891
1.140
0.621
1.821
-0.272

1.613
-1.794
-0.181
2.420
2.167
-0.022

% Urban
% Female in labor force
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate

-0.629
4.187

U.S. military presence
Education3
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim

-0.851
1.155
-0.728
0.357

2.037
1.648
^.838
-1.278
-0.046

0.869
0.769
0.802

0.959
-0.382
-1.261

-0.013

-0.118
3.030

2.793
2.998
17.273
-6.638
1.875

-0.469
-3.250
^.946
4.485
0.784

1.627
-2.660
2.175
-1.994
-0.141

-1.429
1.660
-1.335
0.336
-0.504

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas
Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76
Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness

-1.557
-1.500

0.023
-3.270
0.055
1.357
-1.282
0.412
-0.544
0.305

0.095
-0.678

0.563
1.196
0.966
-2.009
-1.874
-13.171
6.230
-0.270
-0.757
0.247
-2.517
1.254
0.581
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Aged 20-34
Variable

Aged 55 and older

Male

Female

Male

Female

-1.436

-3.594

2.529

3.140

1.293

2.607

-1.289

-1.767

Medical benefits

-0.085

-1.842

0.609

2.293

Unemployment insurance

-1.219

-0.897

1.341

1.203

Universal family allowance

-0.679

-0.082

0.489

0.490

Employment family allowance

-1.118

-0.733

1.230

1.349

Median age in i

-3.372

^.259

3.111

2.724

Total sex-specific immigration
aged 20 and over from i

67.247

59.234

39.156

38.899

2.31

2.40

2.75

2.12

Cash sickness benefits
Maternity benefits

Control

Test of exogeneity of H-T
instruments

a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
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Table F3 Age Composition of Numerically Restricted Immigrants:
^-Statistics
Aged 20-34
Variable

Males

Females

Aged 55 and older
Males

Females

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force

0.378

0.934

-1.002

-1.248

-0.675

-0.852

1.305

-0.002

0.833

1.523

-1.114

-0.582

-1.127

-2.181

1.319

0.920

0.554

2.265

-3.989

-1.378

-1.059

-1.326

2.063

1.464

Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate

0.412

0.458

1.801

3.390

-0.566

-0.068

0.709

0.090

0.757

-2.962

0.359

-2.157

-0.005

-0.234

-1.047

-2.157

0.734

0.825

1.293

3.002

Political competitiveness

1.013

0.633

-0.812

-1.608

Catholic

1.689

1.204

-2.156

-2.863

Muslim

0.378

0.427

-1.331

-1.550

1.145

1.739

-0.998

-5.399

U.S. military presence
Education3
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations

3.066

3.496

-2.496

-1.501

Silva visas

-4.833

0.510

3.045

2.846

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-0.966

-2.536

5.476

7.300

1.137

1.112

-1.828

-2.333

2.130

2.465

-1.097

-0.492

-2.720

-3.576

3.455

2.296

0.448

0.725

0.203

1.325

-1.425

-1.020

0.539

-0.043

3.229

2.861

-0.013

-0.442

Lottery visas

Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness
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Aged 20-34
Variable
Cash sickness benefits

Males

Females

Aged 55 and older
Males

Females

-2.485

-3.319

1.924

3.393

Maternity benefits

1.312

2.234

-1.774

-3.911

Medical benefits

0.907

0.507

1.446

3.267

Unemployment insurance

0.669

0.539

1.212

1.868

-0.111

0.659

1.296

1.901

0.183

0.481

1.017

1.570

Median age in i

-1.164

-1.098

0.455

-1.079

Total aged 20 and over
numerically restricted from ib

67.479

67.034

27.957

26.341

2.31

3.67

5.12

4.41

Universal family allowance
Employment family allowance
Control

Test of exogeneity of H-T
instruments

a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to
the respective gender.
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Table F4 Age Composition of Numerically Exempt Immigrants:
^-Statistics
Aged 20-34
Variable

Aged 55 and older
Females

Males

Females

1.607

1.380

-1.820

-1.263

-0.597

-3.499

2.138

3.459

Government revenues

1.063

2.839

-2.239

-2.971

% Urban

0.576

-4.144

1.745

4.348

% Female in labor force

4.642

5.507

-5.708

-5.459

Distance to U.S.A.

-0.399

-1.078

0.340

0.598

Birth rate

-1.114

3.244

-0.576

-2.452

U.S. military presence

-1.277

1.903

1.189

-0.115

0.216

-3.144

1.078

1.820

-2.139

-2.115

3.410

2.716

0.485

-0.587

-0.911

-0.311

Political competitiveness

-0.371

-1.660

1.568

2.108

Catholic

-0.642

-1.286

1.497

1.636

Muslim

0.765

-1.029

-0.702

0.684

-1.615

-0.708

-0.013

0.329

Males

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP

Migration costs

Education3
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations

2.129

1.502

-2.658

-1.236

Silva visas

-0.539

-0.235

-0.319

0.108

Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-2.254

-3.596

2.977

3.539

Asia

-1.831

0.231

2.750

0.983

Universal old-age

0.260

0.258

-0.787

-0.397

Employment-related old-age

0.226

0.816

-0.084

0.150

Provident fund old-age

0.346

2.029

-2.055

-2.550

Lottery visas

Social programs

Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness

0.505

-0.148

-0.062

0.222

-0.902

-0.217

-0.678

-0.677
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Aged 20-34
Variable

Males

Females

Aged 55 and older
Males

Females

Cash sickness benefits

0.327

-0.605

2.619

2.050

Maternity benefits

0.636

0.253

-0.376

0.078

Medical benefits

0.383

-0.230

0.284

0.629

Unemployment insurance

-1.589

-0.944

1.156

0.923

Universal family allowance

-0.935

0.004

0.030

0.156

Employment family allowance

-1.492

-0.582

0.923

0.960

Median age in i

-3.410

-4.227

2.345

3.224

Total exempt aged 20 and over
from ib

82.974

89.533

24.404

40.416

2.20

1.44

1.58

1.12

Control

Test of exogeneity of H-T
instruments

a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to
the respective gender.
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Table Gl Highly Skilled Immigrants by Age: ^-Statistics
Variable

Total

Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

0.453

1.000

-0.114

-2.194

-2.503

0.530

1.137

1.504

-0.519

-2.985

-1.239

-1.866

3.081

5.955

-3.285

-3.578

-2.983

-2.569

1.258

1.927

0.225

Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence

1.104

0.893

1.326

^.052

-4.897

0.463

3.756

3.419

3.975

-0.939

0.312

-1.621

Political competitiveness

0.495

-0.196

0.219

Catholic

2.752

3.004

1.867

Muslim

0.510

1.412

-0.686

-0.382

-1.165

-0.185

Education
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion

U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

1.953

2.109

0.963

Silva visas

-1.813

-3.621

-2.563

Western Hemisphere 1 972-76

-5.243

-4.484

-0.740

5.014

4.178

5.005

0.992

1.706

0.138

-2.125

-2.116

-1.360

1.697

2.757

-1.025

Old-age pension not portable

-1.877

-2.127

0.221

Universal sickness

-1.134

-0.619

-0.198

0.145

-1.089

3.290

Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age

Cash sickness benefits
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Variable
Maternity benefits
Medical benefits

Total

Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

0.942

1.406

-0.284

1.132

1.560

1.169

-0.326

-0.152

0.838

Universal family allowance

1.312

2.010

0.582

Employment family allowance

0.147

0.671

0.313

% No occupation3

-3.052

-1.452

0.683

Total U.S. immigration from ib

14.567

15.489

20.695

4.10

3.31

5.65

Unemployment insurance

Control

Test of exogeneity of H-T
instruments

a The control for the percentage of immigrants that does not declare an occupation is mea
sured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and aged 35-64).
b The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and
aged 35-64).

Table G2 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Gender: ^-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate
U.S. military presence
Education3
English language
U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim
U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas

Total

Males
Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

Total

Females
Aged 20-34

Aged 35-64

0.710
-1.613
0.750
-1.920
3.961

1.191
-2.428
1.244
0.084
6.273

0.054
1.192
-0.588
-2.343
-2.512

0.238
-1.755
0.993
-2.030
1.394

0.602
-1.902
1.116
-1.017
4.111

0.061
-0.090
-0.474
-0.421
-3.483

-3.961
0.325
0.847
-2.883
4.109
-0.880

-3.634
1.116
0.630
-2.871
4.513
0.107

-3.048
-0.531
1.167
-1.153
3.338
-1.593

-2.502
2.396
1.489
-2.060
3.751
1.489

-2.005
3.435
1.476
^.487
3.269
1.048

-0.908
1.227
1.082
2.573
4.356
-1.252

2.308
2.691
1.070

0.925
3.611
2.440

1.824
1.128
-0.667

-1.493
3.263
0.466

-1.629
3.273
1.039

-1.668
2.732
-0.313

-0.549
2.817

-0.861
2.485

-0.582
2.008

-0.731
0.493

-2.252
1.129

0.174
-0.420

Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76
Asia

-0.802
-4.595
5.134

-1.726
-4.073
4.725

-2.280
-0.909
4.767

-4.489
-3.421
4.473

-8.960
-2.173
4.057

-2.799
0.252
4.294

Social programs
1.039
1.953
1.659
-0.623
1.918
0.786
Universal old-age
-0.468
-1.524
-1.556
-1.275
-2.326
-2.394
Employment-related old-age
-0.306
2.477
1.595
-1.248
2.424
1.417
Provident fund old-age
-0.014
-1.493
-1.487
0.439
-2.053
-1.589
Old-age pension not portable
0.779
0.119
0.126
-0.835
-0.629
-1.460
Universal sickness
2.464
-0.007
0.373
3.314
-1.188
0.280
Cash sickness benefits
1.319
1.333
1.836
-1.506
1.072
-0.112
Maternity benefits
0.608
2.245
1.151
1448
1.262
1.124
Medical benefits
1.620
1.061
0.805
0.339
-0.278
-0.678
Unemployment insurance
0.739
2.499
1.425
0.656
1.897
1.269
Universal family allowance
0.437
1.244
0.422
0.384
0.642
0.158
Employment family allowance
Control
0.224
-0.351
-1.416
0.070
-1.950
-2.682
% No occupation"
22.560
22.387
18.036
19.195
13.761
13.477
Total U.S. immigration from ic
Test of exogeneity of H-T instruments____3.35_____3.04_____4.85______5.85______5.83_____4.25
a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the respective gender.
b In the gender-specific regressions, this control is measured specific to the respective gender, as well as to the specific age group.
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the respective gender, as well as to the specific age
group.
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Table G3 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Entry Class: ^-Statistics
Males

Females

Numerically exempt
Females
Males

1.452

0.894
-2.412

-1.251
0.671

1.669
-0.807
4.106

-2.014
-1.154

-0.978

-1.499
1.036
1.451
1.571
1.780
-2.173

-0.048
0.811
1.494
1.798
3.625
-1.231

1.875
0.117
-0.815

-1.856
1.567
-0.629

Numerically restricted
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force
Migration costs

-2.269
1.869
-0.489
6.289

-3.363

0.042
0.205
-0.942
-0.218
-2.956

Distance to U.S.A.
Birth rate

-3.684
-1.061

U.S. military presence
Education3
English language

0.388
-3.450
4.315

3.867
0.972
-3.798
1.929

U.S. college students
Polit. attract, and religion
Political competitiveness
Catholic
Muslim
U.S. immigration policy
Per capita naturalizations
Lottery visas
Silva visas
Western Hemisphere 1972-76

-0.148

1.500

0.620
3.671
2.581

-1.893
2.648

-0.422
2.729
-8.706
-5.231

-1.259
-0.006
1.720
2.722

-1.127
-1.384
1.461
2.196

Asia
Social programs
Universal old-age
Employment-related old-age
Provident fund old-age
Old-age pension not portable
Universal sickness

4.758

-1.297
1.798
-15.580
-1.561
3.316

2.301

3.185

0.690
-1.979
1.800
-1.062
0.569

1.481
-0.540
2.683
-0.870
1.799

-0.737
-0.316
-2.245
1.028
-1.570

0.682
-0.363
-0.791
0.008
-0.008

0.990
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Numerically restricted
Variable

Males

Cash sickness benefits

-1.827

Maternity benefits

-0.842
1.423

Medical benefits
Unemployment insurance

Females

Numerically exempt
Males

Females

-1.436

4.012

3.005

0.028

-0.572

1.003

1.412

0.350

1.085

-1.001

1.256

0.331

1.593

Universal family allowance

1.460

2.563

0.103

1.035

Employment family allowance

0.344

1.236

0.202

1.018

% No occupation15

-2.910

-0.849

-1.332

-0.639

Total U.S. immigration from ic

16.054

24.358

23.432

25.021

2.87

4.58

1.44

4.42

Control

Test of exogeneity of H-T
instruments

a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the percent no-occupation variable is specific to
the respective gender, as well as immigrant class.
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total is specific to gender and immi
grant class.
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53n8
impact on U.S. wages, 18n9
North American Free Trade
Agreement effect on, 186, 197
options for dealing with, 196-197
Silva program effect on, 1978 and
1981, 142
Migrant stock, 91-92
Migration
by native workers in U.S.A., 13
returns on, 157
See also Immigration
Migration costs
and age composition, 136, 141,
151-152
and age/entry class composition, 146,
147-149
and age/gender composition, 143
as an econometric vector, 95-96,
156-157, 188-189,216
effect on economic migrants,
114-115
and gender composition, 127
and gender/entry class composition,
188
and overall U.S. immigration, 106
and skill/age composition, 160, 166,
180

and skill/entry class composition,
175
and skill/gender/age composition,
169
"Muslim" [econometric variable]
and age composition, 140t
and age/entry class composition,
148t, 150t
and age/gender composition, 144t
and gender composition, 120t, 125,
127, 128n3
and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 125
and skill/age composition, 164t, 166
and skill/entry class composition,
176t
and skill/gender/age composition,
170t, 173, 190
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
Muslim religion
as an econometric variable, 97,
Illn6, 190, 216
See also Religion
NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement), 186, 197-198
Net export demand, effect of
immigration on, 13
Newfoundland, immigration from, 52n6
Non-economic migrants. See Tied
migrants
Non-economically active immigrants,
136, 138, 153n4, 162
Nonimmigrant class of entry, 60
Nonpreference immigrants, 25
Nonpreference visas, 98
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 186, 197-198
Norway, immigration from, 39
NP-5 program, 112n8, 194-195
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Numerically exempt immigrants
by age 77, 80t, 81, 137
and age/gender composition,
146-147, 150t-151t, 154nl2,
186
compensating for incomplete records
of, 71-73
as an econometric variable, 16, 94,
183
and overall U.S. immigration
(1972-1991), 104t-105t,
106-110
and gender composition, 74, 76t,
121-123, 122t-123t, 124, 126
INS data for, 57
during the 1990s, 204t
policy implications for, 206-208
preference system for (1968-1991),
26-27
and skill composition, 84-87, 85t,
87t, 174-179, 186
U.S. military spouses as, 95-96
from Western Hemisphere countries,
24
Numerically restricted immigrants
by age (1972-1991), 77, 79t, 81,
153n5
and age/gender composition,
146-149
compensating for incomplete records
of, 71-73
as an econometric variable, 16, 94,
183
establishment of preference system
for, 25-26
and gender composition, 74, 76t,
121-123, 122t-123t, 125, 126
INS data for, 57
during the 1990s, 204t-205t
and overall U.S. immigration
(1972-1991), 104t-105t,
106-110
policy implications for, 206-208
quotas, 60
and skill composition, 81, 83t, 84,
86t, 174-179, 186

Occupation coding of immigrants, 87n8
Occupation-related data
compensating for incomplete records
of, 70-71
for 1990-1994, 206t
problems with in INS data, 66-68
Occupational categories
for immigrants, 50, 5 It
used in model of immigration, 67
Occupational preferences, 25, 26t
See also Employment-based
preferences
Occupational skills of immigrants. See
Skill composition of U.S.
immigration
Oceania, immigration from, 45t
"Old-age pension not portable"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 137, 140t, 142
and age/entry class composition,
148t, 150t
and age/gender composition, 144t
and gender composition, 117-118,
120t
and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 126
and skill/age composition, 164t
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 179
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t, 174
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 108
Older immigrants. See Age composition
of U.S. immigration
Older native workers, effect of
immigration on, 14
OP-1 program, 112n8, 194-195
Output growth, immigration effects on, 3
Panel data advantages, 222
Pension systems
as an econometric variable, 16, 99,
218
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Pension systems (cont.)
See also Employment-related old-age
pension programs; "Old-age
pension not portable"; Provident
funds pension systems; Universal
old-age pension programs
Per capita income (aggregate), effect of
immigration on, 6
Per capita naturalizations
as an econometric variable, 97-98,
189, 194, 210n3, 217
"Per capita naturalizations"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 140t, 194
and age/entry class composition, 146,
148t, 150t, 153n5,194
and age/gender composition, 143,
144t, 194
and gender composition, 117, 120t,
189
and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 125, 194
and skill/age composition, 161, 164t
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 178, 194
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t, 173, 194
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 107
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 227t
Percentage of females in labor force
as an econometric variable, 94, 187,
215
"% female in labor force" [econometric
variable]
and age composition, 140t
and age/entry class composition, 147,
148t, 150t
and age/gender composition, 144t,
154n9
and gender composition, 120t, 123
and gender/entry class composition,
121, 122t, 187
and skill/age composition, 164t,
165-166

and skill/entry class composition,
175, 176t, 179-180, 187-189
and skill/gender/age composition,
169, 170t, 187
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 106
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
"% no occupation" [econometric
variable]
and skill/age composition, 165t
and skill/entry class composition,
177t
and skill/gender composition, 172t
Percentage of population that is urban
as an econometric variable, 94, 95,
187,215
"% urban" [econometric variable]
and age composition, 140t, 141
and age/entry class composition,
148t, 150t, 187
and age/gender composition, 144t,
187
and gender composition, 120t
and gender/entry class composition,
121, 122t, 187
and skill/age composition, 164t, 165
and skill/entry class composition,
164t, 165
and skill/gender/age composition,
170t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 106
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
Permanent resident aliens, 26t, 30t
Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, 29
Philippines, immigration from, 81, 82t
Poland, immigration from, 44
Political attractiveness and religion
as an econometric vector, 96-97
Political competitiveness
as an econometric variable, 94,
96-97, 190, 216
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"Political competitiveness"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 140t, 151-152
and age/entry class composition, 146,
148t, 149, 150t, 190
and age/gender composition, 144t,
190
and gender composition, 120t
and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 190
and skill/age composition, 161,164t,
180
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 177
and skill/gender/age composition,
170t, 173, 190
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 107
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
Political repression and immigration,
96-97, 161
Population
as an econometric variable, 218
impact of immigration on U.S., 3,12,
16,42-44,132
and overall U.S. immigration, 105t
source country sex ratio, 121t, 123t
"Population of i" [econometric variable]
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t
Population sex ratio, 114, 12It, 123t,
219
Potato Famine, 39
Preference-category quotas, 27, 208
Principals and beneficiaries, 57
Production-theory approach, 5-6, 11-13
"Provident fund old-age" [econometric
variable]
and age composition, 140t, 142,
154n8
and age/entry class composition,
148t, 150t, 191
and age/gender composition, 144t,
145, 191
and gender composition, 120t

and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 191
and skill/age composition, 164t, 168,
191
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 179
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t, 191
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t
Provident funds pension systems
as an econometric variable, 99, 101,
191,218
prevalence of (1972-1991), 210n5
Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS),
shortcomings of, 55
Push vs. pull immigration influences, 90,
92-93
Qualified aliens, 34n9
Quota Law of 1921, 20, 21-23
Quotas
effect on gender composition of U.S.
immigration, 46, 125
effect on skill composition of U.S.
immigration, 50
Immigration Act of 1924, 23
impact on U.S. immigration, 41
in the 1990s, 44, 209
policy options with, 196
Quota Law of 1921, 20, 21-23
three-tier system of, 27
Random effect model, 222, 224
Recent immigrants
U.S. labor market displacement of,
10
wage rates of, 8, 13
Refugee Act of 1980, 25, 34n7, 42
Refugees
from Cuba, 98
and gender composition of U.S.
immigration, 74, 88nl3
INS data about, 57
from Mexico, 98
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Refugees (cont.)
and model of immigration, 61,
63-66, 98
from Nazi Germany, 34n6
during the 1980s, lllnl
during the 1990s, 204t
policy options for, 196
Region-specific effects of immigration,
11,12
Regional dummies, 97
Relative attractiveness, concept of,
152n3
Relative growth of GDP
as an econometric variable, 94, 95,
186,215
"Relative growth of GDP" [econometric
variable]
and age composition, 136, 140t, 141,
186
and age/entry class composition,
148t, 150t
and age/gender composition, 143,
144t, 186
and gender composition, 120t
and gender/entry class composition,
121, 122t, 123, 186
and skill/age composition, 159-160,
164t, 165
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 179-180, 186
and skill/gender/age composition,
169, 170t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 183
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
Relative per capita income
as an econometric variable, 94-95,
104t, 184, 215
"Relative per capita income"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 135-136, 139,
140t, 141, 151, 184
and age/entry class composition, 147,
148t, 150t

and age/gender composition, 144t,
184
and gender composition, 120t, 123,
183-184
and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 123, 183
and skill/age composition, 159, 163,
164t
and skill/entry class composition,
176t
and skill/gender/age composition,
170t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 106
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
Relative rate of female education
and age/gender composition of U.S.
immigration, 149, 189
as an econometric variable, 114, 189
Relatives of U.S. citizens
and immigration preferences, 26t, 27,
30t-31t
INS data about, 57
See also Per capita naturalizations
Religion, 94, 96-97
and age composition, 151-152
and age/entry class composition, 146,
149
and gender/entry class composition,
190
and skill/age composition, 166, 180
and skill/entry class composition,
177-178
and skill/gender/age composition,
173,190
See also Catholic religion; Muslim
religion
Replacement hypothesis, 4
Research methods
case-study, 18n8
human capital approach, 16
pioneering researchers, 2
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production-theory approach, 5-6,
11-13
See also Econometric model
Roman Catholicism. See Catholic
religion
Rural to urban migration, 41
Russia, immigration from, 91-92
Second-generation immigrants, 113
Second-generation workers, 7
Second wave of U.S. immigration, 3,
40-41
Segmentation hypothesis, 4, 9
Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, 27
Service sector, U.S. immigration effects
on, 10
"Sex ratio in f s population"
[econometric variable]
and gender composition, 121t, 123t
Sickness-related benefits. See Cash
sickness benefits; Universal
sickness benefits
Silva visa program
as an econometric variable, 98, 217
"Silva visas" [econometric variable]
and age composition, 142, 152
and age/entry class composition, 146,
•148t, 150t, 154nl2
and age/gender composition, 143,
144t, 154nll
and gender composition, 120t, 126
and gender/entry class composition,
121, 122t
and skill/age composition, 164t
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 178
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 108
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 227t
Simpson-Mazzoli Bill of 1984, 27-28
Single-unit independent immigration,
114

Skill composition of U.S. immigration
and exempt category of immigration,
210n3
and family reunification, 31-32
changes in, 3
econometric model for, 156-162
effect of U.S. immigration policy on,
207
empirical findings about, 163-180
historical overview, 48, 50-51
importance of studying, 15-16, 155
recent data about, 81-87, 206t
trends in (1972-1991), 86t
versus Canadian immigration, 200t
Skill transference, ease of, 5, 93,
115-116, 124-125,136-137
and skill composition of U.S.
immigration, 160
Skilled immigrants
definitions of, 50, 5 It, 162
education levels of, 15
historical data about, 84-86
impact on U.S. economy, 15-16
in models of immigration, 6
selective quota preferences for, 24
See also Skill composition of U.S.
immigration
Social programs
and age composition of U.S.
immigration, 100, 137-138, 152,
190, 207
and age/entry class composition of
immigration, 146, 147
and age/gender composition of
immigration, 145
availability in English and nonEnglish speaking countries,
209n2
as an econometric vector, 16-17, 93,
94,98-101, 190-193,217
effect of immigrants' age on U.S.,
132
female use of, 113
and gender composition of
immigration, 117-118, 126-127
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Social programs (cont.)
and gender/entry class composition
of immigration, 126-127,
127-128
importance of studying, 207-209
and overall U.S. immigration, 103,
108-109
and skill/age composition of
immigration, 161, 167-168, 180
and skill/entry class composition of
immigration, 178
and skill/gender/age composition of
immigration, 173-174
Source countries
annual immigration from
(1972-1991), 64t-65t
effect on immigrant skill levels, 84,
87
gender regression coefficients for,
212t-213t
historical overview of, 44—45
importance of studying, 89, 182
median age in, 132, 141t, 145t, 149t,
151t, 219
population, 218, 227t
population sex ratio, 114, 121t, 123t,
219
total U.S. immigration from, 165t,
172t
types of information about, 61
used in this book's study, 62t
See also names of individual
countries or regions of the world
Southeast Asia, immigration from, 42
Southern Europe, immigration from, 39,
40, 46, 50
Soviet Union, immigration from, 40, 41,
44,52n5
Special immigrants, 26t, 27
Steamship voyages by immigrants, 52n
Sweden, immigration from, 39, 91
Taxes
on employers of immigrants, 196
on female immigrants, 13

on immigrants, 196
as impetus for emigration, 95, 100,
106, 159
Technological improvements and
immigration, 37-38, 40
Third wave of U.S. immigration, 41
Tied migrants, 113
Time series data, 91-92, 97, 119, 224
Time-specific effects, 222-225
"Total exempt from i" [econometric
variable]
and age/entry class composition, 149t
"Total migrants from i aged 20 and over"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 14It
"Total numerically restricted (or
exempt)" [econometric variable]
and gender/entry class composition,
123t
"Total numerically restricted from i"
[econometric variable]
and gender/entry class, 149t
"Total sex-specific immigration from i"
[econometric variable]
and age/gender composition, 145t
Total U.S. immigration, HausmanTaylor estimates of, 103,
104t-105t, 219
"Total U.S. immigration from i"
[econometric variable]
and gender composition, 12It
and skill/age composition, 165t
and skill/entry class composition,
177t
and skill/gender composition, 172t
Undesirable immigrants, definition of,
19, 21,33n3
Unemployment, historical rates of, 3, 92
Unemployment benefit programs
as an econometric variable, 16, 17,
99,100,101,190-191,218
prevalence of (1972-1991), 210n5
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"Unemployment insurance"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 14It, 142,
190-191
and age/entry class composition,
149t, 15 It
and age/gender composition, 145t,
191
and gender composition, 117, 12It,
126, 127, 191
and gender/entry class composition,
123t, 127-128
and skill/age composition, 161, 165t
and skill/entry class composition,
177t, 179
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t, 174
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 108
United Kingdom, immigration from, 39,
40,81,821,90-93
United States Immigration Commission,
2
"Universal family allowance"
[econometric variable]
and age composition of immigration,
138, 141t, 143
and age/entry class composition of
immigration, 147, 149t, 15 It
and age/gender composition of
immigration, 145t, 193
and gender composition of
immigration, 117, 12 It, 127-128
and gender/entry class composition
of immigration, 123t, 192-193
and skill/age composition of
immigration, 161, 165t, 168,
192-193
and skill/entry class composition of
immigration, 177t, 178, 193
and skill/gender/age composition of
immigration, 17 It, 174, 193
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 109

Universal family allowance programs
as an econometric variable, 16, 99,
100, 101, 192-193,218
prevalence of (1972-1991), 210n4
"Universal old-age" [econometric
variable]
and age composition, 137-138,140t,
142
and age/entry class composition, 147,
148t, 150t
and age/gender composition, 144t,
192
and gender composition, 117, 120t,
127-128
and gender/entry class composition,
1221, 192
and skill/age composition, 161,164t,
167
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 178, 192
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t, 174, 192
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 108
Universal old-age pension programs
as an econometric variable, 16,
100-101,192,217
prevalence of (1972-1991), 210n4
"Universal sickness" [econometric
variable]
and age composition, 138, 140t, 142
and age/entry class composition, 147,
148t, 150t, 192
and age/gender composition, 144t,
192
and gender/entry class composition,
1221, 126, 192
and on gender composition, 117,
120t, 127-128
and skill/age composition, 161, 164t,
168
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 178, 192
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t, 174, 192
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 109

292
Universal sickness benefits
as an econometric variable, 16,
99-100,101,192,218
prevalence of (1972-1991), 210n4
Unskilled immigrants
Asian, 18n9
definition of, 162-163
Hispanic, 18n9
impact on U.S. labor market, 3, 4-5,
7,9, 10,41
in models of immigration, 6
recent data about, 84-86
See also Skill composition of U.S.
immigration
U.S. college education
as an econometric variable, 96, 216
"U.S. college students from /"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 140t
and age/entry class composition,
148t, 150t
and age/gender composition, 144t
and gender composition, 116, 120t,
124
and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 124-125
and skill/age composition, 164t
and skill/entry class composition,
175, 176t, 177
and skill/gender/age composition,
170t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 107
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
U.S. Department of State form VISA
OF-155 data, 57
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) data. See INS data
U.S. immigration policies
and age composition, 33, 142, 152,
207
and age/entry class composition, 146,
149, 153n5
and age/gender composition, 143

as an econometric vector, 16, 93-94,
97-98, 193-195, 217
historical overview, 19-35, 21-31
and illegal immigration, 196-198
implications of model of immigration
for, 198-209
importance of studying, 182
options for legal immigration,
195-196
and skill/age composition, 167
and skill/entry class composition,
178
and skill/gender/age composition,
173
U.S. military presence
as an econometric variable, 95, 188,
216
U.S. immigration policy and, 33
"U.S. military presence" [econometric
variable]
and age composition, 140t
and age/entry level composition,
147-149, 150t
and age/gender composition, 144t,
188
and gender composition, 116, 120t,
126, 127, 188
and gender/entry level composition,
122t, 124, 188
and skill/age composition, 164t
and skill/entry level composition,
175, 176t, 188
and skill/gender/age composition,
169, 170t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 104t, 107
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 226t
U.S. population,
historical growth rates, 42-44
immigrant contribution to, 43t
effect of immigration on, 3, 12, 16,
42^4, 132
U.S. Social Security Insurance system,
34-35n9, 132
U.S. worker to dependent ratio, 132
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Visa allocation system (1968-1991), 26
Visas
auctioning, 196
for family-based immigration, 28
under Immigration Act of 1990,
201-202
nonpreference, 98
See also Lottery visas; Silva visa
program
Wage differentials
between countries, 90-93, 103, 106,
159, 163, 184, 185
male and female, 128nl, 129n7, 184,
185
between skilled and unskilled
immigrants, 6, 18n9, 195
Wage rates
impact of immigrants on, 2, 3,4,5-6,
7-8, 11,13, 18n9
of recent immigrants, 8
Wars, effects on U.S.A. immigration, 41
Wealthy individuals, and immigration to
the U.S.A., 196
Welfare reform and U.S. immigration,
34-35n9, 197, 209
See also Universal family allowance
programs; Universal sickness
benefits
Western Hemisphere
contemporary immigrants from, 11
as an econometric variable, 97, 217
historical overview, 1, 40, 41, 42
immigration from, 45t
impact on U.S. wages, 18n9
quotas for, 27
study definition of, 62t
"Western Hemisphere 1972-76"
[econometric variable]
and age composition, 140t, 142, 152
and age/entry class composition, 146,
148t, 149, 150t
and age/gender composition, 143,
144t, 154nll
and gender composition, 120t

and gender/entry class composition,
122t, 125
and skill/age composition, 161, 164t,
167
and skill/entry class composition,
176t, 178
and skill/gender/age composition,
171t
and U.S. immigration rate
(1972-1991), 105t, 108
and U.S. immigration rate alternative
estimates (1972-1991), 227t
Workers. See Labor market
displacement; Second-generation
workers; Skilled immigrants;
Unskilled immigrants; Younger
workers
Worldwide ceiling for U.S. immigration,
28, 34n7, 208
Younger immigrants
effect on U.S. economy, 14
propensity to emigrate, 17, 190
See also Age composition of U.S.
immigration
Younger workers, effects of U.S.
immigration on, 9
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